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Introduction

1 Introduction
The modern monetary system is controlled by the state and yet linked to private
deposit banking. Monetary value held in deposits with commercial banks is known
as ‘commercial bank money’ (CoBM). Monetary value held in deposits with the
central bank – as well as banknotes issued by the central bank – is called ‘central
bank money’ (CeBM). Under this scheme, central banks thus issue two forms of
central bank money: cash for the retail sector and balances in traditional reserve
accounts for wholesale purposes (reserves).1 However, for several years now, and
most recently in particular against the background of private actors commencing to
issue private digital currencies, a growing number of central banks have also been
investigating the possibility and implications of issuing a digital form CeBM for the
general public: central bank digital currency (CBDC), also known as retail CBDC
(rCBDC).2
The literature on the subject has grown accordingly. A significant proportion comes
from central banks themselves3 or their staff,4 the Bank for International Settlement

1
2

3

See e.g. BIS CPMI, Central bank digital currencies, March 2018 (link) pp. 3 et seq.
See the most recent overviews at: Auer Raphael/Cornelli Giulio/Frost Jon, Taking Stock:
Ongoing retail CBDC projects, BIS Quarterly Review, March 2020, 97‐98 (link); Barontini
Christian/Holden Henry, Proceeding with caution: a survey on central bank digital currency,
BIS Papers, no 101, January 2019 (link); Boar Codruta/Holden Henry/Wadsworth
Amber, Impeding arrival – A sequel to the survey on central bank digital currency, BIS Paper
No. 107, January 2020 (link); Calle George/Eidan Daniel, Central Bank Digital Currency: an
innovation in payments, r3 White paper April 2020 (link); CEMLA Center for Latin
American Monetary Studies, Key Aspects around Central Bank Digital Currencies, Policy
report, Central Bank Digital Currencies Working Group, May 2019 (link); Duong
Johannes, Overview of Central Bank Digital Currency – State of Play,» SURF Policy Note,
Issue No 158, April 2020 (link).
Banque de France, Central Bank Digital Currency, 8 January 2020 (link); Bank of Canada,
Contingency Planning for a Central Bank Digital Currency, 25 February 25 2020 (link); Bank
of England, Central Bank Digital Currency: Opportunities, challenges and design, Discussion
Paper March 2020 (link); Bank of Israel, Report of the team to examine the issue of Central
Bank Digital Currencies, November 2018 (link); Central Bank of the Bahamas, Project Sand
Dollar: A Bahamas Payments System Modernisation Initiative, 24 December 2019 (link);
Danmarks Nationalbank, Central bank digital currency in Denmark? Analysis, December
2017, No. 28 (link); CEMLA (2019); ECB, Innovation and its impact on the European retail
payment landscape, December 2019 (link); EUROchain, Exploring anonymity in central bank
digital currencies, IN FOCUS no. 4, December 2019 (link); ECB/Bank of Japan: Project Stella
‐ Balancing confidentiality and auditability in a distributed ledger environment, February 2020
(link); Norges Bank, Central bank digital currencies, Norges Bank Papers 1/2018, 18 May
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(BIS) and their respective internal working groups5 as well as their staff6 or that of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 7 Other official bodies have so far made

4

5

6

7

2018 (link); Norges Bank, Central bank digital currencies Second Report of the Working
Group, Norges Bank Papers 2/2019 (link); Sveriges Riksbank, The Riksbankʹs e‐krona
project Report 1, September 2017 (link); Sveriges Riksbank, The Riksbankʹs e‐krona project
Report 2, October 2018 (link).
See also: Helen Partz, Central Bank of Russia Reviews Potential Benefits and Drawbacks of
CBDCs, Cointelegraph, 19 April 2019 (link) and (link).
Bindseil Ulrich (2020), Tiered CBDC and the financial system, ECB Working Paper Series
No 2351, January 2020 (link); Davoodalhosseini S. Mohammad R., Central Bank Digital
Currency and Monetary Policy, Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper 2018‐36 (link);
Duong (2020); Engert Walter/Fung Ben S.C., Central Bank Digital Currency: Motivations
and Implications, Bank of Canada Staff Discussion Paper 2017‐16 (link); Fung Ben
S.C./Halaburda Hanna, Central Bank Digital Currencies: A Framework for Assessing Why
and How, Bank of Canada Stuff Discussion Paper 2016‐22 (link); Garrat Rodney/von
Oordt Maarten R. C., Privacy as a public good – a case for electronic cash, Bank of Canada
Staff Working Paper 24, July 2019 (link); Grym Aleksi/Heikkinen Päivi/Kauko
Karlo/Takala Kari, Central bank digital currency, Bank of Finland BoF Economics Review
5/2017 (link); Pfister Christian, Central Bank Digital Currency: One, Two or None? Banque
de France Working Paper Series no. 732, October 2019 (link); Pfister Christian, Central
Bank Digital Currency, SUERF Policy Note No 143, March 2020 (link); Wierts Peter/Boven
Harro, Central Bank Digital Currency: objectives, preconditions and design choices, De
Nederlandsche Bank Occasional Studied Volume 20‐01 Draft April 2020 (link); Sveriges
Riksbank, Special issue on the e‐krona, Economic Review 2018:3 (link); Sveriges Riksbank,
Second special issue on the e‐krona, Economic Review 2020:2 (link).
BIS Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and Markets Committee:
Central bank digital currencies, Central bank digital currencies, CPMI Papers, no 174,
March 2018 (link).
Auer Raphael/Bohme Rainer, The Technology of retail central bank digital currency, BIS
Quarterly Review, March 2020, 85‐96 (link); Auer Raphael/Cornelli Giulio/Frost Jon,
Covid‐19, cash, and the future of payments , BIS Bulletin No. 3, 3 April 2020 (link); Auer
Raphael/Cornelli Giulio/Frost Jon, The rise of central bank digital currencies: drivers,
approaches and technologies, forthcoming, 2020; Bech Morten Linnemann/Garrat Rodney,
Central Bank Cryptocurrencies, BIS Quarterly Review September 2017 (link).
Agur Itai/Ari Anil/DellʹAriccia Giovanni, Designing Central Bank Digital Currencies, IMF
Working Paper, 8 November 2019, Washington DC (link); Adrian Tobias/Mancini‐
Griffoli Tommaso, The Rise of Digital Money, IMF FinTech notes No. 19/001 July 2019 (link);
Kiff John/Alwazir Jihad/Davidovic Sonja/Farias Aquiles/Khan Ashraf/Khiaonarong
Tanai/Malaika Majid/Monroe Hunter K/Sugimoto Nobu/Tourpe Hervé/Zhou Peter, A
Survey of Research on Retail Central Bank Digital Currency, IMF Working Papers
WP/20/104, 26 June 2020 (link); Mancini‐Griffoli Tommaso/Martinez Peria Maria
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rather sporadic statements. 8 Finally, the scientific community also addressed the
issue from legal, policy, economic and technical perspectives.9

8

9

Soledad/Agur Itai/Ari Anil/Kiff John/Popescu Adina/Rochon Celine, Casting Light on
Central Bank Digital Currency, IMF Staff Discussion Note 18/08, November 2018 (link).
G7 Working Group on Stablecoins, Investigating the impact of global stablecoins, October
2019 (link); Swiss Federal Council, Central bank digital currency report, December 2019 (link).
For media coverage of the recent spate of activity in the USA see e.g.: Nikhilesh De &
Zack Seward, US Senate Floats ʹDigital Dollarʹ Bill After House Scrubs Term From
Coronavirus Relief Plan, 24/26 March 2020 (link); Daniel Kuhn, The Overton Window Opens
for a Digital Dollar, 25/27 March 2020 (link); Paddy Baker, Chris Giancarloʹs Digital Dollar
Project Names Ex‐Treasury, CFTC Officials to New Board, 26 March 2020 (link); Nikhilesh
De, Digital Dollar Project Calls for 2‐Tiered Distribution System in First White Paper for US
CBDC, 29 May 2020 (link); Jason Brett, After Congress Debuts Digital Dollars Amid Covid‐
19, New Think Tank Broadens Vision Of U.S. Money, 30 May 2020 (link); Jason Brett,
Congress To Hold Hearing On ʹDigital Dollarʹ Options For Possible Future Stimulus Payments,
8 Jun 2020 (link) and particularly: The Digital Dollar Project (link).
For legal contributions see: Athanassiou Phoebus L., Digital Innovation in Financial
Services – Legal challenges and Regulatory Policy Issues, Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2018;
Atner Douglas W./Buckley Ross/Zetzsche Dirk A./Didenko Anton N., After Libra, Digital
Yuan, and COVID‐19: Central Bank Digital Currencies and the New World of Money and
Payment Systems, EBI Working Paper Series 2020 ‐ no. 65, 11/06/2020 (link); Dell’Erba
Marco, Stablecoins in Cryptoeconomics – From Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) to Central Bank
Digital Currencies (CBDCs), NYU Journal of Legislation & Public Policy, forthcoming (link);
Geva Benjamin, Cryptocurrencies and the Evolution of Banking, Money and Payments, in: Chris
Brummer (ed.), Cryptoassets Legal, Regulatory and Monetary Perspectives, Oxford
University Press 2019, 11‐38; Goldsmith Jacob, The IMF must develop best practices before
government‐backed cryptocurrencies destabilize the international monetary system, Emory
International Law Review, 2020, Vol. 34, 595‐638 (link); Hofmann Christian, The Changing
Concept of Money: A Threat to the Monetary System or an Opportunity for the Financial Sector?
European Business Organization Law Review (2020) 21:37–68 (link); Huber Joseph,
Dominant Money, January 2020 (link); Nabilou Hossein, Central Bank Digital Currencies:
Preliminary Legal Observations, Working Paper 2019 (link); Nabilou Hossein/Prüm André,
Central Banks and Regulation of Cryptocurrencies, Review of Banking & Financial Law,
forthcoming (link); Ricks Morgan/Crawford John/Menand Lev, FedAccounts: Digital
Dollars, Vanderbilt Law Research Paper 18‐33, UC Hastings Research Paper No. 287,
George Washington Law Review, forthcoming (link); Crawford John, Making Money Safe,
95 Notre Dame L. Rev. Reflection 1, 2019 (link); Zellweger‐Gutknecht Corinne (2016),
Digitale Landeswährung – Ein Überblick, Jusletter 31. Oktober 2016 (link).
Economic contributions include: Andolfatto David, Assessing the Impact of Central Bank
Digital Currency on Private Banks, Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis Working Paper No.
2018‐26D, 2018 (link); Barrdear John/Kumhof Michael, The Macroeconomics of Central
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This research paper examines whether the European Central Bank (ECB) is entitled
de lege lata to issue an electronic equivalent of paper‐based euro banknotes
(hereinafter e‐banknotes) and, if so, under what conditions such e‐banknotes might
have legal tender status. The paper is structured as follows: Part 2 sets the stage by
discussing the reasons that might motivate or even compel the ECB to issue an e‐
banknote (2.1) and by analysing whether an e‐banknote is a banknote by reference to
general principles of law and financial practices (2.2). Part 3 examines which
monetary policy objectives and tasks could be better fulfilled if an e‐euro were
issued or, conversely, whether non‐issuance could in the future impair the fulfilment
of the ECB’s mandate. Subsequently, Part 4 analyses the constitutional framework
that empowers the ECB, within certain clear limits, to pursue the objectives set. This
includes particularly the interpretation of the term ‘banknotes’ in Article 128 TFEU10
as well as the content and scope of selected basic tasks set out in Article 127 TFEU
and mirrored in the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of
the ECB (hereinafter: Statute).11 The results are then weighed against the potential
interests of third parties that could be affected by an e‐euro. Part 5 proceeds by
discussing the design features that a functional equivalent of a paper banknote can
and must exhibit in order to meet the previously defined objectives and
constitutional limits. Part 6 explores the issue of architecture, i.e. the possible models
of issuance. The conclusion in Part 7 includes a summary and policy
recommendations.

10

11

Bank Issued Digital Currencies, Bank of England Staff Working Paper Nr. 605, 18. Juli 2016
(link); Berentsen Aleksander/Schär Fabian, The case for central bank electronic money and
the non‐case for central bank cryptocurrencies, Fed Reserve Bank St. Louis Review 100(2):97‐
106, (link); Bordo Michael D/Levin Andrew, Digital Cash: Principles and Practical Steps,
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 25455, 2019 (link); Bordo
Michael D/Levin Andrew T, Central Bank Digital Currency and the Future of Monetary
Policy, WP 23711 NBER Working Paper Series, August 2017 (link); Brunnermeier
Markus K./James Harold/Landau Jean‐Pierre, The Digitalization of Money, NBER
Working Paper No. 26300, September 2019 (link); Brunnermeier Markus K./Niepelt Dirk,
On the Equivalence of Private and Public Money, Journal of Monetary Economics, 106 (2019)
27–41; Kumhof Michael/Noone Clare, Central Bank Digital Currencies – Design Principles
and Balance Sheet Implications, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 725 (link);
Niepelt Dirk, Reserves For All? Central Bank Digital Currency, Deposits, and their (Non)‐
Equivalence, International Journal of Central Banking, forthcoming 2020 (link).
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ
C326/47.
Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the
European Central Bank.
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2 Setting the stage
2.1 Dwindling use of cash
In our research paper, we assume that central banks will be induced to complement
and ultimately even supplement their cash issuance with digital equivalents in the
near future. The most pressing motive for this is likely to be the accelerating decline
in the demand for cash. 12 The (existing and possible future) reasons for this
development are briefly considered below.
The share of cash in M1 has been declining steadily for years. In the economies
examined, it ranges from 20% down to less than 5%.13 The US, with its 40% ratio, is
only apparently an exception, as most dollar notes are used abroad as a parallel
currency and store of value.14 So far, three factors are mainly responsible for this
development (Subsections 2.1.1‐2.1.3); a fourth factor is likely to be added in the near
future (Subsection 2.1.4).
2.1.1 Public law measures
A growing number of public law measures restrict or even exclude the use of cash
(although being legal tender)15 and facilitate or require payments with CoBM.16 For

12

13

14

15

16

The use of cash and cards differs according to country, place of purchase, transaction
value and consumers’ demographic characteristics; for details see Esselink
Henk/Hernández Lola, The use of cash by households in the euro area, ECB Occasional Paper
Series No 201, November 2017 (link).
See e.g. Wierts/Boven (2020) p. 12: in the Netherlands cash accounted for 80% in 1900
while it stood at 16% in 2019; Huber (2020), p. 3 and 9. In the UK, in March 2020 cash in
M1 was at 3.64% with amounts outstanding of monetary financial institutionsʹ sterling
and all foreign currency (UK estimate of EMU aggregate) liabilities to private and public
sectors not seasonally adjusted were at GBP 1ʹ948.612 billion (link). Sweden 2%, CH 8%,
For absolute amounts per OECD‐countries see link.
Federal Reserve, Money Stock Measures – Billions of dollars, March 2020 (link), tables 1
and 3; Huber, (2020) p. 9 with further reference: The share has risen from 20% (sic) in the
1950/60s in parallel with the USD as the dominant world currency.
See e.g. the pending request for a preliminary ruling in the cases C‐422/19 and C‐423/19;
Herrmann (2020) p. 42 and footnote 20; Sáinz de Vicuña (2010) para 25.15 therefore even
called the concept of legal tender obsolete.
Recital 19 of the Regulation on the introduction of the euro, (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May
1998, states that it should not be incompatible with the status of legal tender of euro
banknotes and coins if Member States introduce limits on payments in banknotes and
coins for reasons of public policy. Siekmann Helmut, Restricting the Use of Cash in the
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instance, taxes and the like are more and more to be paid in cashless form.17 Also,
cash ceilings have been introduced under the heading of combating tax offences,
money laundering and the financing of terrorism (particularly in countries with tight
financial budgets).18 Above certain levels, the acceptance of cash payments requires
due diligence measures – ever more outside the financial sector.19 Cross‐border cash
transfers must be declared above a certain threshold.20
Other measures are rooted in the monetary law environment itself. For instance, if
cash changeovers follow each other too often and with very short exchange periods,
people may prefer converting cash into deposits, thus avoiding further expected

17

18

19

20

European Monetary Union, in: IMFS Working Paper Series No. 108 (2016) p. 15 et seq., has
strongly questioned the authority of this provision. But the ECB acknowledges
commercial bank money as «other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts»,
see e.g. CON/2017/8 (Denmark), CON/2014/37 (Romania), CON/2014/4 (Lithuania),
CON/2013/43 und CON/2013/18 (Belgium), CON/2013/11 (Finland), CON/2013/9
(Denmark), CON/2012/83 (Slovakia), CON/2012/27 (Denmark), CON/2012/36
(Lithuania), CON/2012/33 (Spain), CON/2011/43 (Malta), CON/2010/79 (Bulgaria),
CON/2011/36 (Greece).
See e.g. § 211 Austrian BAO; § 224 Abs. 2 German AO ; Article 1680 French Code
général des impôts; §35a para 2 German Income Tax Act; Article 16 Finnish
Employment Contracts Act 55/2001 as modified by Act 398/2013; § 25 Abs, 1 Ziff. 1 Bst. a
Austrian Income Tax Act.
Article 1(898) Italian Act (28/12/2015), n. 208; Portugese Act 20/2012 (14/05/2012)
modifying Act 64‐B/2011 (30/12/2011); Article 69(2) Greek Act 4446/2016 (12/12/2016);
Articles L112‐6 para I and D112‐3 para I French monetary and financial code as
modified by Article 61 Act 2016‐1691 (09/12/2016) and Article 1 Decree 2016‐1985
(30/12/2016); Article 7 Spanish Act 7/2012 (29/10/2012); Slovenian Act on Changes and
Amendments to the Act on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing (17/03/2014); Slovak Act No. 394/2012 on Restriction of Cash Payments
(29/11/2012); Latvian Act on Taxes and Duties that the government (20/09/2016)
modified in 2019; Articles 20‐21 Belgian Act (11/01/1993) as modified by Article 170 Act
(29/03/2012); Danish Money Laundering Act consolidated by Act no. 1022 (13/08/2013);
Articles 129(2) and 136(2) Swiss Act on debt settlement and insolvency.
See e.g. Article 1 of Directive (EU) 2018/843 of 30 May 2018 (so called 5th anti‐money
laundering Directive) and Articles 2 and 11 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of 20 May 2015
(so called 4th anti‐money laundering Directive).
See e.g. Articles 3 and 14 Regulation (EU) 2018/1672 of 23 October 2018.
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changes.21 The fade out of high value banknotes (for reasons of «concerns that this
denomination could facilitate illegal activities»)22 does maybe not dampen demand
for cash in the short‐run. 23 Nevertheless, such actions increasingly place its use
under a sense of general suspicion. It also seems to weaken the use of cash if the
state downgrades the cash supply from a legal guarantee to a political objective24
and largely delegates cash supply to the banking sector, whose business model does
not rely on promoting the cash turnover.25
2.1.2 The rise of commercial bank money
For over a century, the decline in the demand for cash has gone hand in hand with a
corresponding rise of private money in the form of sight deposits at commercial
banks26.27 Apart from the public law ‘sponsorship’ just mentioned, the reasons for
this are multi‐layered, but some advantages over cash stand out. First of all, book
money is convenient; it eliminates physical transport and storage, including the
associated costs and risks, and payees do not have to fear counterfeiting. Thanks to

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

Koning John Paul, Swedish betrayal, Blog Moneyness, 27 December 2018; see e.g. the tight
schedule of the Swedish changeovers from 2009 to 2017: Sveriges Riksbank, Banknote and
coin changeover in Sweden – Summary and evaluation, March 2018, p. 20 (table 5).
ECB, Press release, 4 May 2016; see also Weidmann Jens, Eröffnungsrede, in: Deutsche
Bundesbank Eurosystem (ed.), 3. Bargeldsymposium der Deutschen Bundesbank 2016,
Frankfurt Juli 2016, 9, 13; Scholten (2017) passim.
See ECB, Banknotes statistics (link): Since the EUR 500 was discontinued in 2019 their
decline was at least compensated by the increased demand for EUR 200 notes.
In Sweden, the former legal guarantee of access to cash services, which was enshrined in
SFS 2001:1276, was abandoned in favour of a purely political objective (prop. 2006/07:55):
Länsstyrelserna, Bevakning av grundläggande betaltjänster, 2015, p. 22.
Boel Paola, Thinking about the future of money and potential implications for central banks, in:
Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2016:1, 147, p. 149; Segendorf Björn/Wretman
Anna‐Lena, The Swedish payment market in transformation, in: Sveriges Riksbank
Economic Review 2015:3, 48, pp. 56 and 61; Sveriges Riksbank, Report on Cash Handling
2011, December 2011, p. 7; Sveriges Riksbank, Review of the Retail Payment Market in
Sweden, Riksbank Studies, Juni 2013, 104, p. 104. Between 2011 and 2015, banks reduced
the number of bank counters from 1415 to 328 and lowered the number of ATMs, so that
by 2015 the average distance to the nearest ATM grew to 12 km. In addition, in 2008, the
Riksbank closed its branches and the Post Officeʹs subsidiary, Svensk Kassaservice,
discontinued its counter services.
Regarding the evolution of banking and the present monetary system – with the
distinctions between commercial and central bank money, as well as between physical
cash and scriptural money – see Geva (2019) p. 11‐37 and 341‐366.
See supra Section 2.1.
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innovations in telecommunications and data processing, deposits are now booked
entirely electronically, enabling ever faster processing also over long distances.
Today, a wide range of infrastructures, interfaces and end devices as well as a
variety of complementary services have been added. 28 Most recently, fears of a
transmission of Covid‐19 through the handling of cash have intensified tendencies to
switch to non‐cash payment in some countries.29 There is an expectation «that the
trends observed will result in a structural rather than temporary increase in cashless
payments».30
Most importantly, however, commercial banks traditionally enjoy great freedom to
create new deposits by granting loans; 31 accordingly, the amount of deposits is
extremely elastic. While central banks traditionally were quite limited in their money
creation,32 commercial banks could react more flexibly to changing circumstances
such as population growth, innovation, etc. Restrictions in the form of deposit
insurance, regulation and prudential supervision (including the corresponding costs)
were only imposed on them with the rampant bank failures in the 1930s and, since
then, increasingly in every new crisis of the financial sector.

28

29

30

31

32

For example, near field communication (NFC) and instant settlement systems such as
TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS; see footnote 256) now allow practically
unrestricted and immediate payments with CoBM. In Sweden, Swish payments now are
settled instantly 24/7 and with central bank reserves. BIS Committee on Payments and
Market Infrastructures CPMI, Fast payments – Enhancing the speed and availability of retail
payments, November 2016, Annex 2 (link) p. 74.
Although demand for cash has risen due to the uncertainty related to Covid‐19; it was
hardly ever used for payment afterwards for reasons of hygiene and thus has been
mostly hoarded up to now. Auer Raphael/Cornelli Giulio/Frost Jon, Covid‐19, cash, and
the future of payments, BIS Bulletin No. 3, 3 April 2020 (link).
ECB Euro Retail Payments Board (ERPB) Secretariat and ECB Directorate Banknotes,
ERPB_response_to_the_current_Covid19_pandemic, ERPB/2020/009, June 2020 (link).
On the money creation by commercial banks see: McLeay Michael/Radia Amar/Thomas
Ryland, Money creation in the modern economy, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 1/2014,
pp. 1–14; Jakab Zoltan/Kumhof Michael, Banks are not intermediaries of loanable funds – and
why this matters, Bank of England Working Paper No. 529, 2015; German Bundesbank,
Die Rolle von Banken, Nichtbanken und Zentralbank im Geldschöpfungsprozess,
Monatsbericht April 2017, 15, 20.
The limitation was due to the gold and gold‐foreign exchange standard, respectively;
see Huber (2020) p. 13 with further reference. It has even remained in emerging market
economies due to the US Treasury bill standard: Tokunaga Junji, The Revised U.S.
Treasury Securities Standard System, University of Massachusetts Amherst Political
Economy Research Institute Working Paper Series No 494, 3 September 2019 (link).
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Growth of deposits is further driven by the cost calculation of banks: while they can
hardly charge fees for cash transactions that would cover the comparatively high
costs involved,33 they benefit from economies of scale in the giro services – related
costs incur anyway but are likely to fall further in relation to the book money units
created. Besides, assets obtained in the process of deposit creation ideally generate
additional net profit and payment transactions provide essential information about
existing and potential clients, which (ideally) helps to optimise further lending.
2.1.3 Saving and hoarding (cash kept out of circulation)
Especially in situations of uncertainty, the public may even increase its demand for
cash. However, the latter does not (at least in the short to medium term) come into
circulation, but is rather used as a store of value, i.e. is saved or hoarded.34 Although
from the individualʹs perspective, both saving and hoarding may mean not spending
the money immediately, the two cases must be distinguished.
In macroeconomic terms, hoarding prevents an optimal supply of liquidity to the
economy, so that production lags behind its potential. In such circumstances, it may
be appropriate for a monetary authority, based on its mandate and using its policy
instruments, to reduce the savings ratio, notably by lowering interest rates.
Saving also keeps money out of the economic cycle in the short to medium term.
However, this happens under circumstances in which additional liquidity would not
promote value creation because the actual liquidity is allocated sub‐optimally due to
structural inefficiencies. This is the case, for example, when a government tries to
keep alive over‐indebted companies with unprofitable business models, thus
preventing the emergence of innovative companies. In such a case, it would not be
appropriate for a monetary authority to fight hoarding by means of financial
repression (such as negative interest rates intended to «encourage» spending).

33
34

Segendorf/Wretman (2015) p. 61.
For instance, since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, there has been a
substantial increase in the ratio of cash to nominal GDP; Berentsen/Schär (2018) p. 101.
The most recent example being the first phase of the SARS‐Cov‐2 pandemic: The euro
zone recorded a seasonally exceptional increase in currency in circulation of EUR 36
billion from February to March 2020 compared to the EUR 27 billion increase before
Christmas 2019 (link).
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2.1.4 Future displacement of cash
Similar to the phenomenon of unofficial dollarization, the public of the euro area
could start using extensively digital money denominated in a non‐domestic currency
unit as a complement to or instead of domestic cash and deposits.35 Besides, the
public could switch to euro‐denominated private money without hardly ever
making use of the redemption option again.36
The competing monies could for instance be state issued. 37 Alternatively, private
digital money could be backed by cash38 or, in the future, by reserves39 – provided that
central banks will grant direct access to their balance sheet for such purposes.40
China has opted for the latter in 2018 already with regard to non‐crypto (mobile) e‐
money: It obliged all non‐bank payment groups such as AliPay (Alibaba) and
WeChat Pay (Tencent) to remove their customersʹ funds from their own balance
sheets (thereby denying fiduciary ownership of customer funds) and had them
transfer the funds until then held with commercial banks to NetsUnion and China
UnionPay. Both represent the reserve‐based state clearing network and have since

35

36

37

38

39

40

Brunnermeier Markus K./James Harold/Landau Jean‐Pierre, The Digitalization of
Money, NBER Working Paper No. 26300, September 2019 (link), p. 32.
See e.g. Hofmann (2019) p. 55 referring to the « potential eternal life of Libra coins» and
p. 56: «The Libra scheme (…) can directly address millions of users (…) [if it] grows into
a (…) system (…) of wide global acceptance, Libra coins may be passed on unlimitedy,
and the system’s redemption feature might ultimately become meaningless».
See e.g. Norges Bank (2018) p. 7; Huber (2020) p. 21. In December 2018, Member of the
Dutch Parliament Mahir Alkaya submitted an initiative note proposing a public deposit
bank (depositobank) to this end. The House of Representatives rejected the proposal on
24 June 2020 (link).
One example (albeit far from any market relevance) is the «Swiss Crypto Token» (XCHF)
is structured as a bond backed with 100% cash (or exceptionally with CHF denominated
high quality liquid assets); see https://www.swisscryptotokens.ch/how‐it‐works.
Sveriges Riksbank, Payments in Sweden 2019, 7 November 2019, 18 et seq. (link); see also
the hypothetical example of an e‐Ruble at Goldsmith (2020), p. 595.
In the Netherlands, the Foundation of (stichting) Ons Geld so far was denied access with
the Nederlandsche Bank, among others with the somewhat counterintuitive explanation
that it did not qualify as a bank and therefore did not participate in the deposit
guarantee scheme. One could wonder if such participation would be necessary under a
100% reserve scheme at all (dissenting already Tobin James, The Case for Preserving
Regulatory Distinctions, in : Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (ed.), Restructuring the
Financial System, Kansas 1987, pp. 167, 172). See Wortmann Edgar, A proposal for radical
monetary reform, 18 September 2016 (link); Wortmann Edgar, A safe‐haven for book‐entry
money, 22 June 2019 (link).
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acted as custodians for customer funds which are now covered by central bank
reserves accordingly.41
Either way, however, a significant outflow from euro denominated money to foreign
state (backed) digital money requires the latter to provide significant additional
benefits to users. This would be the case, for example, for a currency used as a safe
haven, but likewise for globally accepted currencies such as the US Dollar that could
be used in cross‐border transactions. Finally, the prospect of easier market access
might also encourage exporters to accept such money, e.g. the Chinese Digital
Currency/Electronic Payment (DC/EP),42 for their goods and services.
A second option would be privately issued digital money of an own denomination and
backed with assets of high quality (while Bitcoin and the like are unlikely to spur
widespread demand for lack of redeemability, cover and supply management43). The
appeal of this option could particularly lie in its usability for cross‐border transfers44
as well as value preservation in emerging market and developing economies.45 To
the extent that such privately issued and backed digital money of an own
denomination offers users a comprehensive ecosystem, it is likely to end up in a
third category sooner or later.
This third category includes private money denominated and redeemable in
domestic or foreign currency (or other assets of high quality),46 which succeed in
establishing a widespread own ecosystem. Thanks to a wide range of opportunities
to spend and receive such money, it circulates virtually endlessly within this
ecosystem, thus eliminating the need for users to ever cash out again.

41

42
43

44

45
46

See Huber (2020) p. 24; Financial Times, Tencent and Alipay set to lose $1bn in revenue from
payment rules, 18 July 2018 (link).
One of the so far most comprehensive overviews gives: https://boxmining.com/dcep/.
Accordingly, they serve primarily speculative purposes, capital flight and other illegal
activities or are acquired for rather ideological reasons: Sveriges Riksbank, Payments in
Sweden 2019, 7 November 2019, pp. 18 et seq. (link).
Hermann (2020) p. 62 on the fact, that whoever offers a convincing solution for the
issues stemming from cross‐border payments might attract demand that cannot be
countered by domestic (non global) central bank money – be it digital or not.
Kiff et al (2020) p. 14 with further references.
This third scenario described here applies equally to monies irrespective of their unit of
account and potential redeemability, if they only benefit from a widespread
autonomous ecosystem. For the example of Libra see Hofmann (2019) pp. 54‐55.
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An example for such a closed loop use is the Swiss Economic Circle (Wirtschaftsring‐
Genossenschaft; WIR), which established an independent complementary currency
system in Switzerland in the 1930s. While WIR received banking status, with a share
of M1 of around 1%, it never seriously threatened the Swiss franc (CHF). However,
WIR Bank granted loans, mainly for private construction projects and to SMEs of the
construction industry in its own currency, the WIR franc (CHW). 47 Users were
contractually prohibited from exchanging CHW for CHF and CHW were only – but
still – redeemable in CHF if a user terminated the business relationship with WIR
Bank. Meanwhile, the redeemability at the end of the relationship has been
abandoned. 48 As a result, CHW circulated mostly among debtors who accepted
CHW payments to service their loans. Little CHW went to other banks, which would
have required exchange and settlement in CHF reserves, and therefore, WIR Bank
could largely avoid refinancing itself in CHF at the high interest rates of the 1980s.
Thus, WIR loans were significantly cheaper and enjoyed annual two‐digit growth
rates. After the bursting of the real estate bubble (inflated by WIR and the other
banks) in the early 1990s, the business model could not be resumed or extended to
other sectors and WIR never regained its old appeal.49
It could have a technically comparable, but economically far greater impact if digital
coins (on DLT or others) would be issued by private entities such as Big Techs and
Fin Techs.50 In the example of Libra,51 only those who are among the industry leaders
in their sector could become funding members of the responsible association.52 The
authorisation required for such networks will presumably impose the highest
demands on the coverage of the reserves53 and thus bring the coins close to credit‐

47
48
49

50
51
52

53

See ISO 4217.
See the General Terms and Conditions (link) Articles C.2(3) and C.11.
Schneider Christian, Barter‐Clubs – Chancen und Probleme: eine theoretische und
empirische Analyse, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1995 (link) pp. 77 et seq. and 235
(growth rates) and pp. 83‐84 (refinancing). For turnover rates between 1935 and 2018 see
link. It grew from 500 million in 1984 to 2.5 billion in 1993.
See on corresponding scenarios already Adrian/Mancini‐Griffoli (2019) pp. 9 et seq.
See G7 (2019) passim.
See the business evaluation criteria (of which at least two were to be met): «Market
value/customer balances: (…) More than $1 billion USD in market value or greater than
$500 million USD customer balances. Scale: (…) Reach greater than 20 million people a
year, multinationally. Brand sustainability: (…) Recognised as a top‐100 industry leader
by a third‐party sector‐specific association or media company.» Cit. Libra, How to
become a funding member, 2019 (link), p. 3 (or via http://web.archive.org).
Libra, White paper 2.0, April 2020 (link), p. 13 regarding custody (or via
http://web.archive.org).
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risk free cash, which at the same time will probably at least reach the convenience of
deposits. Libra coins are not designed for end‐users to be redeemable. But also
designated dealers who exceptionally can convert the coins54 will not have to make
use of this option as long as «the more coin holders rely on the usage of digital coins
for payment purposes … the more these coins lead a life of their own and
independent of currency, and the more disruptive for the established payment and
monetary systems they become».55
2.2 The e‐Banknote: can a ‘digital coin’ be a ‘banknote’?
2.2.1 What is a banknote?
There is no statutory definition for ‘banknote’. Historically, it emerged as an
unconditional promise in writing signed by a banker, engaging to pay on demand a
sum certain in money to the bearer. It is transferrable from one person to another by
delivery, free of claims and defences. As such it is a negotiable instrument.56 The
promise to pay may, however, be implicit by the mere specification of the sum
‘payable’ on the banknote.57 At present, banknotes are typically issued by central
banks on either paper or plastic and are legal tender. Each is counterfeit‐resistant
and bears a serial number that distinguishes it from any other even of the same
value. The promise to pay is a mere formality58 as convertibility is banned so that the
instrument is «perpetually renewable».59 Historically, as it evolved from a genuine
promise of a commercial banker to pay money, to a legal tender inconvertible and

54

55

56

57

58

59

See Libra, White paper 2.0, April 2020 (link), p. 13 (or via http://web.archive.org)
describing this sterilisation process as «burning Libra Coins for end users and
liquidating assets comprising the Reserve to make payment as appropriate».
Cit. Hofmann (2020) p. 47 describing the phenomenon from a generic point of view and
p. 54 specifically regarding Libra.
See e.g. DAL Smout, Chalmers on Bills of Exchange 13th ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1964)
at 274; AW Rogers, Falconbridge on Banking and Bills of Exchange 7th ed. (Toronto: Canada
Law Book, 1969) at 127; Charles Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money, 6th ed.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 25. A leading case is Banco de Portugal v.
Waterlow and Sons, Ltd. [1932] A.C. 452 (H.L.) at 483, 487 (and as to the promise see also
at 478 and 480). Whether negotiable instruments legislation applies to the banknote is
outside the scope of the present discussion.
Banco de Portugal ibid. at 487. For the form of the notes involved in that case see e.g. at
460, 480.
For viewing the promissory language as «merely ornamental» see RG Hawtrey «The
Portuguese Banknote Case» (1932), 42 Economic Journal 392, 395.
Banco de Portugal (n ???) at 508.
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hence a ‘sterile’ obligation of a central bank,60 the banknote continuously adapted to
changing economic, technological and institutional conditions.
In continental Europe, as of the end of the 16th century, moneychangers in
Amsterdam ‘transformed’ to ‘cashiers’ (or kassiers in Dutch). Receipts they issued to
their depositors, «could take the form of promises to (re)pay the sum deposited».
These instruments «became negotiable by endorsement.» Gradually they became
payable to bearer, and “effectively raised the money supply.»61 Having heralded the
appearance of the banknote, this development was arrested with the establishment
of the Bank of Amsterdam (the Wisselbank) in 1609, whose operations superseded to
a large extent those of the moneychangers.62
Europeʹs first freely circulating banknotes are said63 to be issued by the Bank of
Sweden, founded in the middle of the 17th century.64 Its «notes were partly certified
cheques» drawn on it, «partly a sort of certificates of deposits.» However, the note‐
issue was «against the wishes of [its] leaders (…), and had never acquired any
importance.»65

60

61

62

63

64

65

The historical discussion draws on Benjamin Geva, The Payment Order of Antiquity and
the Middle Ages: A Legal History (Hart: Oxford and Portland Oregon, 2011) Chapters 8, 10
and 11. See also Helmut Siekmann, Deposit Banking and the Use of Monetary
Instruments» in David Fox and Wolfgang Ernst (eds), Money in the Western Legal
Tradition (Oxford: OUP 2016) at 489.
All quotes in this paragraph are from P. Dehing & M. ’T Hart, “Linking the Fortunes:
Currency and Banking, 1550‐1800” in M. ’T Hart, J. Jonker & JL Van Zanden, eds., A
Financial History of the Netherlands (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at
37, 43. See also P. Spufford, “Access to Credit and Capital in the Commercial Centres of
Europe”, in K. Davids & J. Lucassen, eds., A Miracle Mirrored: The Dutch Republic in
European Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) at 303, 306.
P. Dehing & M. ’T Hart, ibid. at 43‐44, note that with the establishment of the Bank of
Amsterdam in 1609 «the municipal authorities of Amsterdam temporarily prohibited all
money changers and cashiers and their paper money (…)». The ban was lifted in 1621
«and the remaining money changers and cashiers became licensed officials.» However,
in this new capacity, cashiers were required to hold accounts with the Bank of
Amsterdam and were prohibited from keeping money in specie for longer than 24 hours.
See C. Eagleton & J. Williams, Money: A History 2nd ed. (London: British Museum Press,
2007) at 179.
See EF Heckscher, “The Bank of Sweden”, in JG Van Dillen, ed., History of the Principal
Public Banks (London: Frank Cass, 1964, being 2nd impression of the 1934 1st edition,
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1934) at 161, particularly at 171‐77.
Ibid. at 178.
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Having evolved against this background, paper money in the form of banknotes is
rooted in post‐medieval England. In the course of the 17th century, goldsmiths issued
receipts with respect to moneys deposited with them.66 Some receipts were payable
to the order of a payee and others to the bearer. They contained the goldsmiths’
undertaking to pay on demand when presented with the receipt. Each came to be
known as a goldsmiths’ or bankers’ note and evolved into an early form of the
promissory note. 67 Originally the instrument was a certificate of deposit or a
‘warehouse receipt’ for deposited coins; gradually it evolved to become a mere
obligation issued against a fractional reserve.68 Already towards the end of the 17th
century, it was judicially acknowledged that «[t]he notes of goldsmiths (whether
they be payable to order or to bearer) are always accounted among merchants as
ready cash.»69
Even in the absence of an explicit note issuing power, 70 the Bank of England
modelled its banking operations on those of the goldsmiths. 71 Shortly after its

66

67

68

69
70

71

RD Richards, The Early History of Banking in England (New York: A.M. Kelley, 1965,
reprint of 1929 edition) at 40‐43.
JM Holden, The History of Negotiable Instruments in English Law (London: University
of London: The Athlone Press, 1955, rep. 1993, WM. W. Gaunt & Sons) at 70‐73. For the
evolution of the form of the goldsmiths’ note, see also A. Feavearyear, The Pound
Sterling – A History of English Money, 2nd ed. by EV Morgan (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1963) at 107‐08.
Notes were issued by banks either against deposit of specie, that is, precious metal or
coins, or against the negotiation, and hence in discount, of bills of exchange, as well as of
promissory notes; Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1976; being the 1776 original text, edited by E. Cannan and prefaced by GJ Stigler,
‘Two Volumes in One’) vol 1 at 504; George Tucker, The Theory of Money & Banks
Investigated (New York: AM Kelly, 1964, reprint of 1839 original) at 161, 164.
Tassell and Lee v. Lewis (1695), 1 Ld. Raym. 743 at 744, 91 E.R. 1397 at 1398 (K.B.).
The Ways and Means Act, 1694 (U.K.), 5 & 6 Will. & Mar., c. 20, s. XIX provided in s. XXIX
for the Bankʹs power to issue formal notes under seal. «These notes were used for
making payments to the Exchequer from the Bank. The Exchequer then paid them out to
the governmentʹs creditors, but they never seem to have become a popular form of
currency.» Holden, ibid. at 89. See also Christine Desan, Making Money: Coin, Money and
the Coming of Capitalism (Oxford: OUP, 2014) at 308‐11. The silence of the statute as to the
bankʹs power to issue circulating notes is explained by Feavearyear by the strong
opposition to that power, and the promotersʹ scheme to defuse this opposition by
avoiding attention to their intention as to make the Bank ag bank of circulation and
issue, and not merely a bank of deposit. Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling (n. ???) at 126.
W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law vol. VIII, 2nd ed. (London: Methuen, Sweet &
Maxwell, 1937, rep. 1966) at 188.
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establishment, it began to issue to depositors, «probably to a very considerable
extent»,72 notes payable to the bearer, similar to those of the goldsmith.73
The transferability by delivery of an instrument payable to the bearer was confirmed
in 1764.74 The property right of a bona fide taker for value from a finder of a ‘bank
bill’75 payable to a payee or bearer goes back to Anon. (1699).76 In Miller v. Race (1758),
in effectively applying the same rule to a bona fide taker for value of a stolen
banknote payable to bearer issued by the Bank of England, Lord Mansfield
characterised such instruments «as much money, as guineas themselves are; or any
other current coin, that is used in common payments, as money or cash».77
Bank of England notes competed successfully with goldsmith notes and finally
superseded them as paper money. 78 After some judicial hesitation, 79 notes of the
Bank of England were made legal tender by statute, the relevant provision being s. 6

72

73

74
75

76
77
78
79

Bank of England v. Anderson (1837), 3 Bing. (N.C.) 589 at 654, 132 E.R. 538 at 562, per
Tindal C.J. (C.P.).
Holden, History (n. ???) at 89‐90. Originally, such notes were of two types. Notes of the
first type contained a promise to pay the whole of a deposit, or some irregular sum.
Notes of the second type contained a promise to pay a round sum. «The note for a
round sum soon became popular and gradually ousted that for an irregular amount.»
Ibid. at 89. See in general RD Richards, The Early History of Banking in England (New York:
A.M. Kelley, 1965, reprint of 1929 edition) at 153.
Grant v Vaughan (1764), 3 Burr. 1516, 97 E.R. 957
According to David Fox, «Bona Fide Purchase and the Currency of Money» (1996), 55
Cambridge L.J. 547 at 560, this was a «sealed Bank of England bill». However, Holden,
History (n. ???) at 91 describes the instrument as «a Bank of England note»
3 Salk. 71, 91 E.R. 698.
(1758), 1 Burr. 452 at 457, 97 E.R. 398 at 401 (K.B.).
Holden, History (n. ???) at 92.
In Wright v. Reed (1790), 3 T.R. 554, 100 E.R. 729 (K.B.), Ashurt J. thought that notes
issued by the Bank of England «are money to all intents» [emphasis added]. But Lord
Kenyon Ch.J. understood Miller v. Race, above note 128 (and see quote which follows) to
hold that these notes «are considered as money to many purposes.» Buller J. inclined to
support Ashurt J., but ultimately sided with the Chief Justice. Acknowledging that
«banknotes pass in the world as cash», he nonetheless stressed that «[t]his Court has
never yet determined that a tender of banknotes is at all events a good tender.» In Ex
parte Imeson (1815), 2 Roseʹs Bkcy Cas. 225, instruments payable in «Bank of England
Notes» were held not to be payable in «money» within the meaning of a statute
governing promissory notes.
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of the Bank of England Act, 1833. 80 Their convertibility ultimately ceased to exist
altogether in the course of the 20th century.81 Similarly, banknotes presently issued by
the Federal Reserve in the USA are in effect non‐redeemable,82 as they are stated to
be redeemable in a mysterious, and thus in fact non‐existing, ‘lawful money’.83 For
the euro, which was conceived from the outset as a pure fiat currency, the question
of redeemability never arose anyway.84
2.2.2 What is a ‘digital coin’?
In his seminal paper on Bitcoin, its mythological founder Satoshi Nakamoto defined
an electronic coin to be «a chain of digital signatures» in a setting in which «[e]ach
owner transfers the coin to the next by digitally signing a hash of the previous
transaction and the public key of the next owner by adding these to the end of the
coin.»85 This explains the mechanism under which control of the coin is transferred
from one person to another. The procedure described is, however, not universal, and
moreover, it does not define what is transferred, namely what the coin is. This is not
to say that Satoshi Nakamoto’s definition is useless; at least it points to the coin as
being a distinct item or entity, rather than a generic value, or a sum of monetary
value.
Other definitions focus on «digital representations of value» 86 and are thus
unsatisfactory. They include account‐based products in which the balance is

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

(U.K.), 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 98. More accurately, the statute made the Bankʹs notes legal
tender in England and Wales for all payments (except for by the Bank itself) over five
pounds. See Holden, History (n. ???) at 196.
Convertibility was abolished for good in the UK under the Gold Standard (Amendment)
Act, 1931, 21 & 22 Geo. V, c. 46.
For a thorough analysis see e.g. Ali Khan, «The Evolution of Money: A Story of
Constitutional Nullification» (1998‐99), 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 393, particularly at 439‐443.
Federal Reserve Act Section 16, 12 USC 411. As amended by act of Jan. 30, 1934 (48 Stat.
337).
See also Scheller Hanspeter K., The Euroean Central Bank: History, Role and Functions,
Frankfurt, ECB, 2004, para 3.4, pp. 103‐108.
Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer‐to‐Peer Electronic Cash System, 1. November 2008
(link) p. 2.
Dong He, Karl Habermeier, Ross Leckow, et al, Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial
Considerations (IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/16/03, January 2016) at 8 (link); Kiff et al
(2020) p. 5. See also ECB/Eurosystem, Virtual currency schemes – a further analysis
(February 2015) p. 25 (link). These are definitions for ‘virtual currencies’ – a term used
(in a sense other than game‐currency) to denote what we consider ‘digital currencies’.
See also in the United States: Uniform Regulation of Virtual‐Currency Business Act,
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expressed digitally87 and are thus too broad. Such definitions cover monetary value
credited to an account; in the digital age, unless qualified,88 they encompass credit
posted to commercial bank accounts accessible from a digital device. Rather, as a
token representing an asset, 89 an electronic or digital 90 coin is a distinct entity
consisting of data in the form of a unique string of bits expressing a specified
number of units of value.91 Like physical coins and banknotes, digital coins are not
paid out of bank accounts 92 so that their payment does not appear to require
intermediation by banks. And yet, exactly as electronic funds transfers, they are paid
over the cyber space. Digital currency is an assortment of digital coins or, more
specifically, a system under which digital coins are issued, transferred and
redeemed. A privately issued digital currency may have its own unit of account,
fluctuating by reference to the value of an official unit of account, in which case it is
self‐anchored. Alternatively, it may be a ‘claim check’ or stablecoin, either in a unit
of account of an official currency or in the value of a specific commodity, whether or
not it is fully (or even partially) backed by a reserve of such currency or
commodity.93 Each digital coin may be in the form of a total unspent amount in a

87

88

89

90

91

92
93

drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
approved and recommended for enactment in all the States at its Annual Conference
Meeting in its One‐Hundred‐And‐Twenty‐Sixth Year, San Diego, California July 14 ‐
July 20, 2017, section 102(23).
Indeed, the IMF Taxonomy Figure, ibid. specifically cover Pay‐pal and e‐money
balances.
In fact, among the three sources cited in n. ???, at least the first two, qualify it in a way
that specifically excludes CoBM but not other account‐based systems.
Practically «with properties that suffice to attest to and transfer ownership» Digital
Dollar Foundation & Accenture, The Digital Dollar Project: Exploring a US CBDC, May
2020 (link) at 10 (where the quoted language is part of the definition itself).
We do not argue that ‘electronic’ and ‘digital’ are identical terms and yet in the present
context they are used interchangeably with the use of ‘digital’ being substantially more
prominent.
According to Gideon Samid, Tethered Money: Managing Digital Currency Transactions
(Elsevier Academic Press, 2015) at 105‐106, the unique string of bits should better
express both identity and value.
Certainly, they may be withdrawn from an account like cash.
Samid (n. ???) at 108. See also Anastasia Melachrinos & Christian Pfister, Stablecoins: A
Brave New World? Banque de France Working Paper Series no. 757, 3 June 2020 (link),
particularly addressing risks created by global privately issued stablecoins.
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wallet94 or, as will be seen below, to one degree or another, a digital representation of
what otherwise would be a distinct physical banknote.
Unlike payment in account balance, payment in digital currency need not be
recorded on a centralised ledger. However, in a given scheme, coins may be issued,
transferred and redeemed under centralised protocol in which case the scheme is
said to be centralised. Conversely, a scheme under which a digital currency is
issued, transferred and redeemed over a distributed ledger is decentralised. Finally,
a digital currency transferable under a decentralised protocol – such as over a
distributed ledger and yet issued by a centralised operator – is hybrid.95
Centralised protocol does not require the intermediation of bank accounts and is
thus entirely different from a centralised architecture in account‐balance payment
systems. Furthermore, payment in digital currency, made from one digital device to
another, does not necessarily require the intermediation of a dedicated electronic
network. Depending on its design, connectivity may be over the Internet or a
telecommunication carrier. A centralised protocol may further require the
intermediation of either an operator of a central switch or a custodian acting as a
virtual store or warehouse person for the coins.
The distributed ledger underlying decentralisation is an asset database that can be
shared across a network of multiple sites, geographies or institutions. Blockchain is
an underlying technology, requiring the Internet to support and maintain its peer‐to‐
peer network that enables digital implementation of a distributed ledger. Being a
computerised ledger on a distributed network, it generates a single version of the
record on each computer. In essence it is:96
«a type of a database that takes a number of records and puts them in a block
… Each block is then ʹchainedʹ to the next block, using a cryptographic
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96

Such a coin exists only as «an identifiable address with a balance.» See Zellweger‐
Gutknecht Corinne, Developing the Right Regulatory Regime for Cryptocurrencies and other
Value Data, in Fox David/Green Sarah (eds.), Cryptocurrencies in Public and Private Law
(Oxford: OUP 2019) 57 at 86 n 160.
For this tripartite classification, see IMF Staff Discussion, Virtual Currencies and Beyond:
Initial Considerations, January 2016 (link); where a third criterion – on the top of issuance
and transfer – is added viz., «mechanisms to implement and enforce internal rules on the
use and circulation of the currency».
UK Government Office for Science, Distributed Ledger Technology: beyond block chain,
2016 (link) at 17.
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signature. This allows block chains to be used like a ledger, which can be
shared and corroborated by anyone with the appropriate permissions.»
Accuracy of the ledger is corroborated under a method determined under rules
adhered to by participants. Record security and visibility to authorised users is
ensured by cryptography.
A ‘cryptocurrency’ denotes a digital currency in which encryption techniques are
used to regulate the generation of units of currency97 and verify the execution of
payment transactions on a decentralised network.98 Cryptography is thus used in
cryptocurrencies to express and protect the value of the coins (the sequence of the
bits), to prevent counterfeiting and fraudulent transactions as well as to perform
validation, execution and recording. These functions are carried out on a distributed
ledger, such as a blockchain. Thereon, each block contains a cryptographic hash or
algorithm that links it to the previous block along with a timestamp for the
transactions from that block. The network allows online payments to be sent directly
from one party to another without going through a bank or any other account‐
holding centralised counterparty.99
It is argued that developers of cryptocurrencies «simply migrated the cryptographic
tools used to safeguard communication and applied them to safeguard digital
currency» and thus subjected them to vulnerability to erosive cryptographic
intractability.100 In the ongoing fight against counterfeiters and fraudulent copiers,
centralised schemes are better positioned to apply superior defence measures in
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This distinctive feature is unfortunately missing in The LawTech Delivery Panel (LTDP),
Legal statement on cryptoassets and smart contracts, UK Jurisdiction Taskforce, November
2019 (link) paras 24‐34, where the focus (particularly in para 28) appears to be on the
control on the asset (rather than on its generation) by cryptographic means.
This definition slightly modifies the one from https://medium.com/@Wolfofcrypto/basic‐
cryptocurrency‐starter‐guide‐8f2071ea85de; particularly, we replaced ‘transfer of funds’
by the ‘execution of payment transactions’ to point at payment by the transmission of
‘coins’ rather than ‘generic value’ in the forms of funds. See also ‘Cryptoassets’
(Wikipedia, 2019) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptocurrency accessed 29 October
2019: «A cryptocurrency (or crypto currency) is a digital asset designed to work as a
medium of exchange that uses strong cryptography to secure financial transactions,
control the creation of additional units, and verify the transfer of assets.» (emphasis added).
Note however that not every decentralised system is that of a cryptocurrency. For a
visual demonstration of the point see Dong He Virtual Currencies and Beyond (n ???),
Figure 1 at 8. We do not adopt the taxonomy proposed by that figure.
Samid (n. ???) at 26.
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protecting the integrity of the data base as well as enhanced security procedures in
both coin and identity verification upon redemption and in trade. 101
Bit‐minted money is proposed as the answer to these drawbacks. Unlike a
cryptocurrency, bit‐minted money is not hinged on a mathematical riddle that even
as it cannot be solved at present, may be solved in the future. Rather, bit‐minted
money, while utilised in schemes using crypto tools for messaging and storage, is
fitted on a completely different foundation, thriving to randomness, also known as
quantum or pure randomness, premised on unpredictability.102 Bit‐minted money is
minted either by BitMint or its methodology and is further discussed below in
Subsection 5.4.3.
2.2.3 Does a digital coin fall into the definition of a ‘banknote’?
As it evolved from a genuine promise to pay, first of a commercial then a central
bank, became legal tender and turned to be inconvertible, that is, containing an
abstract ‘sterile’ obligation, the written banknote has been transformed in substance.
The transformation has occurred in response to ongoing advancing technological
conditions, changing market demand and evolving institutional frameworks. For its
part, also the form, or more specifically the media of the banknote, has crystallised in
response to changing conditions. Indeed, according to Toynbee, the feasibility of
paper money is «associated with the two Sinic inventions of paper and printing»
that culminated in its issue by the Sung Government in 970 CE. 103 In turn, an
ongoing process of improving printing, enhancing security features and replacing
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See e.g. Samid (n. ???) at 92‐94 and cf. ibid. at 125‐27 as well as at 25, 98‐100 albeit
focusing on the advantage of paying with digital coins over that of paying in scriptural
money which may expose account data to hackers.
See e.g. «Prime Numbers and National Digital Money — The Subtle Risk Central Banks
Ignore» (August 20, 2019), online: https://medium.com/@bitmintnews/prime‐numbers‐
and‐national‐digital‐money‐the‐subtle‐risk‐central‐banks‐ignore‐f2ccd3052726;
and«Bitcoin‐Chernobyl: Risk Similarities Between Nuclear Reactors and Crypto
Currencies,» (July 30, 2019) online: https://medium.com/@bitmintnews/bitcoin‐
chernobyl‐risk‐similarities‐between‐nuclear‐reactors‐and‐crypto‐currencies‐
99dd34b864be . For the superior protection of randomness premised on «a cipher which
use[s] no mathematical complexity but instead call[s] for large amounts of randomness»
see e.g. Carsten Stöcker and Gideon Samid, Randomness: The Fix for Todayʹs Broken
Security (link).
AJ Toynbee, A Study of History: Abridgement of Volumes VII‐X by DC Somervell
(London: Oxford University Press, 1957) at 62.
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paper by plastic, facilitated by technological advances, has been precipitated by a
search for more savings and convenience as well as confidence, safety and
security.104
Throughout its evolution, the banknote has remained ‘written’, even as the meaning
of ‘written’ has expanded to cover printed, stamped, embossed and in theory also
engraved. 105 At the same time, we argue, the ‘writing’ requirement has been
functional. In the case of the banknote it is premised on the need to have a record,
both as a matter of evidence to secure attribution, permanence, integrity and
authenticity as well as to facilitate simple transferability. Once technology could
allow these functions to be performed through a novel medium, as is the case with
the digital coin, there has been no reason to insist on the written format more than
on the existence of a genuine obligation to pay metallic money. The accommodation
to a changed environment ought not to be limited to the nature of the obligation and
bypass the media.
It is noteworthy that in the universally accepted definition of a banknote,106 there is
no mention of an independent requirement of being a tangible object.107 Rather, the
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105

106
107

See in general Don Cleveland IBNS LM‐136A, History of Printed Money, online:
https://www.theibns.org/joomla/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=251&
Itemid=127; and more specifically on existing security features: Jeff Desjardin, Central
Banks: 10 Banknotes From Around the World, and Their Security Features , June 18,
2018, online: https://www.visualcapitalist.com/10‐banknotes‐around‐world‐security‐
features/; as well as Security features for staying one step ahead of the counterfeiters; online:
http://banknoteinfo.net/security‐features/.
For example, under Schedule 1 to the UK Interpretation Act 1978 c 30:
‘Writing’ includes «typing, printing, lithography, photography and other modes of
representing or reproducing words in a visible form (...)».
A creative interpretation may treat words in a permanent record ‘visible’ on a computer
screen as satisfying the writing requirements: Leif Gamertsfelder, «Electronic Bills of
Exchange: Will the Current Law Recognise Them?» (1998) 21:2 UNSWLJ 566.
c/r.
Under UCC 1‐201(43) ’Writing’ is defined to include «printing, typewriting, or any other
intentional reduction to tangible form.» This is in contrast to UCC 1‐201 (31), under
which ‘Record’ is defined to mean «information that is inscribed on a tangible medium
or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable
form.» It is recommended to revise UCC Article 4A by expanding ‘writing’ to include
ʹmedium stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable formʹ.
Such distinction is for the purposes of the interpretation of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Regardless it is not flawless, as for example it is hard to understand as to why an
inscription is on a record and not in writing.
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tangibility feature derives from the ‘writing’ requirement as envisioned prior to the
electronic age. At that time, there was no way of ‘writing’ on an intangible media;
writing in the air was (and is) meaningless. However, with new technologies, it has
become possible to write on something intangible. We write an email exactly as
much as we write a postcard or a letter. What paper or any other tangible media
gives to writing is permanence – which technologically can now be accorded to an
intangible record in the cyberspace. Accordingly, we argue, notwithstanding the fact
that it is a uniquely generated item of information and as such an intangible, the
digital coin may nevertheless be seen as ‘written’, or at least, functional equivalent to
‘written’.
As indicated, liability on a banknote requires signature. 108 Generally speaking,
‘signature’ may be written, lithographed, facsimiled or stamped on a document (or
anything else tangible) with the intent of authenticating liability on a contract. 109 The
key is however a permanent record for the authentication of liability. Accordingly,
the electronic authentication of an electronic record that substitutes writing will
satisfy the signature requirement.
Observations to such ends were already made in the common law.110 In one case, the
court did not doubt that «if a party creates and sends an electronically created
document then he will be treated as having signed it to the same extent that he
would in law be treated as having signed a hard copy of the same document.»111 In
another case the court looked upon an email as written.112
Accordingly, where it is a ‘signed’, ‘written’ debt obligation on which its issuer is a
bank unconditionally liable to pay on demand a sum certain in money to the bearer,
a claim check digital currency, even a cryptocurrency, complies with the definition
of a banknote. Whether it also fulfils the function of a ‘banknote’ is addressed in the
immediately following Section.

108
109

110
111
112

c/r.
See e.g. A.W. Rogers, Falconbridge on Banking and Bills of Exchange, 7th ed. (1969), pp. 440‐
441, 443 and 444.
Simon Gleeson, The Legal Concept of Money (Oxford: OUP, 2018) 176 para 9.47.
J Pereira Fernandes v. Mehta [2006] 1 All ER (Comm_ 885 para 28.
Golden Ocean Group v. Salgocar Mining Industries [2012] EWCA Civ. 265.

Page 27

Setting the stage

2.2.4 Does the digital coin fulfil the function of a ‘banknote’?
As a negotiable instrument, the paper banknote is both a chattel and obligation, or
else, it is both a chose in possession and a chose in action.113 Furthermore, it is a
«document in which a right is incorporated in such a way that it cannot be claimed
nor transferred to others (...) without the document.»114 As such it is a specie of the
Germanic Wertpapier 115 as defined in Article 965 of the Swiss Code of Obligations.
Stated otherwise, the obligation on a banknote (sterile as it is nowadays) is
embodied in the chattel, so as to inure to the benefit of the possessor of the chattel.
Indeed, the transfer of possession as a requirement to the transfer of title to, hence
payment in, money. 116 Accordingly, for the digital coin to function as a written
banknote, not only that the obligation thereon must be ‘signed’, ‘written’ and
embodied in something permanent as a chattel; rather, that ‘something’ ought first
to be the object of property, just as the piece of paper on which a banknote is written.
Second, it must be capable of being moved from the exclusive control of one person
to that of another, as paper can be moved from the possession of one person to that
of another.
As for the first characteristic, that of an object of property, common law recognises
proprietary features of an intangible right even where it is not a chose in action, as

113

114

115

116

Relating both to «a chattel, a tangible scrap of paper» and «a bundle of contracts», a
claim to a negotiable instrument thus involves not only «the right to possess a thing but
[also] the right to sue several persons [liable to it]». Zechariah Chaffee Jr., ʹRights in
Overdue paperʹ (1918) 31 Harv L Rev 1104, 1109.
Swiss Code of Obligations: English Translation of the Official Text (Swiss‐American
Chamber of Commerce 2003). On the German Wertpapier see in general: L. Dabin,
Fondements du droit cambiaire Allemand (Faculté de droit de Université de Liège 1959). For
a comprehensive discussion on the German conceptual framework, and as to whether it
sheds additional light on the nature of a negotiable instrument, see Denis V Cowen and
Leonard Gering, Cowen The Law of Negotiable Instruments in South Africa Vol. One: General
Principles (5th edn, Juta 1985) 79‐98 (where a slightly different translation, albeit to the
same effect, of the Swiss provision is reproduced at 82). Their negative conclusion as to
whether the Wertpapier sheds additional light on the nature of a negotiable instrument at
110, is criticised by JT Pretoriusʹ book review in (1986), 103 SALJ 151 at 154‐56. On the
negotiable instrument as Wertpapier see also: FR Malan, JT Pretorius & SF Du Toit, Malan
on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes in South African Law (5th edn,
LexisNexis 2009) 4, 7.
According to Cowen & Gering, Negotiable Instruments ibid. at 94, the word ‘Wertpapier’
cannot be well translated to English, so that words such as ‘security’ or ‘commercial
paper’ do not convey its accurate meaning.
David Fox, Property Rights in Money (Oxford: OUP, 2008) paras 3.32‐3.42
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long as the right is «definable, identifiable by third parties[,] capable in its nature of
assumption by third parties and have some degree of permanence or stability.»117 It
was accordingly held that cryptocurrencies are to be treated as property.118 Civilians
may have been more dogmatic. 119 Nevertheless, drawing on Gaius’ distinction
between res corporales and res incorporales, Nicholas maintains the existence of
«abstract things, such as a debt or a right of way» that cannot be possessed and yet
can be owned.120 He concludes that the «the law of things includes all those rights
which are capable of being evaluated in money terms.»121
The fulfilment of the second characteristic, that of transferability from hand to hand,
requires first to explore the mechanics of payment in digital currency and second an
assessment of the legal treatment of the mechanism. For its part, the mechanics of
payment in a digital coin depends on the specific design of the coin and its
underlying scheme. A common denominator for all mechanisms is the use of a
telecommunication network, and the availability of a validating intermediary,
designed to prevent double payment, something that cannot exist in the case of
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118

119

120

121

Natinal Provincial Bank v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175, 1247‐48; [1965] 2 All ER 472, 494 (HL,
per Lord Wilberforce).
First in B2C2 Limited v Quoine PTC Limited, [2019] SGHC (I) 03 (Singapore International
Commercial Court) para 142; followed in AA v Persons [2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm) para
61. In reaching its conclusion AA v Persons also treated the Legal statement of the
LawTech Delivery Panel as persuasive and yet not being an authoritative statement of
the law. Ibid. at para 57. The LawTech Delivery Panel, Legal Statement of the UK
Jurisdiction Task Force, Crypto Assets and Smart Contracts, 11 November 2019 (link),
para 15. For a full discussion see ibid. at paras 35–85 (and to a less extent also paras 86–
99). For mostly earlier scholarly discussion see David Fox, «Cryptocurrencies in the
Common Law of Property» in Fox & Green (eds. (n. ???) 139, at 152‐54; paras 6.38‐6.41.
See also Christopher Hare, «Cryptocurrencies and Banking Law: Are There Lessons to
Learn», Fox and Green, Cryptocurrencies (n. ???) 229, at 237 n. 53; Gleeson (n ???) 166
para 9.10. Another discussion is by G A Walker, «Financial Technology Law‐ A New
Beginning and a New Future» (20??), ??? The International Lawyer ???. For another
perspective see Sarah Jane Hughes,  «Property, Agency, and the Blockchain: New
Technology and Longstanding Legal Paradigms,» 65 Wayne L. Rev. 57 (2019).
See in detail e.g. Daniel Carr, «Cryptocurrencies as Property in Civilian and Mixed Legal
Systems» in Fox and Green, Cryptocurrencies (n. ???) 177.
Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law, (Oxford at Clarendon Press, 1962) at 106.
Indeed, «incorporeal things» are recognised by the Institutes. The Institutes, Book II Title
II, translation reproduced in RW Lee, The Elements of Roman Law, 4th edn (London Sweet
& Maxwell, 1956) at 114 and discussion at 110.
Nicholas, ibid. at 98 (emphasis added).
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payment by means of a paper banknote. To both such ends several scenarios are
available:
1. Being in control of a digital coin ‘affixed’ to a single Internet domain, for
which it attorns to the payer, a ‘baliee’ 122 complies with the payerʹs
instructions and executes them by attorning to the payee, thereby causing
‘possession’ in the coin to be transferred from the payer to the payee.
Alternatively, such a system may be viewed as run by a central switch
operator, which at the instruction of the payer transfers the control of the coin
from the payer to that of the payee;
2. A ‘coin’ in the form of an unspent transaction output (UTXO)123 in the payerʹs
wallet, reflecting earlier transactions, is transformed into a new UTXO in the
payeeʹs wallet. Where the payer does not use up the entire UXTO, payment is
carried out by splitting the payerʹs UXTO into two UTXOʹs: one in the sum of
payment going to the payeeʹs wallet, and the second, in the amount of the
balance of the UXTO, remaining in the payerʹs wallet.
3. The payer sends from his or her digital device to the payeeʹs device a ‘coin’ or
any split of it. The payee may (but is not required to) validate the coin
authenticity with the ‘mint’.
Respectively, these are the methods of payment in WingCash, Bitcoin124 and BitMint.
Among these three, only Bitcoin requires a blockchain and is a cryptocurrency.
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124

We agree with the LTDP (n. ??) paras 87‐88 that strictly speaking no ‘bailment’ can exist
with respect to a ‘digital banknote’, except that we address below the option of ‘control’
as a functional equivalent to ‘possession’.
The term is explained e.g. in https://komodoplatform.com/whats‐utxo, visited on
January 16, 2020.
Satoshi Nakamoto, «Bitcoin: A Peer‐to‐Peer Electronic Cash System» (2008) at 2, online:
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf , accessed 28 December 2017 and see e.g. Stuart Hoegner,
«What is Bitcoin?» in Stuart Hoegner, ed, The Law of Bitcoin (Bloomington IN: iUniverse,
2015) at 1; Neil Guthrie, «The End of Cash? Bitcoin, the Regulators and the Courts»
(2014) 29 BFLR 355. For its mechanics, see Jonathan Levin, «Bitcoin: New Plumbing for
Financial
Services»,
coindesk
(29
November
2014),
online:
http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin‐new‐plumbing‐financial‐services/,
accessed
28
December 2017. See also Nicholas Wenker, «Online Currencies, Real‐World Chaos: The
Struggle to Regulate the Rise of Bitcoin» (2015) 19 Tex Rev L & Pol 145; and Jacob
Hamburger, «Bitcoins vs. State Money Transmission Laws: Protecting Consumers or
Hindering Innovation?» (2015) 11 J L Econ & Polʹy 229. See also
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Neither WingCash nor BitMint are cryptocurrencies. No blockchain is required in
BitMint or even exists in WingCash. Both WingCash and BitMint are discussed in
Part 5.
In a cryptocurrency, the coin consists of the total available in the wallet. Stated
otherwise, a coin is not handled as a unique and separate entity from the beginning
of a payment transaction to its end. Furthermore, in a cryptocurrency, the sequence
of the bits represents the value of the coin. Being unique to each coin, it is that
sequence which gives the coin its identity. Accordingly, insofar as each coin in
WingCash and BitMint has both an identity and a specific value, as separate
functions and from the beginning of the transaction to its end, among the three
designs addressed in Part 5 they both stand closer to the paper banknote. Between
them, WingCash coin, being a digital representation of the fiat currency banknote, is
thus closer to the paper banknote. This, however, may not compensate for some
unique features of BitMint, such as continuous payment, coin splitting and tethering.
Furthermore, the BitMint payment transaction better assimilates payment in cash as
it does not require any intermediation. Finally, among the three, only BitMint
facilitates transactions between simple mobile phones and with no resort to the
Internet and thereby enhances inclusion. True, smartphones and Internet will
enhance the functionality of BitMint and yet, unlike in the other designs, they are not
indispensable. We believe that broader‐based accessibility is a key factor in
according a legal tender status to a monetary object.
Payment under each scheme is premised on the transfer of control of the digital coin.
Functional equivalence with transfer of possession of a paper banknote is quite
obvious. For example, in a case of digital coins accessed by keys, Fox speaks of a
presumption in favour of control by the public key holder as the «intangible
analogue of the familiar (…) presumption that possession is evidence of title».125
Undoubtedly, this principle guided the drafters of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Electronic Transferable Records (2017)126 (MLETR).
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitcoin,
accessed
28
December
2017;
http://www.coindesk.com/information/what‐is‐bitcoin, accessed 28 December 2017;
http://www.wired.com/2011/11/mf_bitcoin, accessed 28 December 2017; and «The Great
Chain of Being Sure About Things», The Economist (31 October 2015). See also
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/How_bitcoin_works, accessed 28 December 2017.
Fox, «Cryptocurrencies in the Common Law of Property» (n. ???) at 157, para 6.50.
Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records, A 72/17, UNCITRAL, 2017 (link),
accessed 27 April 2020 (hereafter: MLETR).

Page 31

Setting the stage

Thus, Article 11 MLETR focuses on the concept of «exclusive control of [an]
electronic transferable record» as a functional equivalent of «the possession of a
transferable document or instrument.» ‘Transferable document or instrument’ is
defined in Article 2 MLETR to mean:
«a document or instrument issued on paper that entitles the holder to claim
the performance of the obligation indicated in the document or instrument
and to transfer the right to performance of the obligation indicated in the
document or instrument through the transfer of that document or
instrument.»
In turn, Article 2 MLETR defines ‘electronic record’ to mean «information generated,
communicated, received or stored by electronic means». Under Article 10(1) MLETR,
an electronic record becomes an ‘electronic transferable record’, where:
«(a) [It] contains the information that would be required to be contained in a
transferable document or instrument; and
(b) A reliable method127 is used:
(i) To identify that electronic record as the electronic transferable
record;
(ii) To render that electronic record capable of being subject to control
from its creation until it ceases to have any effect or validity; and
(iii) To retain the integrity of that electronic record.»128
Article 8 MLETR renders information that is «accessible so as to be usable for
subsequent reference» the functional equivalent of ‘writing’. Similarly, MLETRs
Article 9 provides that where «a reliable method is used to identify [a] person and to
indicate that personʹs intention in respect of the information contained in [an]
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The general reliability standard is provided for in Article 12 MLETR. It addresses
operational rules, the assurance of data integrity, the ability to prevent unauthorised
access and use, the security of hardware and software, the regularity and extent of
independent audit, a declaration by a supervisory or accreditation body, and any
applicable industry standard.
Under Article 10(2) MLETR:
«The criterion for assessing integrity shall be whether information contained in the
electronic transferable record, including any authorised change that arises from its
creation until it ceases to have any effect or validity, has remained complete an
unaltered apart from any change which arises in the normal course of
communication, storage and display.»
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electronic transferable record», a legal signature requirement by that person is
satisfied.
Article 11(1) MLETR goes on to provide that the «exclusive control of [an] electronic
transferable record» established by «a reliable method», which also identifies the
person in control meets a legal requirement for «the possession of a transferable
document or instrument». As well, under Article 11(2) MLETR, «the transfer of
control over [an] electronic transferable record» is the equivalent for the «transfer of
possession of a transferable document or instrument».129
A footnote to Article 1(3) MLETR leaves open the possibility of excluding negotiable
instruments from what otherwise seems to be a proper framework for the creation
and transfer of an electronic instrument. Taking into account the fact that the
banknote is a negotiable instrument, this is unfortunate. At the same time, standing
on its own, MLETR statutory language is quite proper and fit to cover negotiable
instruments in general and for our purposes, the banknote in particular. Indeed, the
banknote is a signed transferable document or instrument, entitling its holder to
claim from the signer the performance of an obligation indicated therein. For its part,
in a digitised form, the banknote is an electronic transferable record, authenticated
by an identified person, which is under the exclusive control of the one entitled to
enforce the obligation it contains. Transferability in the former format is by the
physical delivery of the paper banknote, while the transferability in the latter format
is by the transfer of control over the electronic record of the banknote.
Functional equivalence with a paper banknote further requires transferability to a
bona fide transferee for value free of any claim or defence. This is, however, neither
a physical nor a technological feature of money. Rather, it is a quality accorded to
money by law. Way back in Miller v Race (1758),130 Lord Mansfield rejected the lack
of an ‘earmark’ to a monetary object as the rationale for the passage in circulation
free of defences and claims. Rather, he explained this quality on the basis of the
‘currency’ of money – which is an attribution by law. Certainly, a paper banknote
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In this context, Article 15 MLETR provides that:
«Where the law requires or permits the endorsement in any form of a transferable
document or instrument, that requirement is met with respect to an electronic
transferable record if the information required for the endorsement is included in the
electronic transferable record and that information is compliant with the
requirements set forth in articles 8 and 9.»
This, however, is irrelevant for the banknote, which is payable to the bearer and thus
transferable by the mere delivery.
1 Burr 452, 97 Eng Rep. 398, 401.
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bears a unique serial number – and in today’s technology may be made to bear a
small chip – all of which facilitate tracing; and yet, for the policy reason pointed by
Lord Mansfield, even a stolen banknote cannot be traced into the hands of a bona
fide taker for value. Accordingly, irrespective of tracing technological capabilities,
we do not see any obstacle for the law to accord the currency quality to digital coins
functioning as money.131
Relating to the quality of passage in currency is that of anonymity. Certainly, in
comparison to payment by transferring funds, payment in digital currency works
like payment in cash: «[t]he value of the transaction is verified regardless of the
identity of the payer» even without exposing the payerʹs hackable account.132
In conclusion, a digital coin falling into the definition of a ‘banknote’ is capable of
fulfilling the function of a paper banknote.
2.2.5 The digital coin as an e‐banknote: Monetary law and the history of the
banknote
Falling into the definition and fulfilling the function of a ‘banknote’, a digital coin
issued by a bank is a ‘banknote’, or more specifically an electronic banknote (e‐
banknote). This conclusion is supported once the role of monetary law in general
and particularly as applied to the history of the banknote is appreciated. Having
evolved from a genuine promise to pay, first of a commercial then a central bank,
having become legal tender, and having turned to be inconvertible, that is,
containing an abstract ‘sterile’ obligation, the written banknote transformed in
substance in response to ongoing advancing technological conditions, changing
market demand and evolving institutional frameworks. With technology facilitating
the change in the media, from written to digital, the move to digital is just another
step in the same process.
History demonstrates that technology, market demand and institutional framework
shaped the emergence and evolution of the banknote. The role of statutory law was
not to lead, but rather to facilitate developments for societal benefit. Hence, statutes
and constitutional powers in relation to money ought to be interpreted in the spirit
of accommodating new developments, harnessing them for the protection of the
public, but not hindering them.
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For the same conclusion with regard to cryptocurrencies see e.g. Sarah Green, Itʹs
Virtually Money, in Fox David/Green Sarah (eds.), Cryptocurrencies in Public and Private
Law, Oxford, OUP 2019, para 2.46.
Samid (n. ) at 50.
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While in England the law followed the creation of the banknote, the issuance of the
written banknote in the USA, first by practice then by statute, bypassed a rigid
interpretation of a federal constitutional power under Article 1 Section 8 «to coin
money»,133 which has been taken to give the power to issue only full‐bodied metallic
money.134 Market (and government) demands were met by the issuance of banknotes,
originally by state chartered banks with no statutory basis, subsequently by national
banks, and finally by the Federal Reserve, first by its regional Reserve Banks, and
subsequently by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.135 All such
banknotes have served as money even as only the latter are accorded legal tender
status. All were held not to be in violation of the US Constitution.
Reflecting on this history, Khan observed that:
«Money is a living creature of the market and its form changes to facilitate
commercial transactions in an ever more efficient, convenient safe manner. As
such most innovations in monetary practices are attributable to the decisions
of the market (…).»136
He then speaks of the (written) banknote, constituting bank money, as «the creation
of the law merchant and the needs of the market», of which «entrenchment in the
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For constitutional aspects of money issuance in the US see e.g. Thomas Wilson, The
Power ʹto Coinʹ Money: The Exercise of Monetary Powers by the Congress (Armonk New York
and London, England: ME Sharp, 1992); and Khan, «The Evolution of Money» (n. ???).
The full text of the US Constitution is available e.g. at https://constitutionus.com/
(Visited May 6, 2020).
Khan ibid. at 393.
For a succinct summary see e.g. Warren E. Weber (formerly of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis), Government and Private E‐Money Like Systems: Federal Reserve Notes and
National Bank Notes, Working Paper, 18 June 2015 (link) at 3, (visited May 06, 2020):
«Throughout most of U.S. history, bank notes have been issued either solely by
private banks or solely by the government through the Federal Reserve System, the
central bank. From 1786 to 1914, bank notes were issued solely by private banks.
State banks were the issuers from 1786 to 1863; both state and national banks from
1864 to 1866; and only national banks from 1866 to 1914. After 1935, bank notes were
solely issued by the government in the form of Federal Reserve notes. The period
from 1914 to 1935 is unique in that it was the only time that both privately‐issued
and governmentally‐issued bank notes were simultaneously in circulation. (…).»
Khan (n ???) at 396, citing (quoting???) Cyril James, «International cooperation in the
Field of Money: A Strand of Economic History», in Money and the Law 1, 1‐2 (1945).
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legal system was the affirmation of a simple monetary tradition: the market creates,
modifies, and recreates the concept of money. The law simply recognises and
changes, often ex post facto.»137 His overall thesis is «that no legal text, not even the
most authoritative, such as the United States Constitution can fully predict how the
future will discard some of the most obvious paradigms.»138
A common feature of the routes under which the paper banknote was recognised in
both England and the USA is the slow pace of the process. There is, however, no
need to adhere to this pace in connection with the euro e‐banknote where the
statutory basis is available and individual initiatives by private players cannot be
stopped and can hardly be harnessed.
Indeed, Khanʹs observations are confirmed by the shifting nature of the banknote,
first in substance and ultimately, we say, in form. Indeed, the role of the
interpretation of monetary law is to accommodate market developments and
harness them to the advantage of society, rather than to endeavour to lead and
create models, or even worse, to set in stone and freeze paradigms existing at a given
time that have been overtaken by technological, institutional and market
developments. In the final analysis, giving a broad meaning to a term, in this case
‘banknote’, is a legitimate tool to ensure that the law remains in tandem with market
and technological developments, particularly where, for political reasons, the
legislative route is not a promising option. This background only reinforces to read
‘banknote’ in Article 128(1) TFEU as including the e‐banknote.
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Khan, (n. ???) 414.
Khan, ibid. 397.
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3 A goal based perspective
3.1 Preliminary considerations
While Article 130 TFEU provides the ECB with a high degree of independence,139 the
latter extends only to the powers conferred upon the ECB by the Treaty and the
Statute.140 In fact, the ECB is constrained by its statutory objectives (the primary one
being price stability 141 ) and tasks as well as «by the demands of democratic
legitimacy and accountability».142 Against this backdrop and since the question is to
be answered under existing law, the ECBʹs mandate is taken as a starting point for
the remainder of our research paper.
The relevant provisions are first and foremost Articles 127 et seq. TFEU.143 Article
127(2) lays down four basic tasks of the ESCB (or rather the Eurosystem), 144
(reproduced in Article 3.1 of the Statute), of which only two need to be considered in
more detail for our purposes: the definition and implementation of the monetary
policy (1st indent) and the promotion of the smooth functioning of payment systems
(4th indent). Both of them will be addressed shortly, together with further possible
objectives. In the first place, however, the focus shall be on Article 128 TFEU.
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The provision reads as follows: «When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks
and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB and of the
ECB, neither the European Central Bank, nor a national central bank, nor any member of
their decision‐making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Union institutions,
bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other
body. The Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies and the governments of the
Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the
members of the decision‐making bodies of the European Central Bank or of the national
central banks in the performance of their tasks.»
This also includes the duty to act in accordance with the principles of an open market
economy with free competition and favouring an efficient allocation of resources as set
out in Article 119 TFEU.
Article 127(1) 1st sentence TFEU. At the same time, it is also a guiding principle for the
Union: Article 119(2) and (3).
Lastra Rosa Maria, International Financial and Monetary Law, 2nd ed., Oxford University
Press, 2015, para 7.86.
Article 139(2) exempts the application of some provisions – among them in (c) and (d)
the objectives and tasks of the ESCB as set out in the Articles 127(1) to (3) and (5) and
128 – for Member States whose currency is not the euro.
The Eurosystem comprises the European Central Bank and the national central banks of
the Member States whose currency is the euro; see Article 282 and Article 139(2)(c) and
(d) TFEU.
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3.2 Note‐issue
3.2.1 A basic task of the ESCB
Article 128(1) TFEU gives the ECB the exclusive competence to authorise the issue of
euro banknotes within the Union and empowers the ECB and the National Central
Banks (NCBs) to issue such banknotes.145 Article 128(2) provides that the volume of
the issue of coins by Member States is also subject to approval by the ECB. As a
result, the ECB was given control over the entire volume of cash supply – or rather:
the supply of all forms of cash existing when the Treaty was drafted, signed and
amended.146
The privilege of note‐issue is often referred to as the core task of central banks.147 The
Treaty drafters also originally listed it under the basic tasks, in Article 105(2) 4th
indent of the EC Treaty, the predecessor of Article 127(2) TFEU.148 However, in the
course of the negotiations, it was cut off and dealt with separately in Article 105(4),
which later became 128(1) TFEU.149
One may wonder what the reason for this separation was. The explanation is
provided by the materials on Article 3.1 of the Statute: The draft version of 3 July
1990 still listed the issuing of notes (now: banknotes) as a basic task. However, this
caused uncertainty regarding the extent to which the NCBs would keep the
possibility to issue domestic banknotes before a single currency would be available
and even for a limited time at the beginning of Stage Three. Besides, the UK wished
to permanently retain the right for some commercial banks in the UK to issue
banknotes and – seemingly even more importantly – to keep the Queenʹs head on

145
146

147

148

149

Regarding the constitutional dimension of this provision see infra Part 4.
Unlike coins, only the issue of notes as such is subject to authorisation, not the volume
of issuance. However, here too, the ECB must be able to influence the quantity since the
volume is based on demand and limited where further issuance would endanger price
stability: van den Berg Chapter 7 main texts after footnotes 178 and 198.
See e.g. Lastra (2015) para 7.33 asking why it was not included in the enumeration of
basic tasks.
See Van Den Berg Carel C. A., Making of the Statute of the European System of Central Bank:
An Application of Checks and Balances, Dutch University Press, 2005 and Purdue
University Press, Amsterdam (link), Chapter 7 main text before footnote 193.
See UEM/82/91; van den Berg (2005) Chapter 7 main text before footnote 199.
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one side of euro banknotes issued by the Bank of England. 150 For these reasons,
Article 16.2 was added to the Statute.151
In contrast to the other basic tasks, therefore, the provision on the issuance of notes
contains a multi‐level hierarchy of competence: At the apex, the ECB is solely
competent to authorise the issue as such, as stated in the first sentence of Article
128(1) TFEU and Article 16.1 of the Statute, respectively. This includes the
competence to allocate issuance quotas to the NCBs and the ECB itself. By contrast,
the NCBsʹ competence to issue, as referred to in the second sentence of each of the
two provisions, is only of a derived quality, since it depends on the ECBʹs
authorisation of the quantity and the allocation of the quota. Finally, the
concession152 granted in Article 16.2, according to which the ECB, when exercising its
competence, must «respect as far as possible existing practices regarding the issue
and design» of banknotes, does not reach the quality of a competence at all.153 Lastly,
coin issuance, subject to the ECBʹs authorisation of the quantity, remained a
competence of the Member States. From this point of view, it was consistent to
legislate on the issue of cash separately in Article 128 TFEU.
The concession made in Article 16.2 of the Statute remained quite marginal: The
provision makes clear that just existing practices could be retained, and even these
only as far as possible, i.e. to the extent that neither the singleness of monetary policy
nor the objective of price stability would be compromised.154 For these reasons, the
issue of banknotes is to be understood as a basic task of the Eurosystem, with the
ECB enjoying the sole competence to determine the quantum of issuance and the
design.
3.2.2 The case for an e‐banknote
However, the marginalisation of cash as described in Part 2 means that the public
increasingly misses out on a range of benefits that public money provides: inclusion
(in terms of access and pricing); privacy; credit‐risk free value (including the
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See van den Berg (2005) Chapter 7 main text before and after footnote 178.
See van den Berg (2005) Chapter 7 main text before footnotes 178 (regarding Article
16.2), 155 and 205 (regarding Queenʹs portrait).
The materials speak of a «concession» that was to be more than a mere «(non‐binding)
Declaration»: van den Berg (2005) Chapter 7 main text between footnotes 202 and 205.
Rather, it is a mere right to request with the responsibility of the ECB to follow the
request if it is compatible with its policy. Insofar, it is more than a right to petition
(which does not even require the addressee to listen or respond).
See van den Berg (2005) Chapter 7 main text before footnotes 178.
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possibility to opt out of the commercial banking system entirely); instant discharge
of monetary debts; resilience (insensitivity to outages); and – above all – an issuer
that is acting in the general interest.
This last point particularly needs further elaboration. If only private providers were
left to supply the public with monetary objects in the future, the competition in
which they have been involved up to now with central banks would be eliminated.
By their very nature, private actors are generally stakeholder oriented, self‐serving
and profit‐making institutions. This is not wrong by itself, but, as will be explained
below, in the monetary area it has undesirable consequences due to a combination of
circumstances:
First, in the absence of a public competitor (acting in the public interest), private
actors will probably internalise the social costs of possible systemic disruptions even
less than before.155 A public actor, in contrast, is by virtue of its mandate inclined to
subsidise the distributional network if necessary in order to onboard the public at
large.156 A public actor refrains from commercialising user data for data protection
reasons alone, but also as its «business model» does not derive profit from
marketable data157 (let alone is predominantly based on it).158 Moreover, ideally, a
public actor preserves the value of its monetary objects by subjecting their issuance to
a price stability goal159 and investing in security in advance to prevent operational
failure. It can do so easily because it is self‐financing from seignorage and the
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See Mancini‐Griffoli et al (2020) pp. 11‐12.
The mere fact that banks had to be forced by law to open payment accounts with basic
features (via Directive 2014/92/EU, not applying to SMEs, though) shows that if free to
decide, they only take on «profitable« customers.
See Garrat/von Oordt (2019) passim.
Armelius Hanna/Boel Paola/Clausen Carl Andreas/Nessén Marianne, The e‐krona and the
macroeconomy, in: Special issue on the e‐krona, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review
2018:3 (link) 43‐65, p. 14; Mancini‐Griffoli et al (2020) p. 11; BIS, Special feature on
payments, BIS Quarterly Review 2020, p. 95; Wierts/Boven (2020) p. 11; see also infra
Section 4.5. On the other hand, private business modelsʹ key motive may well be to
obtain payment data from users, whether or not to combine those with earlier collected
data: Wierts/Boven (2020) p. 11; see also Hofmann (2020) pp. 48, 50, 56 referring to big
tech and data giants.
Hofmann (2020) p. 53 and footnote 66. See in contrast the tendency towards over‐issue
under the profit‐maximising goal of the commercials banks in case without
convertibility: Lastra (2015) para 2.20; Herrmann (2010) pp. 324 et seq. with further
references; Klein Benjamin, The competitive Supply of Money, in: Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking, 1974, 423, pp. 424 and 426 ff.
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proceeds of its foreign and monetary reserves and enjoys budgetary autonomy,
meaning that, although the law may require an efficient allocation of resources,160 it
is not obliged to maximise profits for delivery to the government (financial
dimension of central bank independence).161 It can be expected that a public actor
will design digital equivalents of its cash in such a way that debts can be discharged
with it instantly162 and with finality – as is the case with physical cash.
Second, competition between several private providers will not suffice to keep the
quality of the monetary objects at high levels. This is due to the fact that payment
systems «tend to become natural monopolies, reflecting strong network externalities
(the value of using a given payment network is greater the larger the user
community, including savings from netting transactions), economies of scale
(decreasing average costs, including high fixed development and maintenance costs),
and economies of scope, (gains from aggregating data to provide additional
services».163 The resulting market concentration will bar new firms from entering the
market, stifle incentives for further innovation, make it obsolete for the dominators
to internalise social costs and entice them to charge unjustifiably high fees for their
services. 164
Third, the market is characterised by genuine agility. The mechanisms described can
therefore not be dealt with by regulation alone. Regulatory procedures are too slow
and complex and their outcome is too rigid to fully cover future development. Often,
regulation has unforeseen adverse side‐effects and ties up forces for monitoring and
enforcement that could otherwise be deployed in a productive manner.165 Likewise,
the introduction of fast payment systems will not suffice,166 as this only improves the
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See Article 127(1) TFEU.
For the Eurosystem see Chapter 6 of the Statute and Article 282(3) TFEU; Lastra (2015)
paras 2.131, 7.82‐83.
Conversely, the experience of cross‐border payments serves as an example for what
happens, if the banking industry benefits from a monopoly in an area: payments take
days and are most expensive, especially for the weakest players: Hofmann (2020) p. 40.
See also Mancini‐Griffoli et al (2020) p. 11 with reference to monopolistic private issuers.
Mancini‐Griffoli et al (2020) p. 11 with further references.
Armelius/Guibourg/Levin/Söderberg (2020) p. 13. See also their definition of network
effect and externalities on pp. 11 and 13.
Armelius/Guibourg/Levin/Söderberg (2020) p. 15. In support of antitrust regulations
and data protection legislation: Mancini‐Griffoli et al (2018) p. 20. For another dissenting
opinion see supra footnote 221.
In this sense Mancini‐Griffoli et al (2018) p. 12.
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payment landscape, but does not cover the publicʹs need for and right to a risk‐free
store of value.
The above leads to the conclusion that cash issuance is not merely a right granted to
the public authorities. It is also accompanied by a duty to make use of it which
cannot be fully waved or delegated. The issuance of cash is the provision of a public
task in the general interest. However, if Article 128(1) TFEU were to be interpreted
narrowly, the fulfilment of this task will soon become impossible. The ever‐
increasing digitalisation of our society inevitably means that physical cash will no
longer be able to fulfil its intended functions in the future. Article 128(1) TFEU
should therefore be interpreted in such a way that the competences in terms of note‐
issue also include a digital functional equivalent of the paper banknote.
Finally, the fact that the use of cash is dwindling must not be taken as evidence that
the public does not actually need or value the benefits mentioned above (any longer).
It is rather due to the digitalisation of ever more aspects of life (as well as cash‐
restricting regulations) that the use of cash is becoming increasingly inconvenient
and even cumbersome. For a growing group of actors the disadvantages of physical
cash start outweighing the advantages, even though the latter are valued and worth
protecting. This group then only make an exception in extreme cases (as highlighted
by the flight to cash during the financial crisis and recently upon the outbreak of the
Covid‐19 pandemic again). But this cannot be a justification for a fade out of cash
without equivalent replacement. Rather, it is the ECBʹs duty to use its (implied)
powers167 and continue to make the advantages of state‐issued cash available to the
public in the future – in a digital form, adapted to the technical realities of our
society.
3.3 Monetary policy
3.3.1 Preconditions
3.3.1.1 Monetary value and its expression
In the following, we argue that the fulfilment of the tasks listed in Article 127(2)
TFEU, and in particular the conduct of monetary policy, requires as an essential
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See infra Part 4.
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precondition the issue of cash as provided for in Article 128 TFEU – or more
generally, the issue of base money for the public with selected functions.168
Today, price stability is recognised as a public good that contributes to broad‐based
prosperity, including a high level of employment and efficiency in a market
economy. 169 Accordingly, the Treaty assigns overriding importance to this
objective.170 In practice, the prices that consumers pay for (a representative basket of)
goods and services should remain reasonably stable over time. But what is the
subject‐matter of the price anyway? Ultimately, it expresses the monetary value of
all kinds of economic objects. However, this expression involves several elements,
among them most notably: a currency unit; monetary objects; technical nominalism;
and uniformity of money.
To begin with, a working unit of account is needed with which monetary value can
be measured and expressed. 171 It is this unit or denominational standard that is
called the currency unit. Within the Eurosystem, it is the euro, divided into 100
cents.172
It must be distinguished from so called monetary objects. The latter comprise all
objects, including tangible and intangible symbols and records that represent the
currency unit as well as its quantity. Such representation is needed to make the
abstract monetary value perceptible – in an attributable, permanent, authentic and
integer way.173 The most important monetary objects today are coins, banknotes and
book money.174 Today, the main two types of the latter are reserves held with central
banks and deposits held with commercial banks.
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As such stand out: public access, privacy granting, credit‐risk free, instantly discharging
(free of claims and defences), underlying of all secondary money denominated in the
single currency unit, resilience, public‐interest oriented issuer.
Armelius/Guibourg/Levin/Söderberg (2020) p. 8.
Lastra (2015) para 7.28.
Armelius/Guibourg/Levin/Söderberg (2020) p. 9.
Article 2, Regulation 974‐98 of 3 May 1998.
Attributability means that a statement (regarding unit and quantum) can be related to a
legal subject (here the issuer), permanence makes the attributable statement
reproducible independent of place and time, authenticity means that the statement is
made by the authorised legal subject (excluding counterfeiting and unlawful usurpation
of issuance) and integrity is given if no unauthorised change can be made (excluding
falsification of counterfeiting).
Book money is not to be confused with the many different ‘access objects’, such as debit
and credit cards, which provide only power of control and disposal over monetary
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Furthermore, nominalism must be ensured: market participants should be able to rely
on a monetary object being accepted at its face value.175 For this purpose, it must
ideally be completely risk‐free. Otherwise, risk results in a premium, thus reducing
the real value of the monetary object. Thereby, commercial transactions would
become considerably less efficient, since risks and the real value of a monetary object
would have to be determined before any business could be conducted. If a monetary
object nevertheless contains a risk, it has to be neutralised as far as possible by
taking countermeasures (to be discussed shortly). This applies all the more so if
several monetary objects of the same currency unit co‐exist in an economy, since no
uniformity of money could be achieved otherwise.
It is precisely the uniformity of money that is a further, indispensable prerequisite:176
All monetary objects of the same currency must circulate at their nominal value, i.e.
at par.177 This is not self‐evident if the monetary objects have different issuers. If
uniformity of money could be reached, this would again lead to undesirable friction
for the economy, as market participants would first have to compare the
‘intracurrency’ exchange rates. Furthermore, following Greshamʹs law, they would
rather hoard lower‐risk money objects and spend higher‐risk ones as quickly as
possible, or, even worse, not accept them at all, thereby impairing liquidity in the
market.
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objects without being such objects themselves. Over time, however, some access objects
have merged into monetary objects, including banknotes (which originally simply
provided access to coins).
Vischer Frank, Geld‐ und Währungsrecht im nationalen und internationalen Kontext, Helbing
Lichtenhahn Verlag, 2010 Basel, p. 49.
Armelius/Guibourg/Levin/Söderberg (2020) p. 1 with further references in footnote 2
and pp. 10‐12.
See e.g. ECB, The Payment System: Payments, Securities and Derivatives, and the Role of the
Eurosystem, Frankfurt a.M., 2010 (link), p. 45; Söderberg Gabriel, Why did the Riksbank get
a monopoly on banknotes? In: Special issue on the e‐krona, Sveriges Riksbank Economic
Review 2018:3, 6‐16, p. 8 et seq. on the triggering factors for introducing state‐backed
bankotes; Gorton Gary, Misunderstading Financial Crises: Why We Donʹt See Them Coming,
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012, p. 19; Armelius Hanna/Clausen Carl
Andreas/Hendry Scott, Is central bank currency fundamental to the monetary system ?
in: Second special issue on the e‐krona, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2020:2 (link)
19‐32, pp. 26 et seq.
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3.3.1.2 Exogenous levelling factors
As mentioned, for a monetary object to circulate at nominal value, it must in
principle be completely risk‐free. Yet, the monetary objects commonly used today
involve different risks, among them credit risks and liquidity risks. The reason for
this lies in the composition of the monetary aggregate M1. It consists of those
monetary objects that can instantly be used as means of payment and influence
prices accordingly. Banknotes and coins form only a small part of M1, 178 with
deposits held with commercial banks (hereinafter deposits) representing the bulk.179
Since banknotes are no longer redeemable, they have lost their claim‐check nature
and with it the inherent risk of default.180 Similarly, the central bank can theoretically
issue additional banknotes at any time – thus, in principle, they do not give rise to
any liquidity risk. Not surprisingly, banknotes circulate today at their face value.181
In contrast, deposits consist of debts of individual entities whose balance sheets back
these debts not only with CeBM (as it would with 100% reserve banking of narrow
banks) and other standardised and immediately monetisable assets. Rather, the asset
side of the balance sheet also consists of a considerable quota of individual credit
claims with incongruent maturities. Nevertheless, deposits are perceived and
accepted by the public as a means of payment and store of value of uniform
quality – both in comparison with each other and with credit risk‐free public money.
There are various levelling factors that can help to achieve such fungibility of
deposits, but experience shows that their combination is most effective. The set of
factors discussed here are of an exogenous nature in that they all lie outside the
monetary objects themselves. The first is to put strong measures in place that enforce
contracts. This compels each bank to keep its deposit promises, but also strengthens
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See supra footnotes 13 et seq.
Others being comparably liquid assets such as transaction accounts or travellers’
cheques.
See Zellweger‐Gutknecht Corinne, Developing The Right Regulatory Regime for
Cryptocurrencies and other Value Data, in Fox David/Green Sarah (eds.), Cryptocurrencies
in Public and Private Law, Oxford, OUP 2019, paras 4.06 et seq. and especially 4.44:
«banknotes nowadays can only be exchanged for other banknotes of the same total face
value. [This] never leads to any form of repayment». What has remained though (and is
actually addressed with the price stability mandate embedded in a protecting
institutional framework) are inflation and exchange rate risk.
Originally, banknotes were issued in the form of promissory notes by commercial banks
and thus covered by the issuing bankʹs balance sheet. Due to the associated individual
credit risk, they circulated at different values; see e.g. Gorton (2012) p. 17.
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the asset side of its balance sheet by urging its own debtors to meet their obligations.
Here, trust and the deriving levelling effect rest on the rule of law.182
Second, various forms of assistance are conceivable when financial problems arise:
illiquidity can be bridged by a lender of last resort (LoLR) facility, while in the event
of insolvency, guarantee schemes take effect. However, often it is not possible in
practice to decide in due time whether a bank is illiquid or already insolvent. This
implies some moral hazard, since a bank could hope to be kept on a lifeline even
though its economic conduct would require resolution or liquidation. Deposit
protection schemes are not without their problems either: they extend to a maximum
limit for each individual depositor and are not designed to remedy systemic crises.
In most countries, pre‐financing by the banking sector is (still) insufficient. In the
case of a state guarantee, depositors ultimately cover their lost deposits with their
own tax money, which seems as unsatisfactory as an open bail‐out by the
government: both burden the public with the risks banks are exposed to, while
leaving potential profits with the bank. In the past, states have repeatedly rushed to
help failing systemically relevant banks,183 and proof that legal prohibitions adopted
in response to the bail‐outs in the recent financial crisis will be observed in the future
has yet to be provided.
Third, in order to avoid bank failures and bail‐outs, deposits are safeguarded by
means of regulation, authorisation and supervision.184 Regulatory frameworks typically
prescribe minimum liquidity coverage ratios (LCR), minimum capital levels,
minimum reserves, maximum leverage ratio, accounting standards, disclosure
standards etc. They also address settlement finality, recovery, resolution,
supervisory mechanisms and authorisation requirements for credit and e‐money
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Bank of Canada (2020) p. 4; Armelius/Clausen/Hendry (2020) p. 23. The latter attribute
in theory the same effect to performance histories (since debtors would then try not to
default in order to avoid negative track records that would impair future business
opportunities). But in practice, they concede that information deficiencies will remain
due to time lags and limited access to such histories.
In England, the practice was for quite some time until the 1990s even not to let fail any
financial institution: Capie Forrest/Wood Geoffrey, The development of the Bank of
Englandʹs objectives: evolution, instruction or reaction? In: Conti‐Brown Peter/Lastra Rosa
María (eds.), Research Handbook on Central Banking, Edward Elgar Publishing,
Cheltenham/Northampton 2018, 34‐52, p. 46.
For the concepts and objectives of bank regulation see Goodhart Charles, Financial
regulation, in: Eijffinger Sylvester/Masciandaro Donato (eds.), Handbook of central
banking: financial regulation and supervision after the financial crisis, Edward Elgar
Publishers, Northampton 2011, pp. 328‐336.
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institutions. 185 Moreover, instant payment methods and the publicʹs increased
education regarding the entire safety net may further enhance trust in the banking
system and its deposits.186
3.3.1.3 Endogenous levelling factor (and the case for an e‐banknote)
However, ultimately, the most decisive factor securing parity between deposits and
CeBM is of an endogenous quality: it is the claim‐check nature of deposits and, as a
consequence, their convertibility on demand into CeBM (or rather the notional
possibility to convert). 187 The uniformity of money is assured, on the one hand,
because all deposits are convertible into cash at par value – thereby, in the perception
of the public, one commercial bankʹs deposits become convertible into another
commercial bankʹs deposits independent of the issuer.188 It is the «demandability
clause»189 and with it peopleʹs confidence «that they can convert it on demand to the
liability of another commercial bank or the central bank» 190 which levels these
monetary objects, thus making them fungible.
On the other hand, commercial banks usually settle their mutual claims with reserves,
thereby abolishing the credit risk and removing the liquidity risk.191 Thus, in the
event of an electronic customer payment, once the payerʹs bank has transferred
reserves in the amount concerned to the payeeʹs bank, the latter can credit its
customerʹs account.192 If, instead, the payeeʹs bank were to grant an interbank loan to
the payerʹs bank, the former would have to assess (and price) the individual
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LCR: Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
capital: Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013; reserves: Article 19 of the Statute; Regulation (EC)
No 2531/98 of 23 November 1998 and Regulation (EC) No 1745/2003.
Armelius/Clausen/Hendry (2020) p. 28.
Fox (2016) p. 134.
Armelius/Clausen/Hendry
(2020)
p.
26
with
further
reference;
Brunnermeier/James/Landau (2019): safety of private money convertible into central
bank money is independent of the issuer.
Andolfatto David, What is Money? How is it Created and Destroyed? Simon Fraser
University, January 2009, p. 14.
Brainard Lael, Digital Currencies, Stablecoins, and the Evolving Payments Landscape, Speech
16 October 2016, The Future of Money in the Digital Age, Conference, Washington D.C.
(link), p. 3.
See CPMI/IOSCO, Principles of Financial Market Infrastructures, report, September 2012, p.
7 footnote 6; Armelius/ Guibourg/Levin/Söderberg (2020) p. 9.
See the example in Armelius/Clausen/Hendry (2020) p. 27.
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creditworthiness of the latter. This could lead to a risk premium193 on the customerʹs
credit balance, thereby destroying the uniformity of money.
However, settlement with reserves minimises only the risks among banks. Customer
deposits, in contrast, remain exposed to the individual credit and liquidity risk of
their bank. Only banknotes offer a certain degree of protection against these risks –
but they are now in danger of disappearing. This must not be accepted by the
monetary authorities. Even if the exogenous factors described above are in place, it is
at least an open question whether they are sufficient to prevent future banking crises.
Historical experience speaks against it. Recent regulatory adjustments do not
necessarily change this assessment, as market players have always found ways to
circumvent regulation.194 Even worse, with the use of cash, an important factor with
a moderating effect on the banking sector is in danger of disappearing in the future.
For this reason, the ECB should fill the gap that threatens to arise from the
marginalisation of banknotes by the issuance of an electronic cash‐equivalent. Only a
credit risk‐free monetary object such as cash, whether physical or digital, issued by
the public sector and serving as underlying redeemable for deposits can have a
levelling effect on deposits in two further ways – from the perspective of both
depositors and banks:
Depositors get a sense of control when, thanks to cash, they are able to withdraw their
money from a bank whose solvency they doubt.195 But the sense of control extends
even further, since, unlike when deposits are withdrawn by transfer, cash‐out allows
customers to leave the banking system as a whole if they are in doubt about systemic
stability. Depositors do indeed make use of this option, as is shown by the fact that
after the collapse of Lehman, the Bundesbank alone issued as many EUR 500
banknotes in one month as in the entire year before.196 Without cash, the public
would have no alternative course of action, as even a shift into AAA government
bonds of their own currency would not be equivalent. Only cash is of such a nature
that it can be used at any time both to retain value without credit risk and to make
payments. As behavioural studies show, the willingness of people to (continue to)
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This was precisely the case with banknotes issued by private banks during periods of
free banking and one of the reasons for the termination of the latter.
Riksbank (2018) p. 12; Armelius/Guibourg/Levin/Söderberg (2020) p. 15 enlisting a
number of potential disadvantages that would come with further regulation.
See Wierts/Boven (2020) p. 14: «a euro (…) exchangeable 1:1 for private money (…)
bolsters confidence in the monetary system».
Weidmann Jens, Eröffnungsrede, in: Deutsche Bundesbank Eurosystem (ed.), 3.
Bargeldsymposium der Deutschen Bundesbank 2016, Frankfurt Juli 2016, 9, p. 13.
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expose themselves to risk increases the more they have (or believe to have) control
over an event.197
At the same time, cash also has a disciplining effect on banks, because with
unsustainable management, they must expect depositors to withdraw their
deposits.198 If depositors for lack of cash could only make transfers, this preventive
effect would be far weaker. As has been shown, depositors then have no real
alternative. Deposits without a redemption obligation would become fiat money of
their own kind for the public – although the issuers of this fiat money do not
primarily pursue public welfare but their own interests.199 This might result in a
tendency for the entire banking sector to gradually over‐extend the creation of credit
(not in the sense that there would be inflation, but that also credit demand of poor
debtors would be covered and asset bubbles financed, thus over time destabilising
the financial system dearly needed for the conduct of monetary policy).200
To sum up, cash, as the primary form of money and the underlying asset with which
deposits can be redeemed, plays a paramount role as a trust‐building anchor and
disciplining instrument.201 When it disappears in its physical form, the resulting gap
should not remain open, but the function should be taken over by an e‐banknote.
Even if the latter (like cash) is associated with the risk of bank runs,202 chances are
good that there will never be such run because of the preventive effect, or because at
least recovery measures can be taken before the situation becomes dire because
depositors have kept their deposits with the bank(s) concerned thanks to a sufficient
sense of control.
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See Armelius et al (2020) pp. 29 et seq.
See for the last financial crisis e.g. Wierts/Boven (2020) pp. 13‐14.
See also Wierts/Boven (2020) p. 13: «the dependency of citizens and businesses on the
banking sector would increase. … If there were no public alternative for the private euro,
the value of private money would not be linked to the public euro one‐to‐one.»
Insofar we deviate from Armelius et al (2020) p. 24 who only address (and rightly deny)
the inflationary risk.
See e.g. Norges (2018) p. 17; also Söderberg (2018) p. 11 regarding the redeemability of
private banknotes for Riksbank banknotes in the 19th century.
See infra Subsection 4.4.6.
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3.3.2 Transmission
3.3.2.1 Mechanism
Cash thus not only preserves the uniformity of money in terms of deposits, but also
contributes to the qualitative level of the deposit‐issuing banks. The latter is equally
important since commercial banks play a cardinal role in the transmission of
monetary policy,203 which is now briefly described.
In order for the ECB to fulfil this core mandate, i.e. to use monetary policy to
guarantee stable prices in the real economy, a so‐called transmission mechanism is
required, which deploys over several stages: at the beginning, a monetary policy
decision is taken (e.g., to help closing a production gap in the real economy). Next,
the setting of an appropriate monetary policy instrument is changed accordingly (e.g.,
the repo rate is reduced). In other words, the ECB alters the conditions of its
monetary policy operations,204 which it conducts with its counterparties. According
to Article 19.1 of the Statute, the eligible counterparties basically consist of credit
institutions.205 Therefore, at this stage, financially sound banks are indispensable, at
least under the current concept.
The adjustment in monetary policy operations ultimately increases or decreases the
counterpartiesʹ reserves and influences the conditions under which they lend and
borrow money in financial markets.206 This passes through to changes in the interest
rates and prices of financial market assets. Finally, via a range of transmission
channels (e.g., the – both key – bank deposit and lending rate, but also real interest
rate, expectations etc.), the financial market movements are passed through to the
real economy (spurring demand for financing for additional production in order to
meet the demand which, in our simplified example, would otherwise have led to an
undesired price increase).207

203
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Hofmann (2020) p. 52.
By providing standing facilities and entering into open market operations; Nessén et al
(2018) pp. 32‐34.
ECB, The Implementation of Monetary Policy in the Euro Area, September 2006 (link), p. 11.
Wierts/Boven (2020) p. 20.
See e.g. Armelius Hanna/Boel Paola/Clausen Carl Andreas/Nessén Marianne, The e‐
krona and the macroeconomy, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2018:3, p. 52;
Meaning/Dyson/Barler/Clayton (2018) p. 15.
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3.3.2.2 The case for an e‐banknote
In this context, an e‐banknote could assume different functions. To begin with,
depending on its design, the e‐banknote could serve as a source of information by
maintaining or even enhancing the ECBʹs ability to collect financial data in real
time.208 However, since this can at most be an auxiliary reason for the introduction of
an e‐banknote, as the possible advantages are outbalanced by quite considerable
risks,209 it will not be dealt with in more detail.
In the most extensive scenario, an e‐banknote could be used as an instrument that
generates itself monetary policy impulses. To this end, it would be designed to be
interest‐bearing and/or have other variable features. The ECB would then be in a
position to manage its demand via the interest rate charged or paid. This will be
further discussed (and rejected) in Subsection 3.3.3.
Finally, e‐banknotes could be designed in a cash‐like way with no variable elements.
If so, they would qualify as a so called autonomous factor, since the amount issued is
not controlled by the ECB but based on public demand. 210 Such a step may be
necessary, in particular, to prevent or reduce the switch of the public to funds not
denominated in euro.211 The latter could impair the transmission mechanism just
described, prompting the ECB and other central banks to loosen monetary policy
control.212 Hence, the e‐banknote would not be a monetary policy instrument itself,
but – once more – an essential prerequisite for the effective use of such
instruments.213 This needs to be further elaborated.
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Bergara Mario/Ponce Jorge, Central Bank Digital Currency: The Uruguayan E‐Peso Case, in:
Gnan Ernest/Masciandro Donato (eds.), Do we Need Central Bank Currency?
Economics, Technology and Institutions, Société Universitaire Européenne de
Recherches Financières, 2018, 82‐90, p. 90: «with e‐Peso monetary policy analysis will
dispose of granular information in real time, which is not available with physical cash.
This should improve the efficiency of day‐to‐day monetary operation»; Kiff et al (2020)
p. 11 with further reference: «CBDC could (…) tap more granular payment flow data to
enhance macroeconomic projections».
Kiff et al (2020) pp. 13‐14.
Nessén Marianne/Sellin Peter/Asberg Sommar Per, The Implications…, Sveriges
Riksbank Economic Review 2018:3, 29, pp. 32‐34.
See supra Subsection 2.1.4.
Adrian/Mancini‐Griffoli (2019) p. 9.
See also Keller Christoph, comments vor Article 17‐24, in: Siekmann Helmut (ed.), EWU
Kommentar zur Europäischen Währungsunion, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2013, para 16
(translated): the banknote monopoly [is] one of the main pillars of the demand for
central bank money and thus for the operational business of central banks («das
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As explained, it is questionable whether parity between deposits and CeBM can be
maintained without any cash at all and only with clearing and settlement in
reserves.214 But even if this view were to prevail,215 it would be too short‐sighted. As
has been shown, several reasons could lead to a situation where the public will make
fewer and fewer payments denominated in euro.216
Under these circumstances, not only the demand for bank loans will decline, but all
interbank customer payments – thus reducing the banksʹ need for clearing and
settlement in CeBM. Neither will prudential liquidity requirements have a
stabilising effect on the quantum of reserves required, as they are based on the
expected future outflow of deposits. As a result, the banks will be demanding fewer
and fewer reserves.
Admittedly, banks cannot reduce the total amount of reserves available in the
system on their own. This is because liquidity needs of the banking system as a
whole are governed by open market operations initiated by the central bank.217 Yet,
if reserve turnover collapses, this massively impairs the central bankʹs ability to act.
After all, «reserves are also a monetary policy tool».218 This is so because, as seen, the
central bank steers the condition of its provision and sterilisation by transacting with
its counterparties, the commercial banks.219 This, however, amounts to a pushing the
rope, if the latter neither demand new nor use their existing reserves.
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Banknotenmonopol [ist] einer der Stützpfeiler für die Nachfrage nach Zentralbankgeld und
damit für das operative Geschäft der Zentralbanken»).
See supra Paragraph 3.3.1.3.
See e.g. Wierts/Boven (2020) p. 13: «This channel [i.e. the exchange of commercial banksʹ
claims on other banks for balances in the reserve accounts with the central bank] does
not depend on the use of cash by the general public and continues to exist even if
general purpose CBDC is not introduced.»
See supra Section 2.1: because the public only (1) saves or hoards them; (2) prefers
monetary objects in a non‐domestic denomination or (3) uses monetary objects
denominated in euro, whose acceptance, though, no longer depends on redeemability.
As opposed to standing facilities, which regulate the liquidity needs of individual banks
at their initiative. See e.g. BIS CPMI/MC (2018) p. 11: «The central bank may ... manage
the total amount of central bank money outstanding through liquidity‐providing and
liquidity‐absorbing open market operations; Nessén et al (2018) pp. 30‐31.
Armelius/Guibourg/Levin/Söderberg (2020) p. 9.
See in detail ECB (2006) pp. 14‐33.
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Finally, monetary policy would also be impaired if the growing use of monetary
objects in foreign or own denominations led to prices and wages being quoted in
this way. The latter would remain unaffected, if the Eurosystem were then to try to
influence the exchange rate to accommodate monetary conditions in times of
negative macroeconomic shocks.220
Such a scenario must be avoided. To this end, the public in the euro area should be
provided with digital monetary objects denominated in euro that are sufficiently
attractive to prevent the migration out of the currency as outlined above. As can be
seen below, however, the traditional privately issued deposits will most probably
not suffice for this purpose. Rather, the introduction of a state‐issued e‐banknote will
be required.221
However, the above should not make us forget that cash and especially banknotes
must not be reduced to their indirect functions just described. The Treaty drafters
clearly wanted cash first and foremost to be used for its very characteristic primary
purposes: a means of payment and store of value. This is shown unmistakably by
the fact that cash issued by the state or one of its agencies and denominated in euro
has been given legal tender status.222
3.3.3 Instrument
3.3.3.1 Pass‐through of policy rate
Some economists would welcome a digital form of public money for the general
public being designed in such a way that it could itself be used as an instrument of
monetary policy. 223 The most important variable design feature for this purpose
would be the possibility to pay or collect interest. The introduction of limits would
be another obvious possibility (be it limits per person, per transaction or overall and
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Armelius/Guibourg/Levin/Söderberg (2020) p. 13 give a corresponding example for
Sweden.
Dissenting Hofmann (2020) pp. 58 et seq., who considers regulatory promotion of the
convenience of deposits to be sufficient.
See Article 128(1) third sentence TFEU (euro banknotes issued by central banks) and xxx
[regulation re coins].
See e.g. Agarwal Ruchir/Kimball Miles, Breaking through the Zero Lower Bound, IMF
Working Paper WP/15/224, 2015; xx.
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as an alternative or in combination with interest). Both would allow the central bank
to govern the publicʹs demand.224
The policy options which this opens up for the central bank can be divided into
several groups. First, there is the expectation that an interest‐bearing rCBDC might
make monetary policy more effective through improved pass through of policy rate
changes.225 This would be because, if the central bank raises both its policy rate and
interest rates on rCBDCs and the public has a choice between the latter and deposits,
banks would be forced to raise interest rates by a comparable amount,226 if they
wanted to avoid an outflow of deposits to rCBDC.227
However, as especially the BIS rightly pointed out, it is «not clear that the pass‐
through of the policy rate needs strengthening».228 Besides, it is not compatible with
a free market economy for the central bank to impose interest rates as a sovereign
act – and it would be equally undesirable to try to come close to this effect through
indirect means.
3.3.3.2 Alleviate the effective lower bound constraint
Second, it is presumed that issuing interest‐bearing rCBDC might help to alleviate
the effective lower bound constraint – although only if cash were abolished or made
costly simultaneously. 229 The effective lower bound (ELB) describes the floor for
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Cit. Nessén Marianne/Sellin Peter/Asberg Sommar Per, The implications of an e‐krona for
the Riksbankʹs operational framework for implementing monetary policy, Sveriges Riksbank
Economic Review, 2018:3, 29‐42, p. 34.
See e.g. Armelius/Boel/Clausen/Nessén (2020) p. 52; Meaning et al (2018) p. xx.
Better service could outweigh a (small) part of the interest.
Nessén et al (2018) p. 35.
BIS CPMI/MC (2018) p. 10.
Kiff et al (2020) p. 13; Rogoff Kenneth, Costs and Benefits to Phasing Out Paper Currency,
NBER Working Paper 20126, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge MA
2014 (link), passim; Bordo Michael D./Levin Andrew, Digital Cash: Principles and Practical
Steps, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 25455, 2019 (link). See
also Ben S. Bernanke, How big a problem is the zero lower bound on interest rate? Hutchins
Center on Fiscal & Monetary Policy at Brookings, 12 April 2017 (explaining that «the
scope for rate cuts is limited by the fact that interest rates cannot fall (much) below zero,
as people always have the option of holding cash, which pays zero interest, rather than
negative‐yielding assets.» and positing, «Although the Fed was able to further ease
monetary policy after 2008 through unconventional methods, the ZLB constraint greatly
complicated the Fedʹs task.»). But see Tyler Cowen, Did the zero lower bound matter?
Marginal Revolution, 14 May 2019 (link) with further reference.
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nominal interest rates. It lies a few decimal points below zero as it corresponds to the
costs incurred by holding non‐interest‐bearing cash (instead of reserves), including
expenses for storage, insurance, transport, etc. 230 Holding an interest‐free rCBDC
would probably be costless. It is therefore feared that the ELB would raise to close to
zero in the future, since monetary policy counterparties may opt to hold rCBDCs
rather than reserves, thereby circumventing the central bankʹs monetary policy
interest rates231 and preventing the central bank from using negative interest rates on
is monetary policy instruments.232
Since 2011, several central banks have introduced negative interest rate policies.233
The motives vary. Mostly, they aim to encourage banks to increase their lending to
the real economy. Partially, they also seek to protect save haven currencies, such as
the Swiss franc and Danish crone, from unwanted further inflows.234 Almost ten
years after their introduction, the low interest rates have spread to more and more
parts of the economy and the associated side effects are becoming more tangible: The
interest margins of banks are eroding, as are those of institutions forced by law to
make low‐risk investments, such as pension funds. Other actors are urged to make
ever riskier investments in companies and states, some of which are already deeply
indebted. As a result, debtors that are structurally unable to survive continue to be
financed. Since there are also governments among the debtors, the conflict of
interests of the central banks that control the interest rates is as obvious as it is
inevitable.
At the same time, robust evidence of the positive effects of low interest rates has
been rare to date. Besides, although the lower rates measures were expressly
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Nessén et al (2018) p. 36; Nabilou (2019) p. 11.
Nessén et al (2018) p. 35.
Nessén et al (2018) pp. 36‐37.
The rate on the deposit facility, which banks may use to make overnight deposits with
the Eurosystem has been first been set below zero in June 2014 (link). The Swiss
National Bank applied negative repo rates on from August 2011 to May 2012 (SNB
Annual Report 2011, pp. 48‐49 and 2012 pp. 43 and 45); since January 2015, the interest
rate on reserves has been negative (link). For further references see Viñals Jose/Gray
Simon/Eckhold Kelly, The Broader View: The Positive Effects of Negative Nominal Interest
Rates, IMF Direct, 10 April 2016 (link).
See also Zellweger‐Gutknecht, Negativzins: Vergütung für die Übernahme des
Geldwertrisikos
durch
den
Kapitalnehmer,
Zeitschrift
für
die
gesamte
Privatrechtswissenschaft, 2015, 350‐376, pp. 362 et seq.
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described as temporary measures, 235 their end, almost a decade after their
introduction, is not foreseeable. Instead, open consideration is being given to
designing rCBDC in a preventive manner so that the policy could be continued.
Moreover, it is questionable whether the envisaged objective – that monetary policy
counterparties cannot circumvent the central bankʹs interest rate policy – could not
also be achieved by milder means, namely by prohibiting counterparties from
holding rCBDC (whether as legal or beneficial owners). Since all of them are
regulated institutions, this measure should be enforceable.
Furthermore, negative interest rates are tantamount to taxation, at least in economic
terms.236 The strict principle that any tax must have a firm basis in law could be
avoided up to now, as negative rates were only directly applied to monetary policy
counterparties based on contractual agreements on the open market or within the
framework of facilities which the banks use on their own initiative. However, such
‘validation’ is unlikely to be available when issuing rCBDCs in the performance of a
public task. Also, negative interest rates would have to be weighed against the
property guarantee. In addition, it could counteract the purpose of price stability,
since, with stable prices, the basket of goods that can be purchased with a sum of
money would – after deduction of interest – decrease.
Apart from this, imposing negative interest rates would be psychologically difficult
for the depositors to bear and «could give rise to public resentment and would make
its introduction politically inexpedient».237 However, this must not be avoided by the
preventive building in of an interest feature. Since experience shows that what can
be used will be used (preferably at first in exceptional circumstances), not only the
use but already the technical preparation of such use requires a sufficient legal basis.
This is precisely what is missing de lege lata for the issue of an e‐banknote, since there
is no doubt that physical cash has always been interest‐free.
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See e.g. Mersch Yves, The causes of monetary policy measures and their impact – a review,
Speech at the Euro Finance Week, FAROS Institutional Investors Forum, Frankfurt, 17
November 2016 (link).
The idea of «taxing currency» (Rogoff [2014] p. 1) this way is attributed to Gesell Silvio,
Die Natuerliche Wirtschaftsordnung, Rudolf Zitzmann Verlag, 1916 (available in English as
The Natural Economic Order, Peter Owen Ltd., London, 1958); see also Buiter Willem H.,
Negative Nominal Interest Rates: Three Ways to Overcome the Zero Lower Bound, NBER
Working Paper 15118, June 2009.
Nabilou (2019) p. 12 with further reference.
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3.4 Payment system
An objective relating to the provision of payment infrastructure for the financial
system is found frequently in central bank laws.238 This is not surprising, as the
issuance of CeBM by itself would be futile. Only if the management of circulation is
likewise ensured, can the money issued fulfil its intended functions, i.e. serve the
public as a means of payment and store of value and, in dealings between the central
bank and the monetary policy counterparties, ensure smooth settlement of payments
in private money and effective transmission of monetary policy decisions into the
real economy.239
In line with this, the forth indent of Article 127(2) TFEU, as mirrored in Article 3.1 of
the Statute, requires the ESCB to «promote the smooth operation of payment
systems» in order to enable the circulation just mentioned. Besides, Article 22 of the
Statute provides that «[t]he ECB and national central banks may provide facilities,
and the ESCB may make regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and
payment systems within the Union and with other countries.» Since Article 34.1 of
the Statute empowers the ESCB to make regulations, 240 take decisions, make
recommendations and deliver opinions, the ESCB enjoys a wide and forceful range
of instruments to foster its payment system related objective.241
This objective needs clarification in several respects. First, by interpreting the term
‘clearing and payment systems’, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
has referred inter alia to the Payment Services Directive (PSD), which defines a
‘payment system’ as «a funds transfer system with formal and standardised
arrangements and common rules for the processing, clearing and/or settlement of
payment transactions»242.243 The CJEU further interpreted the term ‘clearing’ in the
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BIS, Issues in the Governance of Central Banks, A report from the Central Bank Governance
Group, 18 May 2009 (link), p. 41; Riksbank (2020) p. 9.
ECB, The role of the Eurosystem in payment and clearing systems, Monthly Bulletin April
2002, 47‐60 (link), pp. 47 and 49; Athanassiou Phoebus L, Payment Systems, in:
Amtenbrink Fabian/Herrmann Christoph (eds.), EU Law of Economic and Monetary
Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2020, 711‐735, para 24.14.
Legal acts of general application, binding in their entirety and directly applicable in all
Member States (participating in the euro area); see ECB, The role of the Eurosystem in
payment and clearing systems, Monthly Bulletin April 2002, 47‐60 (link), p. 50.
See ECB, The Payment System: Payments, Securities and Derivatives, and the Role of the
Eurosystem, Frankfurt a.M., 2010 (link), pp. 309‐327.
See today Article 4(7) PSD2, i.e. Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market,
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light of the task conferred on the Eurosystem by the fourth indent of Article 127(2)
TFEU, which mentions only payment systems, and therefore regarded it as being
limited to payment clearing systems alone, providing e.g. net settlement payment.244
Second, ‘smooth’ is used here as an overarching term, which expresses that systems
should be efficient but at the same time secure, which requires a constant balancing
between these conflicting characteristics.245 Third, the ESCB is not obliged to operate
such systems itself. Rather, it is sufficient if it ‘promotes’ them.246 Fourth, although
this duty is listed among the basic tasks in Article 127 TFEU, it is not an end in itself,
unlike note‐issue and monetary policy. It actually enables and fosters the fulfilment
of the latter two and is therefore rather of a supporting nature.247 Fifth and finally, the
Eurosystem considers itself to assume complementary roles in order to fulfil its task:
an operative role as owner and operator of or participant in a system,248 a monitoring
role as overseer of systems249 and an enabling role as facilitator and catalyst.250 To
this must be added the shaping role of the regulator, which permeates and
strengthens the three roles mentioned above.251
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amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No
1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC.
CJEU, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v ECB T‐496/11 [2015]
ECLI:EU:T:2015:133 (so‐called CCP location policy case), para 94. See also Athanassiou
(2020) para 24.7. See also paras 24.13‐16 regarding the pivotal role of payment systems.
CJEU, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v ECB T‐496/11 [2015]
ECLI:EU:T:2015:133, paras 89‐101.
ECB (2002) p. 48 i.f.
Waldhoff Christian, comments on Article 127, in: Siekmann Helmut (ed.), EWU
Kommentar zur Europäischen Währungsunion, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2013, para 57.
Ibid sees evidence for the supportive role of what is termed to be a side task
(Nebenauftrag) in the fact that the ESCB has the right to leave the role of an operator to
others.
Athanassiou (2020) paras 24.26‐35; ECB (2010) pp. 243‐270.
Athanassiou (2020) paras 24.36‐41; ECB (2010) pp. 271‐290; ECB, Revised Oversight
Framework for Retail Payment Systems, Frankfurt a.M., 2016 (link).
Athanassiou (2020) para 24.32‐45; ECB (2010) pp. 291‐308; ECB (2002) pp. 53‐58; CJEU,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v ECB T‐496/11 [2015]
ECLI:EU:T:2015:133 para 4.
Ibid para 84, where such regulation was deemed to go «beyond mere oversight». See e.g.
the (binding) TARGET2 Guideline, which the Governing Council adopted on 26 April
2007, in order to harmonise the individual rules governing the contractual relationship
between participants and NCBs (i.e. the terms and conditions subject to which
TARGET2 offers its services). For details see Athanassiou (2020) para 24.31.
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Currently, the Eurosystem operates in the field of payment systems as the issuer of
euro banknotes and as the bank of banks, essentially providing the latter with
liquidity in the form of reserves. Both types of CeBM require their own kind of
payment system. In fact, historically, central banks’ payment systems function was
rooted in the need to strengthen the banknote as a means of payment. 252 Even
though the supply, circulation and storage of cash cannot do completely without
electronics,253 it requires nonetheless a payment system, which, however, is not to be
understood primarily as a technical but rather as an organisational infrastructure. In
this regard, the Eurosystem issues banknotes as described earlier.254 Moreover, the
ECB oversees the activities of the NCBs and initiates further harmonisation of cash
services within the euro area, while the NCBs put cash into circulation in particular
via the banking system and ensure the proper functioning of their national cash
distribution systems. Therein, the users themselves are responsible for transfer and
storage, supported by various services performed by their banks and other
authorised cash handlers who recirculate banknotes based on standards set by the
Eurosystem.255
In contrast to face‐to‐face cash payments, the transfer of digital funds regularly
requires a settlement process and the corresponding technical infrastructure and
agents. In this regard, the Eurosystem predominantly implements its operational
competencies in connection with TARGET2, the backbone of the infrastructure
facilitating wholesale payments in euro, and, since November 2018, TARGET instant
payment settlement service (TIPS), 256 on both of which it has also issued
guidelines.257 The Eurosystem conducts its oversight in accordance with Article 12.1
of the Statute, largely following a soft law approach with regard to financial market
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See ECB (2010) p. 151.
Wierts/Boven (2020) p. xx.
See supra Section 3.2.
See e.g. Decision ECB/2010/14 of 16 September 2010 on the authenticity and fitness
checking and recirculation of euro banknotes.
For historical details on the Trans‐European Automated Real‐time Gross Settlement
Express Transfer system, TARGET, its successor, TARGET2, and the TARGET instant
payment settlement service, TIPS, see Athanassiou (2020) para 24.27‐35. For other
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See Guideline ECB/2007/2 of 26 April 2007 on a Trans‐European Automated Real‐ime
Gross settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET2) and its Annexes; Guideline
ECB/2015/15 of 2 April 2015 amending the TARGET2‐Guideline.
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infrastructures (FMIs). 258 In addition, the ECB and the NCBs have developed
standards and recommendations aimed at harmonising and systematising
supervision and facilitating the comparison of assessments of different systems.259
Finally, as a catalyst, the Eurosystem encourages change that helps to overcome
remaining fragmentation in the payment sector and mitigates risks due to the
complexity of the market. The most outstanding result to date in this respect is
clearly the implementation of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) project.260
In light of the above, it could be argued that the Eurosystem’s task to provide
facilities under Article 22 of the Statute may include the establishment of an
infrastructure for the processing and settlement of rCBDC. As mentioned, this should,
however, not be an end in itself. Rather, the supportive nature of the task in question
must be respected. Therefore, the infrastructure in question would have to become
indispensable either because otherwise the Eurosystem could no longer fulfil its task
under Article 128(1) TFEU (to issue banknotes) or under Article 127(1) TFEU (to
implement the single monetary policy). That there is such need has already been
explained.261
It was also shown that there is a need for rCBDC in the sense of the digital monetary
object itself. 262 Accordingly, the mere provision of the core infrastructure by the
Eurosystem would suffice. At the same time, however, it would still be
indispensable: Given the strong network externalities associated with payment
systems,263 the Eurosystem should provide a core infrastructure on which private
operators could build additional services. This would make it possible to reconcile
competing policy objectives: On the one hand, it would help to mitigate the market
dominance of private payment systems and reduce the concentration risk in such
payment systems, while, on the other hand, creating a level playing field under
which the private sector could further innovate its services to the public.264
Given the strong network externalities that come with payment systems, the
Eurosystem should provide a core infrastructure on which private providers could
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See however Regulation ECB/2014/28 of 3 July 2014 on oversight requirements for
systemically important payment systems.
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Athanassiou (2020) paras 24.40‐41.
See Athanassiou (2020) para 24.43.
See supra Paragraph 3.3.2.2.
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IMF (2020) p. 11.
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Page 60

A goal based perspective

build additional offers. This would allow to reconcile competing policy objectives:
on the one hand, it would help to mitigate the market dominance of private payment
systems or reduce concentration risk in such payment systems, while, on the other
hand, a competitive level playing field were created wherein the private sector could
further innovate its service to the public.
To return to the monetary object itself: while Article 128(1) TFEU imposes limits on the
Eurosystem in the design of a relevant rCBDC, such limits are not immediately
apparent with regard to the implementation of the Eurosystemʹs monetary policy
and the functioning of the euro area money market. In other words, this would
mean that based on Article 127(1) and (4) TFEU, a design would also be conceivable
which would give the rCBDC functionalities that an e‐banknote de lege lata could not
have under Art. 128(1) TFEU, namely the possibility of making it interest‐bearing.
As has been shown, such a feature would have far‐reaching effects. In particular, it
could affect its users in their fundamental right to property as enshrined in Article
17(1) of the of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.265 The
Eurosystem is bound by the principle of proportionality in the exercise of its
competences. Since, in our opinion, the desired objectives can also be sufficiently
achieved with the help of an e‐banknote (or evidence to the contrary would have to
be brought forward first), a more far‐reaching design would not be permissible.
3.5 Financial stability
Financial stability can be a goal pursued with the issuance of rCBDC, but it may as
well restrict the design of such digital currency. Retail CBDC may serve as a back‐up
for electronic saving and paying in CoBM, particularly in times of financial crisis,
thus enhancing the resilience of the financial system. Similar to proposals on ‘narrow
banking’ and ‘full‐reserve money’, rCBDC may render the overall financial system
safer by unbundling, at least in part, the dual function of deposits as a means of
payment for depositors and of refinancing for the bank. On the other hand, it is
feared that rCBDC could lead to a disruption of commercial banksʹ business models,
enhanced risk of large‐scale bank runs (‘digital runs’) and, more fundamentally, too
large of a ‘footprint’ of central banks in the financial system, thereby increasing
financial stability risk. How the issuance of a rCBDC will impact financial stability in
the short and longer term is difficult to anticipate, as economic studies yield
ambiguous results.266 A careful balancing of interests is of the essence.267
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Financial stability objectives are difficult to spell out and pursue due to their
multidimensionality (see David J. Archer, A coming crisis of legitimacy?, Sveriges
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While the exact scope of its financial stability mandate remains opaque,268 the ECB
must take the potential implications on financial stability – both positive and
negative – into account when deciding whether to issue an e‐euro and how to design
such e‐euro. It is not unlikely that the ECB, in its multiple capacities as monetary
authority and prudential supervisor, will encounter conflicting financial stability
objectives with a view to the issuance of an e‐euro, which need to be carefully
managed at an institutional level. As a monetary policy‐maker, the ECB depends on
a stable and functioning banking system to transmit monetary impulses.269 It may
therefore, subject to a well‐reasoned proportionality assessment, pursue financial
stability as an intermediate objective of monetary policy, i.e. an objective that
ultimately promotes its primary objective of price stability.270 Not unlike in the case
of unconventional monetary policy measures, financial stability considerations or,
more specifically, the need to ensure smooth transmission channels in the face or in
anticipation of a dwindling use of cash as a public money, may therefore, in
principle, inform the ECBʹs decision to issue an e‐euro. In its capacity as the direct
(micro‐)prudential supervisor of the most significant banks of the euro area, the ECB
bears «significant responsibility (…) to safeguard financial stability in the Union».271
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Riksbank Economic Review, Vol. 3, 2016, 86‐95, 91‐92, amongst others). Not only do
they relate do different (and sometimes conflicting) time horizons, but they also closely
interact with other policy fields, exhibiting prudential, monetary and fiscal dimensions.
Attempting to locate financial stability objectives within the EUʹs law and policy Gianni
Lo Schiavo, The Role of Financial Stability in EU Law and Policy, Wolters Kluwer 2017).
See infra Sections 4.4 and 4.5.
Fundamentally Psaroudakis Georgios, The Scope for Financial Stability Considerations in
the Fulfilment of the Mandate of the ECB/Eurosystem, Journal of Financial Regulation, Vol. 4,
2018, 119‐156.
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In that capacity, the ECB is primarily focused on the safety and soundness of the
individual bank. It will therefore naturally tend give more emphasis to potential
shorter‐term financial stability risks associated with the introduction of an e‐euro,
such as potential disruptions of banksʹ traditional business models, rather than (less
certain) long‐term financial stability gains.

November 2010 conferring specific tasks upon the ECB concerning the functioning of
the European Systemic Risk Board [2010] OJ L331/162.
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4 A constitutional perspective
4.1 The ECBʹs power to authorise the issuance of e‐banknotes
In the following, we argue that Article 128(1) TFEU provides for both a source of
competence for the ECB to issue an e‐euro and a limitation to that competence. It
serves as a source of competence in that it confers upon the ECB the power to issue
(or authorise the issuance of) cash as a retail public money, with the limited
exception of minor cash (coins).272 The issuance of a widely‐used public money is a
precondition for monetary policy,273 which is why the issuance power was accorded
to the ECB in the first place. Article 128(1) TFEU imposes limitations on the ECBʹs
competence to issue an e‐euro by restricting its functional design. We derive these
conclusions, in a first step, from a historical, teleological and systematic
interpretation of Article 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 of the Statute.
4.1.1 E‐banknotes as banknotes under Article 128(1) TFEU
The wording of Article 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 of the Statute does not exclude
that euro banknotes be issued in a medium other than paper, nor does the drafting
history of these provisions. As the Maastricht Treaty was drafted before the Internet
had started impacting economic and social interactions on a massive scale and first
forms of e‐money had evolved, it does not come as a surprise that working groups
involved with the future issuance of euro banknotes had paper‐based banknotes in
mind.274 The drafting history, however, does not reveal any evidence of a qualified
silence of the Treaty drafters in the sense that they intended to exclude media other
than paper for banknotes covered by Article 128(1) TFEU. The fact that the
emergence of the Internet and of private digital currencies (such as Liberty Reserve
in 2006) did not lead to an amendment of the provision in the Treaties of Amsterdam
(1997), Nice (2001) and Lisbon (2007) does not indicate such qualified silence. At the
time, these private digital currencies were still in their infancy, and the discussion
about their effect on central banking and the prospects for the introduction of a
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On the issuance of coins as a remaining, but very limited, national competence
according to Article 128(2) TFEU see infra Subsection 4.1.3.
See supra Subsection 3.3.1.
See e.g. ECB, Report on the legal protection of banknotes in the EU Member States,
Frankfurt, 9 November 1999 (link), p. 41 («authorised paper money»); see also p. 5 with
reference to a «Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote (BNWG)»
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rCBDC started only about a decade after the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon.275 While
technology may have allowed for the digital issuance of central bank currency
already at the time of these Treaty amendments, the evidence is that the drafters
simply did not have rCBDC on their radar screens.276 As a consequence, they neither
explicitly made provision for the issuance of a rCBDC nor explicitly – even silently –
excluded it from the scope of Article 128(1) TFEU.
Article 128(1) TFEU should be read in light of the intention to design a constitutional
framework for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) that is flexible enough to
accommodate economic, social and technological developments.277 This particularly
pertains to developments that, like the crowding out of cash by privately‐issued
digital currencies, could jeopardise the use of the euro as the single currency, which
underlies EMU as its very basis. A teleological interpretation of Article 128(1) is
consistent with the dynamic and evolving nature of EMU and the ECB more
specifically278 and takes into account the evolution of the concept of banknote, of
which the transition from the paper to the digital medium only constitutes the last in
a row of evolutionary steps.279 Accordingly, we find that the paper medium is not a
defining feature of the concept of a banknote. The requirement for it to be ‘written’
to give it permanence may just as well be met by a digital record. A purposive
reading of Article 128(1) TFEU suggests instead that the defining feature of
banknotes relates to their function: to serve as a credit‐risk free means of payment
and store of value accessible to the general public. The provision puts the ECB in
charge of issuing or authorising the issuance of a retail public money. The medium
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The Bank of England was leading in initiating this global discussion. See e.g. Victoria
Cleland, Digital Future for Sterling: Assessing the Implications, Bank of England, 5 July
2017.
Similarly, Banque de France (2020) p. 31.
See supra Subsection 2.2.5. On intertemporal flexibility with a view to the ESCBʹs
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Review 359.
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para 20.
See supra Subsection 2.2.3.

Page 65

A constitutional perspective

of that issuance, however, may adapt to (unanticipated) changes in technology and
user demand.
At the same time, it is this defining function of banknotes that limits the ECBʹs
competence to issue e‐banknotes. Their intangible nature renders e‐banknotes much
more versatile than paper‐based banknotes and allows for their use to serve other
functions – including functions we may not even anticipate yet today. In particular,
e‐banknotes could open up new horizons in the conduct of monetary policy,
allowing for a much more direct control of (potentially ultra‐negative) interest rates
and effectively creating a form of tax. 280 Article 128(1) TFEU, however, while
allowing in principle for the issuance of e‐banknotes by the ECB, legally restricts
their use to the functions of cash. In other words, in order to be covered by Article
128(1) TFEU, e‐banknotes must be designed as a functional equivalent to paper‐
based banknotes. 281 Accordingly, their functions would be limited to those of a
means of payment and a store of value, which excludes their use as a monetary
policy tool.
This reading is supported by a systematic interpretation of the provision. Both the
Treaty and the Statute mention banknote issuance separately from the basic tasks of
monetary policy.282 The fact that the competence to issue banknotes is codified in a
separate article corroborates that issuing banknotes – whether paper‐based or
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See supra Subsection 3.3.3.
Coming to similar conclusions, reports issued by the De Nederlandsche Bank and the
Banque de France base their argumentation on the second paragraph of Article 16 of the
Statute stating: «The ECB shall respect as far as possible existing practices regarding the
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digital – is the logical precondition for monetary policy, rather than an instrument of
that policy.
4.1.2 Scope of the ECBʹs competence based on Article 128(1) TFEU
Based on Article 128(1) TFEU, the ECB is competent to issue e‐banknotes to the
extent these banknotes exhibit a cash‐like functional design. The power of banknote
issuance – whether paper‐based or digital – is a power in its own right. In particular,
the issuance of e‐banknotes by the ECB would not require any prior legislative act
authorising the ECB to make use of its powers. Article 133 TFEU states:
«Without prejudice to the powers of the European Central Bank, the
European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the
ordinary legislative procedure, shall lay down the measures necessary
for the use of the euro as the single currency. Such measures shall be
adopted after consultation of the European Central Bank.» (emphasis
added)
Article 133 TFEU provides for the legislative competence at EU level to issue
secondary law acts to address certain issues pertaining to the use of the euro. Those
are ancillary acts of legislation that cannot and must not interfere with the
constitutional powers granted to the ECB. When the euro was adopted, it was
necessary to put a detailed legal framework in place to facilitate the substitution of
national currencies and to address practical matters arising from the introduction of
a single currency.283 Moreover, as Member States retained the competence to issue
euro coins and only the power over the volume of coin issuance was transferred to
the ECB, it was for the EU legislators to regulate the denominations and technical
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See Council Regulation (EC) No 1103/97 of 17 June 1997 on certain provisions relating to
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specifications of euro coins uniformly for the euro area.284 In contrast, all matters
regarding the design of euro banknotes, including denominations, specifications and
security, relate to powers incidental to the issuance power according to Article 128(1)
TFEU and are therefore laid down in ECB decisions. 285 Article 10 of Regulation
974/98 is of a purely declaratory nature, merely repeating the legal tender status
assigned to euro banknotes by Article 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 of the Statute.
4.1.3 The ECBʹs exclusive competence to issue an e‐euro on the basis of Article
128(1) TFEU
What remains to be clarified is whether the ECB is exclusively competent to issue (or
authorise the issuance of) an e‐euro. As Member States explicitly remained
competent to issue euro coins according to paragraph 2 of Article 128, one may
argue that they retain the power to issue some sort of ‘digital coins’ alongside the
issuance of e‐banknotes by the ECB.286 However, this view overlooks the fact that the
distinction between banknotes and coins with their respective denominations is not
practicable for an e‐euro. Just like book money, an e‐euro will be stored, transferred
and accounted in lump sums. And just like in a bank account, the electronic wallet
will show no separable ‘20‐cent’ or ‘five‐euro piece’ of the digital coin.
Accordingly, the delineation of competences assigned to the European level for
(physical) banknotes on the one hand and to the national level for (physical) coins on
the other is not pertinent in the digital world. The result cannot be that the
ECB/NCBs and the Member States possess parallel competences to issue an e‐euro.
Allowing Member States to issue a limited volume of ‘their own e‐euro’ would
almost certainly create confusion among users and threaten the singleness of the
euro. On a fundamental level, national competence cannot provide for a single e‐
euro. This is why Member States effectively transferred monetary sovereignty to the
EU level and put the independent ECB in charge of the issuance of the single
currency, with the limited exception of (physical) coins, and of conducting a single
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See Council Regulation (EU) No 729/2014 of 24 June 2014 on denominations and
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monetary policy for the euro area.287 From the perspective of practicability, it would
make little sense and be very costly to divide the digitisation of payments between
the ECB and the Member States. Several issuers would be issuing the essentially
same thing: What would distinguish the e‐euro issued by Member State X from the
e‐euro issued by Member State Y and the e‐euro issued by the ECB/NCBs?
In practice, the issue may cause little concern since the volume of coin issuance by
Member States is subject to ECB authorisation and the ECB could therefore control
the volume of ‘digital coins’ authorised for issuance under Article 128(2) TFEU.
However, there are more fundamental reasons to assume that the European
competence to issue an e‐euro must prevail. We have argued that rCBDC is much
closer to the concept of banknote as set out in Article 128(1) TFEU than to the
concept of coin according to Article 128(2) TFEU as history attests to the
unimportance of coins as payment objects. 288 Representing a subsidiary form of
cash,289 the issuance of coins has traditionally been left to the Treasury or a body
closely linked to it (e.g., the Mint).
Article 128(2) TFEU was never meant to control Article 128(1) TFEU, but on the
contrary, to leave in the hands of Member States only powers as to subsidiary objects
of payment – which in the case of the e‐banknote are not needed. Accordingly, the
ECB is competent to issue any form of cash, except physical coins. 290 This
understanding is supported by the reasons for which Member States retained coin
issuance as a remaining piece of national monetary sovereignty. Originally set to
become a supranational competence as well, the issuance of coins was ‘returned’ to
Member States in the course of the Maastricht negotiations in order not to break with
the tradition of coin issuance being a power governments are typically vested with.
A majority in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) agreed that coins were of
«minor monetary importance» and that it would suffice for the ECB to control the
volume of coin issuance to ensure conformity with its primary objective of price
stability.291 Member Statesʹ interests in keeping coin issuance a national competence
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On monetary sovereignty and the euro Charles Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspects of
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were primarily of a sentimental and fiscal nature. Since an e‐euro by definition
would lack a ‘national side’ like physical coins to exhibit kings and queens, national
heroes and historical monuments, sentimental interests can largely be neglected.
Fiscal interests of Member States, in contrast, will be affected by a loss of seignorage,
achieved today by net emission of EUR 900 million p.a. less costs,292 to the extent an
e‐euro substitutes physical coins. However, the ECB/NCBs could compensate
Member States for their lost seignorage. Each NCB could credit the relevant Member
Stateʹs account with e‐euro up to the value of coins no longer authorised for issue by
the ECB every year. The amount would have to be set for the future based on the
(overall quite linear) development to date.
4.2 Issuance of an e‐euro as an implied power of the ECB
We have put forward that e‐banknotes are the logical continuation of paper‐based
banknotes and covered by Article 128(1) TFEU to the extent their usage is restricted
to the functions of cash. This is our primary line of argumentation. In the following,
we will bring forward the accessory argument that the ECB possesses the
competence to issue an e‐euro even if this e‐euro were not to qualify as banknotes
according to Article 128(1) TFEU but represented a new type of monetary object
different from ‘banknotes’ or ‘coins’.293
This accessory argument relies on implied powers that are indispensable for the ECB
to fulfil its monetary mandate according to Article 127(1) and (2) TFEU.294 In fact, the
ECB, like other central banks, was given the power over the issuance of banknotes
because the use of the latter by the public is an indispensable precondition for the
conduct of monetary policy. 295 The indispensability for the conduct of monetary
policy, however, does not necessarily relate to the concept of ‘banknote’ according to
Article 128(1) TFEU. In principle, any type of outside money accessible to the general
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ECB Statistical Data Warehouse (link).
Such ‘sui generis e‐euro’ would still be a euro. It would simply supplement physical
euro cash by digital euro cash, i.e. a new monetary object representing that same
monetary value.
The CJEU acknowledges implied powers to the extent that these powers are
indispensable for an EU institution to carry out a task conferred on it by the Treaties.
See e.g. joined cases C‐281, 283‐285 and 287/85 Germany and others v Commission
EU:C:1983:351 para 28: «(…) it must be emphasised that where an article of the [Treaties]
(…) confers a specific task on the Commission it must be accepted, if that provision is
not to be rendered wholly ineffective, that it confers on the Commission necessarily and
per se the powers which are indispensable in order to carry out that tasks.»
See supra Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
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public, i.e. money coming from outside the private sector, because it is issued or
fully backed by a public institution such as a central bank, could serve as a
precondition of monetary policy. This includes an e‐euro issued by the ECB/NCBs or
authorised for issuance by the ECB, whether or not it qualifies as ‘banknotes’ in the
strict sense of the term.
Article 128(1) TFEU nevertheless has a confining effect. The term ‘banknote’ limits
the implied powers of the ECB in that it excludes the issuance of types of outside
money that do not share the distinctive features of banknotes. In particular, the
issuance and transfer of banknotes are independent from the identity of users. It is
due to the token‐based nature of banknotes that the issuerʹs balance sheet only shows a
bulk position ‘banknotes’ and no individual accounts as it is the case for reserves.
This feature of banknotes is vital for the privacy of users and excludes from the
ECBʹs implied powers the issuance of an account‐based e‐euro. Moreover, as has
been stated before, banknotes are not a tool of monetary policy and were never
(intended to be) used as such. As in the primary argumentation above, the accessory
argumentation therefore excludes the possibility that digital cash could serve such a
function.
Implied powers are powers that are indispensable for an authority in order to carry
out a task it is assigned with.296 If the use of physical cash were to diminish to an
extent that it would no longer exhibit its stabilising effects, confidence in the
monetary system may erode and the conduct of monetary policy be impeded. The
issuance of an e‐euro will then become necessary for the ECB to fulfil its basic task of
defining and implementing the monetary policy of the euro area, for which it is
given far‐reaching independence.297 In the exercise of its monetary powers – explicit
and implied – the ECB is independent and barred from taking or seeking any
outside instructions. It would be a violation of this independence if the co‐legislators
could interfere via secondary legislation. While the significant and persistent
dwindling of cash may appear to be a development of a distant future, the ECB has a
duty to act in anticipation of that point. There is no doubt that private initiatives will
continue to seek to fill the void by issuing digital currencies. Network effects, i.e. the
fact that a growing number of users of a digital currency increases the utility of that
digital currency for each new and existing user, require central banks to be among
the first movers.
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Being based on implied powers of the ECB necessary to pursue its monetary
mandate, the issuance by the ECB of a token‐based outside money would neither
require a Treaty amendment nor a legislative act of authorisation by the Council and
EU Parliament. An account‐based form of outside money, in contrast, would have to
be authorised by an act of secondary legislation. It would also require a careful
design in light of the impact of its use (and ultimately its replacement of cash) on
fundamental rights of end‐users, in particular usersʹ right to privacy as enshrined in
Article 8(1) of the Charter and Article 16(1) TFEU.
4.3 Legal tender status of an e‐euro
4.3.1 When does an e‐euro possess legal tender status?
Whether or not e‐banknotes have legal tender status depends on who is their legal
issuer298 and is therefore a consequence of their exact architecture and the issuance
model chosen.299 Article 128(1), third sentence, TFEU300 states:
«The banknotes issued by the European Central Bank and the national
central banks shall be the only such notes to have the status of legal
tender within the Union.»
Accordingly, e‐banknotes issued by the ECB/NCBs by definition have legal tender
status based on primary law, i.e. without the need for further legislation. Article
128(1) TFEU allows for the ECB to authorise the issuance of e‐banknotes by non‐
ESCB entities, for example commercial banks. It excludes, however, explicitly legal
tender status for such banknotes. Article 128(1) TFEU was phrased to accommodate
the British practice, according to which some commercial banks in Scotland and
Northern Ireland issue their own banknotes fully backed by pound sterling. These
banknotes are not legal tender in Scotland or Northern Ireland, but nevertheless
enjoy a legal status comparable to that of banknotes issued by the Bank of
England.301
The wording of Article 128(1) TFEU further suggests that legal tender status could
be assigned to an e‐euro that does not qualify as banknotes, but represents a new
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‘Issuance’ essentially refers to the appearance as a liability on the central bank’s or
commercial bank’s balance sheet.
See infra Part 6.
See also Article 10, second sentence, Regulation 974/98 (with a purely declaratory
character).
Van den Berg (n 277), xxx.
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type of monetary object (according to our scenario above under Section 4.2).302 In fact,
it was chosen to ensure that Member States could (continue to) grant legal tender
status to current accounts with commercial banks (‘book money’) denominated in
euro. In its version of 25 October 1990, Article 16.1 of the draft Statute had read as
follows:
«The Council shall have the exclusive right to authorise the issue of
notes within the Community. The notes issued by the ECB and the
national central banks shall be the only legal tender for any amount.»
(emphasis added).
In the negotiations during the Governorsʹ meeting on 13 November 1990, the Dutch
delegates cautioned against the loss of the legal tender status they thought CoBM
enjoyed in the Netherlands once the euro was adopted.303 It was agreed to change
the second sentence of Article 16.1 of the draft Statute as follows:
«The notes issued by the ECB and the national central banks shall be the
only notes to have legal tender status.» (emphasis added).
The Dutch IGC presidency included the same wording also in Article 105(4) fourth
indent of the draft Treaty of 25 September 1991 (now: Article 128(1) TFEU).304 The
intention was to allow Member States to maintain practices that treat account‐based
private money in a manner equivalent to legal tender, as is the case with Article
6:114 of the Dutch Civil Code, without subjecting such money to authorisation by
the ECB. However, nothing in the wording or history of Article 128(1) TFEU
suggests that legal tender status (or a treatment equivalent to such status) is
excluded for a token‐based monetary object issued by the ECB/NCBs.
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The same is true for Article 16, third sentence, of the Statute («The banknotes issued by
the ECB and the national central banks shall be the only such notes to have the status of
legal tender within the Union.»; emphasis added) and Article 10, second sentence,
Regulation 974/98 («[…], these banknotes denominated in euro shall be the only
banknotes which have the status of legal tender in all [participating] Member States.»;
emphasis added). See also Article 11, second sentence, Regulation 974/98 regarding
coins.
Article 6:114 of the Dutch Civil Code codifies the acceptance of bank transfers as a valid
payment method for private law purposes. It does not, however, formally assign legal
tender status to CoBM in public‐law terms.
Van den Berg (n 277), xxx.
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The main purpose of the reference to legal tender in Article 128(1) TFEU was simply
to ascribe to the euro the status of exclusive legal tender once it substituted the
national currencies of euro area Member States. There was to be a single euro, and
clearly, Member States are forbidden from creating parallel currencies by granting
legal tender status to banknotes, coins or any other monetary object not denominated
in euro.305 Even if an e‐euro were to qualify as a monetary object different from
banknotes or coins according to Article 128(1) and (2) TFEU, it would be euro‐
denominated.306 Primary law does therefore not exclude that legal tender be granted
to such e‐euro by an act of secondary law to the extent it is issued by the ECB and/or
NCBs. The issuance of a legal tender e‐euro qualifies as an act of public authority
and is therefore, according to general principles, not delegable to private actors.307
The ECB may authorise the issuance of a sui generis e‐euro by commercial banks, but
such e‐euro could not be given the status of legal tender.
Monetary object
Issuer
Banknote
ECB/NCBs
(Article 1281(1) TFEU
Commercial banks
(subject to ECB
authorisation)
Coin
Member States
(Article 128(2) TFEU)
Other
ECB/NCBs
Commercial banks
(subject to ECB
authorisation)

Legal tender status
By definition
(based on Article 128(1) TFEU)
Excluded
(based on Article 128(1) TFEU)
Yes
(based on Article 11 Regulation 974/98)
Possible
(based on secondary law)
Excluded (principle of non‐delegability of
acts of public authority)

4.3.2 What does legal tender mean in the EU?
The meaning of legal tender and its implications in EU and national private and
public law are characterised by a remarkable lack of legal certainty. Prior to the
adoption of the euro, every euro area Member State had its own distinct
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This possibility was briefly discussed at the outset of the Greek sovereign debt crisis
(‘Eurolino’), but then dropped due to its obvious interference with primary law.
A ‘sui generis e‐euro’ would also have to be convertible to ensure that it circulates at par
with physical cash euro and to avoid the assumption of the public that banknotes and
the e‐euro were two kinds of euro.
See also the assessment made by the European Legal Tender Expert Group (ELTEG):
European Legal Tender Expert Group, Report on the definition, scope and effects of legal
tender of euro banknotes and coins, Brussels, 21 January 2009 (link), p. 5.
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understanding of the meaning of legal tender with a view to its national currency.308
This understanding was often based on historical tradition, doctrine and/or case law
rather than statutory provisions. Article 128(1) TFEU refers to the term ‘legal tender’
without defining it. It continues to be an open question whether Article 128(1) TFEU
has fully harmonised the meaning of the term at EU level or whether pre‐existing
national understandings of its meaning have remained largely unaffected.
The EU has not (yet) made use of its exclusive competence in matters of monetary
policy to clarify the issue.309 Secondary law referring to the status of the euro as legal
tender is scarce and generally limited to assigning legal tender status to certain
(physical) expressions of the euro, without clarifying any further the fundamental
consequences of that status. 310 Instead, the Commission adopted in 2010 a non‐
binding Recommendation on the scope and effects of legal tender of euro banknotes
and coins, addressed to euro area Member States and the ECB, amongst others.311
This Recommendation was informed by the findings of the European Legal Tender
Expert Group (ELTEG), an inter‐institutional working group composed of national
and EU experts.312
The ELTEG had reached consensus on only three core implications of the concept of
legal tender, later adopted in Article 1 of the Commission Recommendation: (1)
responsibility to accept (unless explicitly agreed otherwise); (2) acceptance at full
face value; and (3) legally recognised means to discharge from payment obligations.
These three core features can be seen as a common denominator of the different
national understandings of the concept of legal tender within the euro area.
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See ELTEG (n 307), Annex (pp. 23‐73).
See Article 3(1)(c) TFEU. A minority within the European Legal Tender Expert Group
(ELTEG), however, was of the opinion that the EU had already made use of its (limited)
competence to define what legal tender is and that all further implications of the legal
tender status were governed by national law: ELTEG (n 307), p. 2.
An exception is Article 11 Regulation 974/98, giving creditors the right to refuse
acceptance of more than fifty euro‐denominated coins, although the implications of that
provision remain opaque. See Robert Freitag, Euro as legal tender (and banknotes), in
Hermann Christoph/Amtenbrink Fabian (eds), EU Law of Economic and Monetary Union
(OUP 2020) 595, para 21.26.
Commission Recommendation 2010/191/EU of 22 March 2010 on the scope and effects
of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins [2010] OJ L83/70.
ELTEG (n 307).
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Which other elements can be deduced from the legal tender status remains an open
question.313 The question is not without practical relevance, and the CJEU will soon
have to decide on the matter in a pending request for a preliminary ruling.314 Article
128(1) TFEU, being a provision of primary EU law, must be interpreted in an
autonomous manner. Autonomous interpretation, however, does not necessarily
imply a distinct European concept of legal tender. In light of the absence of a clear
definition of legal tender in EU law, the CJEU may well find that the term lacks
common understanding at EU level – at least beyond the core features identified in
the Commission Recommendation – and that Article 128(1) TFEU refers to the
understandings according to the law and practice in each euro area Member State
predating the adoption of the euro. 315 Such interpretation would confirm the
prevalent understanding of legal tender as a largely ‘open concept’.316
4.3.3 Why assign legal tender status to an e‐euro?
The existence of legal tender is often explained by its stability and trust‐building
effects and the fact that it facilitates the exercise of fundamental freedoms.317 Cash as
legal tender serves a number of public interests. The ECB, in charge of authorising
the issuance of euro banknotes, therefore, sees itself «responsible for protecting the
status of euro cash as the sole legal tender», including by «guaranteeing the
existence of euro cash and its usability as legal tender».318
But is it really mandatory for a means of payment and store of value to have legal
tender status in order to serve its key functions in the public interest? In other words,
would there be any major drawbacks if no legal tender in a strict sense were
available to the general public, for example, in case physical cash would naturally be
replaced at some point in time by an e‐euro lacking formal legal tender status?319
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Elements discussed by the ELTEG included: refusal of high denomination banknotes;
validity of cash surcharges; and refusal of cash in Business to Customer (B2C)
relationships. ELTEG (n 308), pp. 5‐7, 9‐10.
Joined cases C‐422/19 and C‐423/19 Johannes Dietrich v Hessischer Rundfunk.
Suggested by Freitag (n 310) para 21.59.
See also Yves Mersch, The role of euro banknotes as legal tender, 4th Bargeldsymposium of
the Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt, 14 February 2018 (link).
See Mersch (n 316).
Mersch (n 316).
History shows that the need for a legal tender in the strict sense may be bypassed.
Kosovoʹs currency regulation under the UN Administration, for example, established
the following: (1) freedom to choose currency; (2) presumption of use of currency
widely used; and (3) power of the government which currency is widely used.
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There is a policy and a legal aspect to that question. As far as policy is concerned,
history shows a remarkable desire of policy‐makers to maintain a formal legal
tender at all times. In the transitional period lasting from 1 January 1999 until 31
December 2001, during which no euro‐denominated legal tender existed yet, pre‐
existing national currencies were declared to be sub‐divisions of the euro to avoid a
period without legal tender.320 The banknotes and coins denominated in a national
currency kept their status as legal tender within their territorial limits until 31
December 2001321 and even beyond.322
The concept of legal tender has its origins in the Mint Lords who forced their people
to accept the money they issued in order to earn seignorage. While the fiscal interest
in maintaining the legal tender concept may have become outdated, legal tender is
still important in order to spur demand in a currency (network effect). It regularly
implies that (1) the government has to accept its own currency; and (2) private
parties will accept it if nothing else has been agreed upon (default result). For these
reasons, it would be recommendable for an e‐euro – whether or not it qualifies as
banknotes according to Article 128(1) TFEU – to possess formal legal tender status,
i.e. to be issued by the ECB/NCBs.
Legally speaking, however, a formal legal tender status is not mandatory. We have
argued that there must be a form of retail public money to serve the key functions of
providing a credit‐risk free means of payment and store of value for the general
public and that the ECB must guarantee a form of such retail public money.323 But it
must not necessarily be physical cash, nor must it be formally assigned legal tender
status. The legal position of a non‐legal tender e‐euro could and would have to be
clarified in alternative ways. For example: To ensure that payment in e‐euro
discharges a citizen of public debts (such as taxes or television fees), the ECB could
allow direct payment in e‐euro by adopting an according legal act. In the unlikely
event that a government would refuse to be paid in e‐euro, the respective NCB could
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Although the regulation avoided the use of ‘legal tender’, the media took it to mean that
the Deutsche Mark replaced the Yogoslav dinar as official legal tender in Kosovo. See
e.g. ʹKosovo adopts Deutschmarkʹ, BBC News, 3 September 1999 (link).
Article 6 Regulation 974/98. More specifically, ‘money of payment’ was distinct from
‘money of account’.
Article 9 Regulation 974/98.
According to Article 15 Regulation 974/98, banknotes and coins denominated in
national currency kept their former status as legal tender for a maximum of six months
after the end of the transition period.
See supra Section 3.2.
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credit the governmentʹs reserve account instead. As long as physical cash continues
to exist, a non‐legal tender e‐euro could be ‘attached’ to the legal tender status of
banknotes and coins by the ECB guaranteeing to convert e‐euro to physical cash
promptly and at all times.324
4.4 Balancing of interests regarding the fundamental right to conduct a business
A potential limitation to the ECB’s power to issue a rCBDC could be seen in the
fundamental right to conduct a business as enshrined in Article 16 of the Charter.
Arguably, this is because with the issuance of rCBDC, the central bank as a public
authority may enter into a domain that has previously been perceived as a ‘private
business’ conducted by commercial banks in particular. From a fundamental rights
perspective, this is a grey area given that commercial banks’ intermediary role is not
only a business case but also aimed at supporting the central bank in fulfilling tasks
of public authority. However, the fact is that depending on the exact features
attached to it, rCBDC has the potential to change – to varying degrees – the
conditions under which commercial banks have conducted their business to date.
The ECB, like any other institution of the EU, is bound to observe fundamental
rights when interpreting the Treaty and executing its tasks. In particular, it must
ensure that any measure it implements is justified in light of the legitimate goals
pursued by it and proportionate to potentially affected rights of third parties. The
economics literature offers insights into the potential impacts of rCBDC issuance on
commercial banks (and other financial institutions) and is discussed in more detail
below. We argue in the following that the risk of disintermediation is less of an issue
than often assumed. In light of alternative strategies for banks to cope with changed
underlying conditions for their business, disintermediation may even offer a chance
for a change to the better in the longer term. Digital runs, on the other hand, pose a
real risk that needs to be managed appropriately.
4.4.1 Risk of disintermediation
Very early on, the discussion about the potential introduction of rCBDC also
included the potentially associated negative effects on financial institutions325 and
especially commercial banks.326 Depending on the technical design of an e‐banknote
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Banque de France (n 276) 32.
E.g. payment services providers, money‐transmission businesses and other entities
operating in the markets for stored‐value products.
Broadbent Ben, Central banks and digital currencies, Speech given by the Bank of England
Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy, London, 2 March 2016 (link), p. 3; Smets Jan,
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and the financial conditions attached to it, households could consider it an
alternative to deposits rather than to cash.327 For the issuance328 of digital money,
central banks would thus enter into direct competition with commercial banks or, at
least, open up the market to further competition to the extent that central banks
would make their reserves available to other intermediaries issuing fully‐backed
private e‐banknotes.329
The public demand for e‐banknotes will be based on a variety of motives.330 In any
case, the starting point is convenience, or rather the need for digital money that is
suited to the needs of modern life. However, the unique selling point compared to
private fractional‐reserve money will always be the desire to hold money that is not
subject to the insolvency risk of the issuer – and in times of crisis it may even become
the sole motive. In normal times, however, cost considerations are likely to spur
additional demand if central banks (that are neither geared to maximising profits
nor enticed to exploit its market power) can operate with lower fees than private
competitors. Furthermore, the need for privacy will also play a role, since central
banks do not commercialise data.331
Absent any mitigating measures (discussed later332), the banks would be affected in
several ways. First, to the extent to which deposits would no longer be used for
payments (by funds transfer, card transactions, etc.), the associated income streams
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Fintech and Central Banks – Fintech and the Future of Retail Banking, Speech given by the
National Bank of Belgium Governor, Brussels, 9 December 2016 (link), p. 9; see also the
study provided by MIT for the Bank of England in 2016: Moreno Arturo/Navarro
Adriano/Quayyum Arif/Saravia Sergio/Siddiqui Emaad/Vasileva Detelina, 15.998
Independent Study in Blockchain – Project 3: Issuing a Central Bank Digital Currency, p. 10;
Broadbent (2016), Mancini‐Griffoli et al (2018), Andolfatto (2018), Kumhof and Noone
(2018), Meaning et al (2018), and Chiu et al (2019), among others.
See e.g. Bindseil (2020) pp. 9‐14; BIS CPMI/MC (2018) pp. 11 et seq.; Wierts/Boven (2020)
p. 19.
The same could apply to storage and transfer; however, these are delegable tasks, thus
bearing a lower disintermediation risk.
See e.g. Adrian/Mancini‐Griffoli (2019) p. 13 regarding potential motives (sponsoring of
domestic issuers operating under direct supervision instead of leaving the market to
natural monopolies of international big firms; retention of seignorage revenue).
See e.g. Juks (2019) p. 88.
On the potential welfare impact of reductions in privacy in payments: Garrat/von Oordt
(2019) passim.
See infra Paragraph 4.4.7.2.
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would erode. 333 Second and equally correlated with the volume of payments no
longer processed via their balance sheets, banks would be stripped of transaction
data needed to provide information‐intensive non‐traded loans in a risk‐adequate
manner.334 Third and most importantly, the shift from deposits to e‐banknotes would
result in banks losing funding. The adverse effects would be all the more distressing
the more households made a switch, as their deposits are traditionally used by
banks as an important, stable, comparatively inexpensive and uncollateralised
source of refinancing. 335 Fourth, operational discipline of banks might decline or
improve depending on the type of deposits to be redeemed in e‐banknotes: those of
cautious and well‐informed wholesale depositors or of insured and passive retail
depositors.336 Fifth and finally, services that are currently cross‐subsidised (by both
payment fees and economies of scale in funding) would need to become viable on a
stand‐alone basis.337
4.4.2 Freedom to conduct a business
In short, the introduction of an e‐banknote could force banks (at least de facto) to
accept a decrease in market power or else take measures that could entail costs and
loss of income for them. This, in turn, could impair the freedom to conduct a business,
which economic agents such as banks enjoy under Article 16 of the Charter.
Freedom to conduct a business, which coincides with freedom to pursue an
occupation, is one of the general principles of EU law.338 It is derived from the case
law of the CJEU339 and aims to safeguard the right of each person, individual and
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BIS (2018) p. 15.
Goodfriend Marvin, Money, Credit, Banking, and Payments System Policy, in: The U.S.
Payments System: Efficiency, Risk and the Role of the Federal Reserve, Humphrey
David B. (ed.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990, 248, 253 et seq. (reprint: link); Fama
Eugene, What’s Different About Banks? Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 15, Issue
1, January 1985, 29‐39. See also Geva (2019) pp. 14, 20, 22.
See infra Subsection 4.4.4.
Mancini‐Griffoli et al (2018) p. 16.
BIS (2018) p. 15.
See CJEU C‐143/88, C‐92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest [1991]
ECR I‐415, paras 72‐77. The same is true of freedom to pursue an occupation: C‐177/90
Kühn [1992] ECR I‐35, para 16; C‐280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I‐4973, para 78; C‐
248/95 SAM Schiffahrt and Stapf [1997] ECR I‐04475, para 72.
The CJEUʹs case law in turn was inspired by national laws of EU Member States.
Bernsorff Norbert, Commentary [in German] on Article 16, in: Meyer/Hölscheidt (eds.),
Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, 5th ed. 2019, para 1; CJEU, C‐4/73
Nold [1974] ECR 491; C‐230/78 Eridania [1979] ECR 2749; C‐151/78 Sukkerfabriken [1979]
ECR 1; C‐240/97 Spain v Commission [1999] ECR I‐6571.
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company, in the EU to pursue a business, i.e. to conduct a profit‐seeking activity,340
without being subject to discrimination or disproportionate restrictions imposed by
EU institutions (or Member States acting within the scope of EU law).
However, Article 16 of the Charter does not grant an absolute right. Rather, the
provision itself makes clear that the freedom to conduct a business is to be exercised
without prejudice to EU law and to national laws and practice. In addition, the
freedom can be subjected to legitimate restrictions as set out in Article 52 of the
Charter, if they are provided for by law and do not impair the very substance of the
freedom guaranteed.341 Further, limitations must correspond to objectives of general
interest pursued by the Union or protect the rights and freedoms of others and, in
line with the principle of proportionality, must not constitute a disproportionate
interference in relation to the aim pursued.342 In particular, a measure concerned
should not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain
the objectives pursued by the legislation in question. Where there is a choice
between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous.343
With regard to e‐banknotes, this means that their introduction needs a legal basis,
which, as shown, can be seen in Article 128(1) TFEU as well as Article 128(1) in
conjunction with 127(1) and/or 127(4) TFEU. 344 Furthermore, e‐banknotes will, as
shown, contribute to realising the ECBʹs mandate in the digital age. In particular,
they will help to preserve and foster two core objectives of general interest pursued
by the Union in the field of monetary policy: first, to provide credit‐risk free money
in euro to the public, thus preventing households and corporates from leaving the
euro for other digital private or public currencies;345 and second, to maintain price
stability, since such switch away from the euro would both weaken the banking
sector and complicate the transmission of monetary policy.346
Finally, as already explained, the same retention effect could not be achieved as
efficiently and by less interference with the fundamental freedoms of banks through
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CJEU, C‐314/12 UPC Telekabel [2014] ECR 192 paras 47 et seq.
CJEU, C‐200/96 Metronome Musik [1998] ECR I‐1953, para 21.
CJEU, C‐184/02 Kingdom of Spain and C‐223/02 Republic of Finland v European Parliament
and Council of the EU [2004] ECR I‐7829, paras 52–55.
See CJEU, C‐184/02 Kingdom of Spain and C‐223/02 Republic of Finland v European
Parliament and Council of the EU [2004] ECR I‐7829, para 57 with further references.
See supra Sections 3.1‐3.4 and 4.1‐4.3.
See supra Section 3.2.
See supra Section 3.3.
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stricter supervision and regulation (of the financial market) and competition alone.347
In this regard, the principle of proportionality would be respected. However, the
concrete effects on the banks must now be explained and weighted, taking into
account external circumstances and conflicting public interests. The following
subsections are devoted to this balancing of interests.
The introduction of an e‐banknote will affect banksʹ business models in various
ways. The following is an overview of banks’ possible reactions, which, however, in
practice will probably occur in combination. The order chosen is based on the
assumption that without pressure, banks will change the status quo as little as
possible. They will therefore try to maintain profitability to keep their costs low and
their lending volume high.
4.4.3 Internalisation
If a banking system is well capitalised and resilient, it is likely to be able to absorb a
mild outflow from deposits to e‐banknotes. 348 This applies all the more if the
transition phase is accompanied by mitigating measures.349 At best, the resulting
lower profits could be offset by the elimination of existing costs. The latter currently
include the expenses related to cash turnover and negative interest on excess
reserves.
At the end of 2019, total excess liquidity with central banks in the euro area
amounted to 1.8 trillion (with negative interest rates at 0.5%).350 Overnight deposits
with commercial banks stood at 4.47 trillion (for households) and 2.17 trillion (for
corporates), respectively.351 Besides, a total of 1.29 trillion euro banknotes were in
circulation. 352 Insofar as physical banknotes will be exchanged for e‐banknotes, new
savings and income opportunities could arise for banks: costs of cash handling will
be reduced and, provided banks were included in the payment processing, new fees
could be raised or at least additional transaction data obtained.
At the same time, however, it should be noted that participation in a fundamentally
new payment system for e‐banknotes will require complex technical solutions. Thus,
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See supra Subsections 3.2.2. and 3.3.1.
Confident in this regard: Bank of Canada (2020) section 4.
See infra Subsection 4.4.7.
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=117.BSI.M.U2.N.R.LRE.X.1.A1.300
0.Z01.E.
https://www.euro‐area‐statistics.org/banks‐balance‐sheet‐deposits?cr=eur&lg=en.
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/ecb_2019_31_f_sign.pdf.
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banks will incur probably major initial investment costs, at least for interface solutions,
and, later, (lower) maintenance costs. Banks will have to internalise these cost factors
in each of the approaches discussed below.
Banks that hold a surplus of (negative yielding) reserves with the central bank will
likely accept a balance sheet reduction 353 . The extent of the latter can only be
estimated. For Sweden, an estimate assumes that total demand (including all kinds
of reasons to hold e‐krona) will reach less than 3% of the gross domestic product
(GDP) in normal times.354 Another study expects demand for an e‐krona to meet the
domestic transactional needs to be around 1‐2% of GDP.355 Applied to the euro area
with its GDP at EUR 11.9 trillion in 2019, 356 these estimates would imply that
transactional demand for e‐banknotes would amount to a maximum of EUR
0.23 trillion. Given the figures above, and assuming that not only deposits but also
cash will be exchanged, this seems to be tenable from a macroeconomic
perspective – even though transaction demand is volatile within a month 357 and
further demand will stem from households and corporates that want to have savings
in e‐banknotes. For Sweden, in normal times, the latter demand is expected to reach
0.35% of GDP358, which would correspond to EUR 0.04 trillion in the euro area.
However, some reservations should be made: At the micro level, the situation at an
individual bank can look quite different (if it has e.g. no excess liquidity while being
faced with considerable deposit outflows). Also, in times of stress, the shift in deposits
for ‘saving’ purposes in the literal sense could be massive, sudden and irresistible.
This scenario will be examined in detail separately at the end.359 Besides, even banks
with excess reserves might prefer to contain the outflow of deposits. This is because
otherwise the liquidity and funding positions could be impaired due to the outflow of
both (highly liquid) reserves and (relatively stable) deposits.360
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Juks Reimo, When a central bank digital currency meets private money: effects of an e‐krona on
banks, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, Special issue on the e‐krona, 2018:3, 79‐99, p. 81.
Juks (2018) p. 88.
Under the assumption of a significant share of the payment market of 30%: Segendorf
Björn, How many e‐krona are needed for payments? Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review –
Special issue on the e‐krona, 2018:3, 66‐78.
https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_10_gdp&lang=en.
Segendorf (2018) p. 73.
Segendorf (2018) p. 75.
See infra Subsection 4.4.6.
Juks (2018) pp. 83‐87.
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4.4.4 Funding
4.4.4.1 Retention by offering better value propositions
In order to retain the existing quantum and structure of refinancing, banks could be
compelled to offer a better value proposition by improving services or setting higher
interest rates on retail deposits or both. 361 The reason for the retention effort is
primarily that deposits from retail customers are particularly stable and inexpensive
sources of funding.362 Moreover, since retail depositors do not require collateral, the
bank is relatively free in how it structures the asset side of its balance sheet.363
This is due to the market power of the banks,364 which in turn has several sources.
First, it is based on the sluggishness of retail depositors: 365 Even though their
deposits may be formally demandable, withdrawals remain partial and quite rare
since they «are motivated mostly by individual depositors illiquidity needs and thus
are predictable based on the law of large numbers».366 Besides, retail depositors are
insensitive to risks and price differences since they often lack the necessary financial
sophistication and, because of deposit insurance, have little incentive for the
adequate attentiveness. Instead, they stay with the bank once selected, above all,
because it offers them a range of services,367 but also in order to avoid high switching
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Bank of Canada 2020 sect. 4; Adrian/Mancini‐Griffoli (2019), p. 10; Hofmann (2020) p. 61;
Berentsen Aleksander/Schär Fabian, The case for central bank electronic money and the non‐
case for central bank cryptocurrencies, Fed Reserve Bank St. Louis Review 100(2):97‐106,
(link) pp. 101‐102; Juks (2018) pp. 90‐91 (however with the assumption of an interest
bearing e‐krona).
See e.g. Bank of Canada (2020) section 4.
Mancini‐Griffoli et al (2018) p. 16; Huang Rocco/Ratnovski Lev, The Dark Side of Bank
Wholesale Funding, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2011, 20 (2): 248–63 (link), sections 1
and 2.2. See however Smets (2016) p. 10 and footnote 13 with reference to opposing
views.
Drechsler Itamar/Alexi Savov/Philipp Schnabl, Banking on Deposits: Maturity
Transformation without Interest Rate Risk, NBER Working Papers 24582, National Bureau
of Economic Research, Inc. 2018 (link), pp. 34 et seq.
Song Fenghua/Thakor Anjan V., Relationship Banking, Fragility, and the Asset‐Liability
Matching Problem, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 20, Issue 6, November 2007,
2129–2177 (link) and SSRN (link).
Huang/Ratnovski (2011) 248–63 and ECB Working Paper Series No 1223 (link), section 1.
For instance transactional services like check‐writing and overdraft privileges, as well as
more relationship‐oriented services like access to live bank tellers, cash management
advice, etc.: Song/Thakor (2007) section 1.1.2.
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costs.368 Another source of bankʹs market power is the level of concentration of local
deposit markets. 369 Given the importance of network effects and the sunk costs
required for entry, the banking sector tends to monopolies, which allows imposing
the terms and conditions in the retail sector.
In view of the above, it is unlikely that the principle of an open market economy as
set out in Article 119 TFEU would be violated at all if banks were induced to offer
depositors a better value proposition in order to retain deposits. Rather, there appear
to be deficiencies in competition in the retail sector, from which the banks have so
far benefited: Quite contrary to the principle of free competition, implicit
government guarantees have subsidised bank funding in an estimated range of 60 to
80 basis points in recent decades.370 In addition, because the public had no (more371)
access to convenient digital and risk‐free money, banks have been able to pay interest
on retail deposits below the risk‐adjusted rate. In any case, the low level cannot only
be explained by the fact that banks must cover distinct costs such as deposit
insurance fees, regulatory costs, as well as branch networks, salaries or marketing.372
Most of these costs serve to maintain market power and the associated deficiencies.
If an e‐banknote were to break this power, they could disappear or be diverted to
improve operational efficiency and customer services.
What is more, these costs are also incurred, at least in part, in the wholesale sector
today.373 Nevertheless, wholesale funds earn higher interest rates – even though they
are much more volatile and regularly only available against collateral;374 yet another
indication that an e‐banknote will not lead to distortions of competition, but will
rather mitigate existing ones.
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Huang/Ratnovski (2011) section 1 with further references.
Drechsler/Savov/Schnabl (2018) pp. 35, 61. The less small(er) firms account for a large
percentage of the total market, the less concentrated it is.
The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), Money and debt ‐ the
public role of banks, Summary of WWR report 100, The Hague 2019, p. 8 (link); Mancini‐
Griffoli et al (2018) p. 23 and footnote 31 with further references to economic literature.
See infra Paragraph 4.4.6.2.
Adrian/Mancini‐Griffoli (2018) p. 10.
However, there is also a great need for secure storage of value in the wholesale market,
as the near‐money premium shows: BIS CPMI/MC (2018) p. 17. If the wholesale sector
could also replace part of its reverse repos with e‐banknotes, the current scarcity of
highly liquid and safe instruments would be alleviated.
Nabilou (2019) p. 18 with further references to economic literature in footnote 94.
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Finally, whether or not an e‐banknote will be issued, other developments in the
financial markets will likely increase competition for deposit funding and payment
services. Banks will therefore have to prepare for more competition anyway.375
4.4.4.2 Alternative funding in the market
Banks will only raise deposit rates until the resulting costs correspond to the costs of
alternative funding in the market.376 At the latest when this point is reached, they will
start adjusting the liability side of their balance sheet, in order to compensate for the
loss in liquidity and funding stability just described. 377 To this end, they will in
particular roll‐over maturing deposits from asset managers (such as pension and
mutual funds) and other short‐term liabilities by issuing new long‐term market
funding.378 Such restructuring will be easier for a banking sector that can already
draw on an existing market for short‐ and long‐term funding (and actually does
make use of it to partially fund its operations). If banks instead have to turn to
foreign markets for wholesale funding, investors will have little need for local
currency. Because banks then will have to refinance in foreign currency, at least a
functioning foreign currency swap market is required to enable banks to hedge their
currency risk (with e.g. export or import firms exposed to foreign assets and thus
willing to take the other side of the trade).379 No financial market is needed insofar as
banks find real sector depositors willing to convert their demand deposits into stable
funding instruments issued by banks, in particular term deposits.380
From the banksʹ standpoint, any alternative funding seems less attractive than retail
deposits: The conversion will entail costs, even if only the real sector were
involved.381 But most importantly, wholesale customers (e.g., money market funds)
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Bank of Canada (2020) section 4; Riksbank (2018) p. 30; Juks (2018) p. 90 with reference
to competition due to Fintech.
The total cost of bank funding will fall as the repo rate increases: Juks (2018) p. 87.
For the adverse effects for banks confronted with an outflow of deposits to (foreign) e‐
money providers that in turn recycle client funds back to the banks and reactions of the
latter: Adrian/Mancini‐Griffoli (2019) p. 10.
Adrian/Mancini‐Griffoli (2019) p. 10; Juks (2018) pp. 88 et seq.; Smets (2016) p. 10.
Juks (2018) p. 86 and footnote 12 with further reference.
Juks (2020) pp. 69‐71.
Juks (2020) p. 73: the cost of conversion will be lower if the real sector holds deposits for
saving purposes and higher if it holds them for transaction purposes. In contrast, the
funding restructuring via financial markets will in any case entail costs since wholesale
investors will only exchange their liquid assets against less liquid assets if they are
appropriately compensated for it.
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are well‐informed players requiring risk‐adjusted interest rates, margins and
information‐insensitive collateral, thus restricting the banksʹ possibilities to grant
information‐intensive non‐traded loans. All in all, historical data suggest that such a
roll‐over will increase the bankʹs funding costs. For Sweden, the effect has been
quantified at up to 25 basis points.382 Moreover, institutional investors dispose of
larger lot sizes and, compared to the retail sector, usually increase their safety
margins or even withdraw their assets faster and more rigorously in times of
stress.383
But even if in the recent past mainly wholesale investors were at the forefront of
bank runs, restructuring flows of funding in their direction need not necessarily
destabilise the banking system in the future. Depositors and payment transactions
will become less dependent on banks, in line with the switch to e‐banknotes. Hence,
the systemic relevance of banks and the associated moral hazard should decrease,
while the risk of additional retail outflows and the monitoring of wholesale investors
should further discipline the banks – thereby contributing to the overall stability of
the financial system.
4.4.4.3 Alternative funding via central banks
Regularly, reference is also made to the central bank as a further funding
alternative:384 If banks needed liquidity – triggered by the publicʹs switch away from
deposits – and could not obtain it elsewhere, the central bank would be referred to in
its role as liquidity provider in ordinary and extraordinary times.385 While this is
admissible in principle, its implementation will pose major challenges. These are
twofold: first, it could further increase the central banksʹ balance sheet size and, with
regard to the asset side, their footprint in the (financial) economy. Second, there is a
risk of a structural change on the asset side of central banksʹ balance sheet if the
criteria for eligible collaterals were softened (or even uncollateralised loans granted
to liquidity seeking banks). The same would be the case if the range of assets eligible
for outright purchase were expanded or the criteria of central bankʹs currency
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In case of uncovered funding: Juks (2018) pp. 90 et seq. and 98.
Gorton Gary B., Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007, Oxford
University Press, 2010 (link), pp. 15, 43 et seq.
Wierts/Boven (2020) p. 19‐21; Juks (2018) 82; Bank of Canada (2020) section 4.
Brunnermeier Markus K./Niepelt Dirk, On the Equivalence of Private and Public Money,
Journal of Monetary Economics, 106 (2019) 27–41, p. xx.
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reserves portfolio relaxed.386 Both challenges are to be taken seriously, but at the
same time must be put into perspective.
To start with the footprint, i.e. the central bankʹs investments in financial (collateral)
markets and beyond, it should be remembered that this exposure was originally
much higher. This is because also the share of cash in M1 was much higher than
today.387 Then as now, the central bank covered its issued (cash) money with assets.
The latter consisted not just of precious metals. Rather, a number of tradable assets
were also eligible for cover from an early stage, among them bills of exchange,
cheque and government debt securities.388
Thus, depending on the share of cash in M1, the central banksʹ footprint in the past
was at times significantly larger than it was before the quantitative easing
programmes were launched from 2007/2008. Nevertheless, the size of the footprint at
that time does not appear to have distorted the markets (for eligible assets) in any
significant way. The problem is therefore apparently less the quantity of central
bank investments than their quality, i.e. the composition of the portfolio on their
assets side. Why is this so?
A fundamental difference between commercial banks and central banks is that the
latter (ideally) only monetise389 standardised and marketable assets. In contrast, banks
create money also by granting unsecured loans, where they must decide
individually whether they want to accept the risk of the counterparty. Not so the
central banks: (again: ideally) they leave the assessment of the quality of the
monetised assets to the market and thus do neither have to examine the individual
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For instance, if the Swiss National Bank (SNB) purchases euros from banks, it then
invests these currency reserves on the financial markets according to the Investment
Policy Guidelines issued by the Governing Board of the SNB (which in turn are based
on the permitted investment operations and responsibilities set down in the Articles 5, 9,
42 and 46 of the National Bank Act; see link).
See supra Section 2.1.
For instance, in Switzerland this comprised bills of exchange, cheque and liquid debt
securities of foreign countries (all maturing within three months), treasury bills and
bonds issued by government and state (owned) agencies and mortgage bonds issued by
the Swiss Mortgage Bond Institutes (all maturing within two years) as well as sight
deposits abroad. See Art. 19 of the Swiss National Bank Act of 1953 (link). A comparable
provision existed in § 19 of the German Bundesbank Act of 1957 (link).
I.e. they create reserves by accepting these assets as collateral in temporary transactions
or buying them outright.
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risk profile of assets nor, in the case of debts, the credit risk in particular.390 This
reflects the idea of efficient markets, which determine the quality and price of assets
more adequately than the state ever could.
This must of course be relativised in several ways. First, the financial crisis has
painfully shown that the market can overvalue assets in irrational exuberance
(temporarily). Second, demand and supply of an asset (and with it its market
valuation) are distorted once the asset becomes eligible for central bank
operations.391 Third, and most importantly, central banks have inflated the reserves
of their monetary policy counterparties from the onset of the financial crisis in 2007,
in order to provide the market, which had dried up, with the necessary liquidity. To
do this, however, they often had to significantly expand their baskets of eligible
assets, 392 because otherwise there would not have been enough collateral on the
banksʹ balance sheets.393 Some central banks went so far as to include even the pure
opposite of standardised and marketable assets, namely non‐securitised loans, in
their basket of eligible assets.394
In contrast to the past, this not only increased the size of central banksʹ asset
portfolio (aka footprint) but also considerably expanded its qualitative composition.
However, all of that occurred in extraordinary times, out of urgent necessity and has
yet to prove its worth in the long run, as it remains to be seen whether the effects
achieved can justify the associated risks of market distortions and moral hazard. The
distortion risk is due to the fact that resources would be less effectively allocated
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Wierts/Boven (2020) p. 21 footnote 24.
BIS CGFS (2015) p. 24: «There is also evidence that eligibility‐induced issuance
incentives can be an important source of structural effects, as banks look to issue more
of certain types of central bank‐eligible assets.»
BIS Global Financial System Markets Committee, Central bank operating frameworks and
collateral markets, Report, CGFS Papers No 53, March 2015 (link), pp. 4 et seq.
The monetary policy and intraday credit operations of the Eurosystem are to be
collateralised, «to mitigate the risk of financial loss to the liquidity‐providing central
bank in the event of counterparty default»: Athanassiou (2020) para 713 and footnote 12,
referring to the second indent of Article 18.1 of the Statute.
See e.g. BIS CGFS (2015) p. 23 regarding the policy change of the Bank of England in
2011. Juks (2020) p. 75 mentions further examples (Federal Reserve, Bank of Canada)
which show that the «inclusion of raw loans to the set of eligible collateral is by no
means an extraordinary step for central banks» since they «have already collateral
frameworks that allow pledging of raw loans in their credit operations».
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because increased financial intermediation by central banks would take place at the
expense of the efficient use of information at a decentralised level.395
The moral hazard risk concerns in particular the banks themselves, if central banks,
as it has been suggested, would provide them with un(der)collateralised funding,
possibly becoming (one of) their largest depositors that refrain from running
themselves in times of financial stress.396 If risks would actually occur, in particular if
a bank would become insolvent and could not redeem its loan to the central bank or
if collateral in the central bank’s portfolio would default, the central bank balance
sheet became negative. In extreme cases, the state would have to recapitalise it and
ultimately compensate via taxes. Of course, this would not be far from what was
practiced in the past via bail‐outs and the like. However, the latter were to be
overcome with the help of improved regulation and resolution procedures – and not
to be accepted again through the back door, quasi as collateral damage in the course
of issuing e‐banknotes.
As a result, this means that central banks should only participate in the restructuring
of funding insofar as commercial banks can offer them standardised and marketable
assets either as collateral or for sale. In any case, they should not grant uncovered
loans to banks and should only accept standardised and marketable assets as
collateral or buy outright. The former is the only way to keep the central banksʹ
footprint in the market within acceptable limits; the latter keeps the moral hazard
risk as low as possible.
4.4.4.4 Alternative funding by cooperative means of self‐help
However, this could lead the banks to grant less information‐intensive loans that are
not easily securitised. To avoid this undesirable consequence, new ways would have
to be created to make it easier for banks to monetise such loans: banks should
restructure their funding through new channels based on the cooperative idea of self‐help.
The Swiss system of Mortgage Bond Institutions could serve as a model for this: For
each type of loan that banks grant to the public, at least two institutions (for reasons
of competition)397 would have to be established. Shareholders of such institutions
would be banks that grant the type of loan in question (e.g., mortgages). The banks
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BIS CPMI/MC (2018) p. 14; Wierts/Boven (2020) p. 21 with reference to a paper (in Dutch)
of Houben Aerdt/Reijnders Dion, De lat voor digitaal centralebankgeld ligt hoog,
Economisch Statistische Berichten, 4774, 2019, 256‐258.
Brunnermeier/Niepelt (2019) pp. 38‐39.
And in contrast to e.g. the Danish model of covered bonds.
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would then pledge the loans they had granted to the public (here: the mortgages) to
the institutions as collateral to obtain (covered) loans themselves from the
institutions. The pledge is made by entering the loans to the public in question in a
separate register (so‐called registered pledge). For their part, the institutions would
refinance the covered loans they grant to the banks by issuing covered bonds to the
public. To this end, the loans to the banks would likewise be entered in a pledge
register, thereby serving as collateral by registered pledge.398
Since, unlike with securitisation, the banks would keep their (pledged) loans granted
to the public on their own balance sheets, they would remain more cautious in their
lending – as would the institutions that likewise keep the (pledged) loans granted to
the banks on their own balance sheets. This is all the more so as the institutions
would only accept good quality loans as collateral, since otherwise the other
shareholders would intervene in order to avoid that too lax of a practice of their
institution would put pressure on the quality of the bonds and thus on their price in
comparison with the bonds of competing institutions.
4.4.5 Lending
If banks do not succeed in internalising the outflows of their deposits (or the
resulting deterioration in liquidity and refinancing) or avert them by means of a
better value proposition and lack adequate refinancing alternatives at the same time,
they will have to adjust their lending practice:399 long‐term loans will tend to be
either more expensive or granted less frequently.
However, cutting the lending to the real sector would only improve the bankʹs
liquidity, but not its funding situation. This is so because a reduction in lending will
also destroy retail deposits (consisting of the lent money).400 In addition deleveraging
would further weaken the banks’ market power since they would not only lose
market share and potential revenue but also transaction data needed to provide
loans in a risk‐adequate manner, to the extent that payments are no longer processed
via their balance sheets.401
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See Swiss Mortgage Bond Act of 25 June 1930 (link; only in German, French and Italian).
Juks (2020) p. 68 deems the effect of a (retail) CBDC on banks supply of loans in normal
timest to be likely insignificant.
Juks (2018) p. 85.
Goodfriend (1990) pp. 248, 253 et seq.; see also Geva (2019) pp. 14, 20, 22.
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For this reason, banks will increase their lending rates where possible.402 This, in
turn, will depend on their power in loan markets403 and the (non‐)availability of
substitutes for bank lending to companies and households such as the corporate
bond market as well as direct lending by institutional and retail investors. 404
Provided that banks start from a position of market power, some even argue that
banks would have leeway to increase rates on deposits, increasing both their
amounts and lending.405
In any case, it must be ensured that the PSD2 will also cover transactions with e‐
banknotes, in the sense that, at the request of the person who made a transaction, the
related data will be released to authorised or registered third parties.406 This would
enable banks to have access to the complete financial history of a potential borrower
– even if the latter did not (or no longer) have a payment account with the bank. In
this way, banks could continue to operate where their core competence lies: in the
provision of information‐intensive non‐traded loans in a risk‐adequate manner.
4.4.6 Stressed times
4.4.6.1 Problem outline
A particular concern relates to the impact of an e‐banknote on the banking sector in
stressed times. If a confidence crisis occurs, bank creditors compare relative merits of
different alternatives to their current investments. Where only a single bank is
affected, runs today are already mostly digital,407 with retail clients transferring their
deposits to other banks and wholesale creditors not rolling over their maturing debts
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See e.g. Bank of England (2020) p. 35.
Mancini‐Griffoli et al (2018) pp. 15‐16; Agur/Ari/DellʹAriccia (2019) p. xx.
Juks (2018) p. 91.
Andolfatto (2018) p. xx.
See Article 67 PSD2 regarding rules on access to and use of payment account
information in the case of account information services: «(1) Member States shall ensure
that a payment service user has the right to make use of services enabling access to
account information as referred to in point (8) of Annex I. (…) .» See also Article 94(2)
PSD2 regarding data protection: «Payment service providers shall only access, process
and retain personal data necessary for the provision of their payment services, with the
explicit consent of the payment service user.» For the time being, Article 3(a) PSD2
excludes payment transactions «made exclusively in cash directly from the payer to the
payee, without any intermediary intervention.»
Kiff et al (2020) p. 17.
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claims. In both cases, the bank concerned must settle the transfer or repayment to
accounts with other banks by means of reserves.408
But the greater the mistrust in the banking sector as a whole, the more retail
creditors ask for cash – and wealthy as well as wholesale creditors for safe assets
such as government bonds. Both escapes routes are limited, however; the former
because cash handling involves inconvenience, risk and cost and the latter because
the supply of safe assets is limited, so that with increasing demand their price rises
and their yield falls, respectively. 409 Beyond a tipping point, particularly large
sophisticated creditors will therefore shift their money to offshore banks or into
foreign currency assets, ultimately turning the banking crisis into a currency crisis.410
If, in contrast, an e‐banknote were available, even the creditors of an individual
troubled bank might prefer to switch to e‐banknotes. The liquidity thus withdrawn
would make the banking system as a whole more fragile, which could develop into
an aggregate run.411 The process could be remarkably fast, as psychological moments
may provide an additional momentum: since all creditors are equally aware of this
readily available option and anticipate the corresponding reaction of their peers,
they themselves will act all the more quickly.
4.4.6.2 Historic evidence
In order to better assess the magnitude of such a run, the experiences of those
countries in which a digital form of public money was available during crises in the
past must be taken into account. Of course, the nature of the crisis (individual,
systemic), the design of the public money (e.g., limits or potential payment options)
as well as further circumstances (in particular aid for troubled banks in form of state
guarantees or deposit insurance) will also need to be considered.
An instructive example is the Swiss PostFinance. When the financial crisis hit in
2007/2008, PostFinance was wholly owned by the Swiss Post, which had been an
independent public‐law institution of the Confederation since 1998. Due to this legal
form, a subsidiary but unlimited state guarantee existed for all deposits with
PostFinance. These deposits reached nearly CHF 45 billion in 2007, while deposits
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In the event that the troubled bank could no longer cover a resulting negative balance
by borrowing from other banks, the central bank would have to assess the liquidity and
solvency situation before it could intervene as lender of last resort. Juks (2018) p. 93.
Juks (2018) pp. 91‐94.
Adrian/Mancini‐Griffoli (2019) p. 12.
Bank of Canada (2020) section 4.
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with Swiss banks amounted to around CHF 190 billion.412 However, the abolition of
the state guarantee had been under discussion for some time. The necessary
statutory amendment went to parliament in 2009, came into force in 2012 and
terminated the state guarantee as of 2017. 413 Since then, the deposits are only
protected by the deposit guarantee scheme, which the banks finance themselves and
ex post. The limit of CHF 30,000 per depositor and bank was temporarily increased
to CHF 100,000 in December 2008 as an emergency measure. The system ceiling was
also raised from CHF 4 to 6 billion (around 3% of privileged deposits); since
September 2011 it has been permanently anchored in ordinary law. 414 Since
PostFinance was granted bank status in 2013, it has also been participating in the
guarantee system. In Switzerland, the financial crisis primarily affected the two big
banks UBS and Credit Suisse, which had been heavily active in the US subprime
market. From autumn 2007, there were massive outflows of deposits to other banks,
which only stopped when the federal government and the Swiss National Bank
(SNB) rescued UBS in October 2008 and subprime paper prices recovered from 2009
onwards thanks to purchases by the US Fed.415 Given the above, how did deposits at
PostFinance develop in the period concerned? Between 2004 and 2008, inflows
fluctuated at around CHF 2‐3 billion per year. Then, deposits doubled from CHF 58
to 120 billion by 2016, where they still lie today.416
Two things stand out. First, from 2007 to 2016, across all deposits the ratio at
PostFinance increased from one to two‐fifths, whereby the inflow remained strong
in 2009 – even though deposit protection had been increased and UBS was rescued.
Second, inflows stopped permanently only with the abolition of the state guarantee
in 2017. These are indications that (at least in Switzerland) the public has a need for
credit‐risk‐free money even outside of a crisis, and that it perceives deposit
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See answer of the Swiss Federal Council to an interpellation (inquiry, case no. 10.3851)
of 1 October 2010 (link; only available in German, French and Italian).
Based on three Acts, all in force since 1 October 2012: Postal Act, Postal Organisation Act
Postal Ordinance.
In September 2008, total privileged deposits amounted to CHF 193 bn, with eight banks
(groups of banks) exceeding CHF 5 bn, the largest of which was CHF 36 bn: Sethe Rolf,
Einlagensicherung und Systemstabilität, SZW 6/2012, 507‐522 (link), pp. 514‐515.
For a brief overview of the measures taken see e.g.: Jordan Thomas, Introductory
remarks given by the Governor of the SNB at the news conference held in Zurich on 11
December 2008 (link), pp. 4 et seq.
According to the Postfinance annual reports (link), deposits (in CHF billion) developed
as follows: 32.8 (2003); 35.7 (2004); 38.2 (2005); 40.6 (2006); 43.7 (2007); 58.0 (2008); 73.3
(2009), 84.1 (2010); 92.2 (2011); 103.0 (2012); 108.5 (2012); 113.6 (2013); 117.2 (2014); 114.9
(2015); 119.4 (2016); 119.8 (2017); 118.9 (2018); 119.1 (2019).
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insurance as an imperfect substitute. However, after the crisis, outflow related to
such need was so moderate that it could easily be absorbed by the rest of the
banking system – not least because PostFinance is not allowed to grant loans and
therefore holds its funds as deposits with the other banks unless it invests them in
the financial market.417
Other such examples418 include the deposit accounts offered by the Swedish National
Debt Office; the Dutch Postcheque‐ en Girodienst as well as the Rijkspostspaarbank;
the US Postal Savings banks and in the British Post Office Savings Bank. Here too,
the type of crisis, the design of the digital public money and further circumstances
would have to be taken into account – but this would go beyond the scope of the
present paper. However, the Swiss experience already leads to the conclusion that
digital public money will always experience inflows in a crisis. Its magnitude, though,
depends largely on how this money is designed and what complementary crisis
intervention measures are taken. The last Subsection is therefore devoted to these.
4.4.7 Factors affecting the degree of potential disintermediation
4.4.7.1 External conditions
Several factors will influence the demand for e‐banknotes. First, there are external
circumstances that cannot (directly) be influenced, such as the general interest rate
environment and the stability of the financial system. It is assumed that in the absence
of a crisis and with a generally higher interest rate level, demand for an e‐banknote
will be modest419 – at least if, as advocated here, the latter is not interest‐bearing.420
Moreover, banks are likely to be able to more easily absorb the switch from deposits to
e‐banknotes if they have substantial excess reserves with the central bank.
Accordingly, the introduction of (non‐interest‐bearing) e‐banknotes may be more
appropriate at a time when the general interest rate level is close to, but not below,
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See PostFinance, Financial report 2019, pp. 29‐30 (link). In 2019, amounts due from other
banks reached 30% of all assets. The prohibition for PostFinance grant loans is about to
be lifted.
In addition, Bank of England (2020) pp. 36‐37 suggests taking into account previous
financial reforms in the UK that have had implications for bank intermediation such as
Competition and Credit Control in 1971 and the financial liberalisation reforms of the
1980s. For further economic literature looking at state banks with healthy balance sheets
or explicit and credible state guarantees: Mancini‐Griffoli et al (2018) p. 24 footnote 36.
Juks (xx)
See supra Subsection 3.3.3.
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zero, when the financial sector is stable and the stock of excess reserves of banks
with the central bank is high.421 In the event of deviations from these supposedly
favourable external conditions, the following other elements will be all the more
important.
4.4.7.2 General mitigating measures
Mitigating measures refer to measures that do not directly pertain to features
attached to the e‐banknotes themselves. They rather aim to influence the economic
environment in which banks operate through policy measures and regulation in a
way that either prevents possible disintermediation or at least cushions its effects.
Most notably, mitigating measures include deposit insurance and moratoria de lege
lata et ferenda under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, but also possible
policy rate facilitations by the central bank.422
Tobin pointed out that if deposits in digital form and covered by the state, which he
had called for as early as 1987, 423 were introduced, deposit insurance could be
limited to covering operational risks in the future.424 However, historical experience
shows that the outflow from deposits is significantly lower where deposit insurance
is available.425 State banks with healthy balance sheets or explicit and credible state
guarantees have also alleviated the run risk in the past. For instance, in Sweden the
banking crisis of 1990‐1994 did not incite any run from bank deposits to the then still
state‐owned Postgirot, since the government announced to guarantee all deposits of
the 114 banks.426
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426

As to possible consequences if reserves are low see e.g. Bank of England (2020) p. 37.
For further adjustments of the current regulatory landscape: Juks (2018) pp. 95‐96.
Tobin James, The Case for Preserving Regulatory Distinctions, in: Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City (ed.), Restructuring the Financial System, Kansas 1987 (link), 167‐183, p. 172: «I
think the government should make available to the public a medium with the convenience
of deposits and the safety of currency, essentially currency on deposit, transferable in any
amount by check or other order» and p. 173: «Computer capabilities should soon make it
possible to … even … order payments to third parties by card or telephone».
Ibid p. 172; Ordóñez Miguel Fernández, The future of banking: secure money and deregulation
of the financial system, Areces Foundation Seminar, 6 February 6 2018 (link), p. 4.
Mancini‐Griffoli et al (2018) p. 24; Wierts/Boven (2020) p. 24.
Segendorf (2018) p. 74. Neither was there a run into National Debt Office (NDO)
accounts during the Financial crisis of 2007/2008. However, in the latter the crisis of
confidence remained concentrated to a limited number of banks. In addition, NDO
accounts do inter alia not offer any payment functionality and inflows take up to two
weeks to be credited: Juks (2018) pp. 94‐95.
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For this reason, and in particular to prevent run risk in crises, it would seem
advisable to maintain the current deposit guarantees. In order to minimise the moral
hazard risk, however, at least where insurance is still financed ex post or is even
guaranteed by the state, a switch to a system financed ex ante solely by the banking
sector would be necessary.
Beyond the ceiling of protected deposits, relevant authorities should be given the
ability to freeze the flow of payments based on specific pre‐ and in‐resolution
moratorium powers which could be introduced through amendments to Title III
(early intervention) and Chapter VI (resolution powers) in Title IV (resolution) of the
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD).427
4.4.7.3 Specific features attached to e‐banknotes
Finally, and most importantly, the degree of possible disintermediation of banks will
largely depend on specific features attached to e‐banknotes. 428 The risk of
disintermediation is all the lower, the less the convenience and functionality
provided by the e‐banknote comes close to that of deposits. However, it would be
wrong to choose a particularly rudimentary, unattractive model for this reason. This
would undermine the goal of finally providing the public with an adequate digital
form of public money, which in particular prevents people from migrating from
their own currency.429
To date, a number of economic models have been developed in which
disintermediation is mitigated by several specific features or a combination thereof.
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For the existing moratorium powers see Article 69 of Directive 2014/59/EU of 15 May
2014 (link). For recently proposed amendments see: Financial Markets Law Committee
(FMLC), Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive: Legal Uncertainties in the Proposal to
Amend Moratorium Powers, April 2018 (link).
Only focusing on the economic design: Bank of England (2020) p. 38.
See e.g. Kiss et al (2020) p. 22 and Bank of England, Central Bank Digital Currency:
Opportunities, Challenges and Design, Discussion Paper, March 2020 (link), pp. 34 et
seq. enlisting a number of attributes that are key to CBDC success in terms of design
options: payment functionalities allowing 24/7 availability, some offline payment
options, optimal balance between throughput and speed of settlement, between privacy
and integrity (resistance against illegal use) as well as between efficiency and security,
intuitive handling, cost‐effectiveness, open architecture and interoperability.
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First, there would be the possibility of introducing interest 430 or other financial
barriers, such as fees431. Alternatively or in addition, it is proposed to limit access, for
example to residents and non‐residents with a nationality from within the euro area
432 or via absolute ceilings (e.g., per transaction). 433 A third proposal focuses on
convertibility, either not guaranteeing it at all434 or limiting it to selected non‐bank
assets such as government bonds or cash.435
However, for the reasons already explained, we reject any demand control of e‐
banknotes via (positive or negative) interest rates on e‐banknotes. 436 Our further
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Kiff et al (2020) pp. 33 et seq.; Bank of England (2020) p. 38; Kumhof Michael/Noone
Clare, Central Bank Digital Currencies – Design Principles and Balance Sheet
Implications, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 725 (link), who use further
features in addition to the interest calculation: non‐convertibility between reserves and
CBDC, no guaranteed on demand convertibility of deposits into CBDC, issuance of
CBDC by central bank and only against eligible securities (gov. bonds); Keister/Sanches
2019: interest increases cost of funding for banks [Should Central Banks Issue Digital
Currency? Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 19‐26];
Chiu/Davoodalhosseini/Jiang/Zhu (2019) situation if banks have market power [Central
Bank Digital Currency and Banking, Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper No. 2019‐20];
Andolfatto (2018) [Assessing the Impact of Central Bank Digital Currency on Private
Banks, Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2018‐26C];
Brunnermeier/Niepelt (2019) ceb lends back to cob [On the Equivalence of Private and
Public Money, Journal of Monetary Economics 106 (October) 27‐41].
Kiff et al (2020) pp. 33‐34 with further references.
Wierts/Boven (2020) p. 34.
Gürtler/Nielsen/Rasmussen/Spange, Central bank digital currency in Denmark?
Danmarks Nationalbank, 2017 (link), pp. 16‐17; Kiff et al (2020) pp. 31‐33; Panetta Fabio,
21st Century Cash: Central Banking, Technological Innovation and Digital Currency,
Speech given by the Bank of Italy Deputy Governor, 7 June 2018, SUERF Policy Note,
Issue No 40 (link), p. 6; on the technical challenges: Gürtler Kirsten Elisabeth/
Rasmussen Kristine/ Nielsen Søren Truels/Spange Morten, Central bank digital currency
in Denmark?, Danmarks Nationalbank Analysis No 28, 15 December 2017 (link), p. 17;
waterfall account for exceeding payments suggested by Bindseil (2020) p. xx and
implemented by the Central Bank of Bahamas DBDC pilot: Central Bank of the Bahamas,
Project Sand Dollar: A Bahamas Payments System Modernisation Initiative, 24
December 2019 (link), p. 12.
Kumhof/Noone (2016); since then parity with reserves and cash would be lost, this
proposal lacks support among central banks: Wierts/Boven (2020) p. 35.
Wierts/Boven (2020) p. 21; Bindseil (2020) p. xx; Juks (2018) p. 96; Kiff et al (2020) p. 16:
issued only against existing physical cash; Kumhof/Noone (20xx) (link): issuance of
CBDC by central bank and only against eligible securities (government bonds).
See supra Subsection 3.3.3.
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deliberations are therefore based on the assumption of non‐interest‐bearing e‐
banknotes.437
Instead, for a transition period (until banks have adapted to the co‐existence of e‐
banknotes), we prefer limits on the amount of rCBDC that could be held.438 For very
practical reasons, the public would ultimately also be confronted with limits in the
case of cash (to which costs involved in withdrawing and storing large amounts of
cash would be added): Comparing the amount of demand deposits within the euro
area with the amount of cash in circulation, it is clear that the supply of cash would
quickly reach logistical limits. For instance, the Sand Dollar Project in the Bahamas
comprises limits, the exceeding of which triggers an automatic ‘waterfall’ so that the
surplus is returned to a bank deposit.439 For unbanked users, it would be conceivable
that payments above the limit are not executed at all.
It was also proposed to choose a supply mechanism whereby e‐banknotes would
only be issued against specific non‐bank assets, i.e. not in direct exchange for bank
deposits and the like. 440 This would initially have the advantage that the total
amount of bank deposits would not decrease, since the assets in question would be
paid with bank deposits. But if demand for e‐banknotes were high, the banks would
still be affected. Because if non‐bank assets such as government bonds are to be a
sufficient cover for e‐banknotes, they must be eligible under central bank standards.
If they became scarce, this would also impact bank’s possibility to further refinance
with the central bank. Moreover, such a system would favour the wholesale sector,
which traditionally already holds such assets, over the retail sector, for which e‐
banknotes are primarily intended. A tiered structure might be most beneficial: for
example, the exchange of deposits could be limited to the amount of the secured
deposits. At the same time, the guarantee per bank and depositor would be reduced
by the withdrawals made and only increased again when a new deposit is made.
Finally, preference should be given to models in which the central bank merely
provides the core infrastructure and a minimum necessary functionality for
payments. 441 On this platform, private sector firms (so called Payment Interface
Providers) – among them necessarily banks – could connect and offer customer‐
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Models without an interest feature can be found at: Bank of Canada, Contingency
Planning for a Central Bank Digital Currency, 25 February 2020, section 4.
See also Wierts/Boven (2020) pp. 21 and 34.
See Bindseil (2020) p. xx.
See footnote 435.
See e.g. Bank of England (2020) p. xx (at Figure 4.1).
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facing services and build additional functionality (so called overlay services). While
the central bank would ensure security, resilience and interoperability by standard
setting and regulation, the private sector could further innovate its services in a
competitive environment and take over functions such as compliance, from which
the central bank should refrain.
4.4.8 Conclusion
The above leads to the conclusion that, while the issue of e‐banknotes will affect the
fundamental right of banks to conduct a business according to Article 16 of the
Charter, the conditions for such an intervention, and in particular the principle of
proportionality, will be respected, if appropriate features are attached to e‐banknotes
and further mitigating measures are taken.
This is because the objectives of general interest pursued with the introduction of an
e‐banknote cannot be achieved just as effectively and with less interference with
banks’ fundamental rights by stricter supervision and regulation alone. Besides and
as shown, although banks will possibly suffer losses in their earnings, these earnings
have so far been partly due to impaired competition, since the lack of digital, credit‐
risk‐free money has enabled them to obtain (too) favourably priced refinancing.
Systemically important institutions, in addition, have benefitted from indirect
subsidisation because investors and other counterparties of the banks have factored
in the (expected) state aid in times of crisis. E‐banknotes with the right features, in
contrast, will create improved conditions of competition, which should eliminate
these distortions. With estimated subsidies of 60 to 80 basis points, the expected
overall increase in banksʹ financing costs of up to 25 basis points takes on a different
dimension. Besides, whether or not an e‐banknote will be issued, disintermediation
of the banking sector is already happening as a result of developments in payments.
Banks will therefore have to prepare for more competition anyway.442
This is all the more so since the monetary system cannot be compared to any
ordinary market from which the state has to withdraw according to the principle of
a free market economy. Even if money as such is not a public good, confidence in its
stability and the instrumental provision of core infrastructure that ensures the safety,
efficiency and finality of payments in all segments are certainly public goods in
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See also Bank of England (2020) p. 37.
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whose provision the central bank plays a pivotal role.443 In other words, only the –
well measured – intervention of the government or, in its place, of the central bank,
which is especially qualified for this purpose, allows the market to develop
efficiently in the monetary area.
Finally, the core content of Article 16 of the Charter would only be violated if e‐
banknotes literally drove banks out of their market. As has been shown, this is not to
be expected in normal times and in particular not in an environment with higher
interest rates. Besides, the introduction of an e‐banknote can be cushioned by
mitigating measures that prevent or alleviate bank runs in times of crisis.
4.5 Balancing of interests regarding the fundamental rights to privacy
As outlined earlier, we argue that only an e‐banknote that mimics the properties of
the physical banknote as closely as possible can be subsumed under Article 128(1)
TFEU. One of the proverbial characteristics is the anonymity that cash conveys to its
holder: although every banknote carries a serial number, this number is not used
(except in isolated cases, such as ransom money) to track the payment method.
Coins lack a corresponding earmark from the outset.
However, the use of cash has been increasingly restricted by regulations in recent
decades precisely because of this characteristic.444 This creates a peculiar situation for
banknotes. Purely de facto, they still provide their holder with full privacy. But in
legal terms, privacy has been weakened by derogatory regulations. The latter oblige
merchants and financial intermediaries in particular to clarify and, if necessary,
report the economic background of a transaction 445 while holders are subject to self‐
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See BIS Annual Economic Report 2020 (part III/CBs and payments in the digital era) pp.
67, 73 and 75.
See supra Section 2.1.
See Directive (EU) 2018/843 of 30 May 2018 (so called 5th anti‐money laundering
Directive) amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the
financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and
amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU; Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of 20 May
2015 on information on the payer accompanying transfers of funds; Regulation (EU)
2018/1672 of 23 October 2018 on controls on cash entering or leaving the Union and
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005. Regarding cryptocurrencies and AML see
Rueckert Christian, Cryptocurrencies and fundamental rights, Journal of Cybersecurity,
2019, 1–12 (link), p. 3 with further reference.
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declaration for tax purposes.446 In addition, the law enforcement authorities have
access to coercive measures – in particular search warrants – if they provide an
appropriate court authorisation. The protection of the persons concerned is ensured
in that they can demand to keep the seized objects under seal until the legality of the
coercive measures has been definitively clarified by the court.447
The public interests behind these limitations of the privacy conveyed by cash are
aimed at maintaining the integrity of the financial market, enforcing the tax system
and protecting law and order including an effective administration of justice. 448
However, they also have to observe the fundamental right to respect for private and
family life as recognised by Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe (ECHR), the right to
respect for private and family life and the right to the protection of personal data as
recognised, respectively, by Articles 7 449 and 8 of the Charter as well as the
application of the proportionality principle.450
Article 7 of the Charter obliges the institutions and bodies of the Union and the
Member States to refrain from invading privacy and to ensure the positive
protection of privacy through legislation, case law and administration. Of the four
aspects mentioned in the provision, the respect for private life is of particular
interest here. It encompasses all areas of life that do not affect others, including
professional activities,451 whereby the extent of this ‘non‐public sphere’ is primarily
determined by a personʹs legitimate expectations of privacy.452
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See e.g. Regulation (EC) 1889/2005 of 26 October 2005 on controls of cash entering or
leaving the Community; European Commission, Guidelines for a Model for a [non‐
binding] European Taxpayers’ Code, Brussels 2016 (link), p. 13.
Art. 47(1) and (2) of the Charter. See e.g. C‐310/16 Dzivev et al EU:C:2019:30, paras 24 et
seq. and 37 et seq.
See e.g. recitals 1 et seq. of Regulation (EU) 2015/847and (EU) 2018/1672.
Article 7 of the Charter hast the same scope of application as Article 8 ECHR, even
though the wording is different. See Article 52(3) of the Charter; Explanatory Note on
Article 7 of the Charter; Rueckert (2019) p. 6.
See e.g. recital 33 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1672; recital 35 of Regulation (EU) 2015/847;
recital 51 of Directive (EU) 2018/843.
CJEU, C–92/09 and C–93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert [2010] ECR I‐11063,
para 59.
Bernsdorff Norbert, Commentary on Article 7 CFR, in: Meyer Jürgen/Hölscheidt Sven
(eds.), Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, 5th ed. 2019 Nomos Verlag
Baden‐Baden, para 15.
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While Article 8 of the ECHR includes the protection of personal data as part of the
protection of ‘private life’, the Charter addresses data protection specifically in
Article 8.453 The latter provision is applicable where authorities systematically collect,
store, share or process data – public or private – related to a natural (or legal) person
thereby affecting the person’s private life. Notwithstanding the distinction between
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, the jurisprudence has considered privacy to be at the
core of data protection.454
An interference with the rights just described requires justification in accordance
with Article 52(1) of the Charter: it has to be provided for by law and if, while
respecting the essence of that right and subject to the principle of proportionality, it
must be necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by
the Union.455
Anti‐money laundering (AML) regulation and other crime prevention concepts of
governments regularly do interfere with the rights to data protection and privacy.
Although they are not disputed in principle to date, the co‐legislators will have to
demonstrate that the interference concerned is necessary in a democratic society and
that they sought to strike a fair balance between the interests of the users of e‐
banknotes and the aim of AML regulations and the like (such as law enforcement,
consumer protection, etc.).456 This is all the more so since the e‐banknote shall serve
as an equivalence with physical banknotes that inherently grant its users privacy to a
very large extent.
Under these circumstances, it seems appropriate for an e‐banknote not to be
designed in a completely anonymous way, but to replicate the status quo of physical
banknotes through its technical design:457 Transactions above a certain threshold can
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In contrast, the US Constitution does not explicitly mention privacy or data protection at
all: Kokott Juliane/Sobotta Christoph, The distinction between privacy and data
protection in the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR, International Data Privacy
Law, Volume 3, Issue 4, November 2013, 222–228 (link) p. 223.
Rueckert (2019) p. 6.
See CJEU, C‐310/16 Dzivev et al ECLI:EU:C:2019:30 para 36; C‐419/14 WebMindLicenses
[2015] EU:C:2015:832, paras 71 and 73.
See e.g. Hingst/Neumann in FS Schmidt (2019) p. 477; Kokott/Sobotta (2013) p. 225.
EUROchain (2019) passim; BIS 2020 Special feature on payments BIS Quarterly Review
p. 95. See also Wierts/Boven (2020) p. 33; Bank of Canada (2020) section 2‐4.
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be tracked, while anonymity is maintained for transactions below. 458 If data is
nonetheless recorded, e.g. for authentication purposes, it must be technically
ensured that it is either used in a confidential way or deleted immediately
afterwards. In addition, it must be ensured that the mere holding of e‐banknotes,
regardless of thresholds, preserves the privacy of the holder – subject to coercive
measures permitted by court. To this end, legislation will have to specify clearly and
precisely under what circumstances access can be granted
Would it therefore be inadmissible to extend the automatic exchange of information
maintained for financial accounts to e‐banknote balances? The justification put
forward there is likely to outweigh the interest of e‐banknote holders in maintaining
confidentiality, too. However, even with automatic information exchange, only
balances are reported, not transaction data. The latter, in turn, would only be made
available in the context of coercive measures obtained by court order (and after
overcoming sealing rights). 459 From a technical point of view, not only should
anonymous small payments be possible, but long‐term protection should also be
ensured by the system deleting such transaction data by default. A ‘forgetting’
feature should be built in.
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A proposal how to achieve this result by means of ‘anonymity vouchers’ see EUROchain
(2019) p. 6. For different techniques to reach privacy see also ECB/Bank of Japan (2020)
passim; Bank of England (2020) p. 44 (link).
For potential enabling techniques in this regard see ECB/Bank of Japan (2020) passim.
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5 A design perspective
5.1 Introduction
A digital money privately issued is often referred to as ‘virtual currency’.460 This
contrasts with what is known as a ‘central bank digital currency’ or CBDC461 retail462
scheme, where the central bank either issues directly, or fully backs the issuance of,
digital currency available to the public at large. Under the first option, the central
bank, as the issuer, may nevertheless delegate functions to the private sector.
Particularly it may distribute the e‐banknotes to the public through commercial
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See e.g. Benjamin Geva, «Disintermediating Electronic Payments: Digital Cash and
Virtual Currencies», (2016), 31: 12 J.I.B.L.R (Journal of International Banking Law and
Regulation) (UK), 661, 664‐666, albeit acknowledging that uniform terminology is not
universally accepted. For the adherence of the ECB to that term in the proposed meaning,
see originally European Central Bank/Eurosystem, Virtual Currency Schemes (October
2012)
at
13,
online:
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf,
accessed 7 May 2020; and as amended in European Central Bank/Eurosystem, Virtual
Currency
Schemes:
Further
Analysis
(February
2015)
at
25,
online:
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemesen.pdf, accessed 7
May 2020. Finally, according to Athanassiou Phoebus L., Digital Innovation in Financial
Services – Legal challenges and Regulatory Policy Issues, Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2018, p.
77 ‘virtual currencies’ are:
«digital representations of value, which despite not being issued by a central bank
or another public authority, nor ʹattachedʹ to a fiat currency (subject to notable
exceptions) are voluntarily accepted by natural or legal persons, as means of
exchange, and which are stored, transferred and traded electronically, without a
tangible, real‐world representation»
However, we do not share his view that lack of ‘attachment’ to a fiat currency is a
normal feature as this will exclude claim‐checks to fiat currencies or stablecoins. At the
same time his view on the matter is not unique: denomination in its own unit of account
appears to be an element in the definition of ‘virtual currency’ (that is, privately issued
digital currency) in IMF Staff Discussion, Virtual Currencies (n. ?) at 7.
Athanassiou, ibid. at 185, generically defines CBDCs as:
«centrally issued digital equivalents of fiat money … that are not intended as parallel
units of account, which fulfill some of the functions of money (namely as means of
payment and stores of value), and which can facilitate proximity and long‐distant
payments alike.»
However, we find the qualification in the definition to be puzzling as CBDC is certainly
used as a medium of exchange as well.
A ‘wholesale’ scheme is for the settlement of interbank payment and is outside the scope
of the present discussion.
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banks and/or other intermediaries exactly like it distributes at present physical
banknotes. Alternatively, under the second option, a central bank may authorise
licensed entities, particularly commercial banks, to issue their own banknotes while
fully backed by a 100% reserve of CeBM. Various options of these architecture and
issuance models are discussed below in Part 6. But first, this part lays down design
options.
5.2 Token‐based vs. account‐based schemes
Today, most payments, at least in volume, are made over the non‐cash payment
system premised on the use of ‘scriptural money’. Its architecture is centralised.
Thereunder, a bank maintains deposit accounts for customers (who thus keep with it
CoBM). For its part, a large bank may also maintain deposit accounts (in CoBM) for
correspondent banks. Finally, the central bank maintains settlement (deposit)
accounts at least for large banks (which thus hold with it CeBM).463 As a whole, the
system can be visualised as a pyramid at whose head or apex stands the central bank
with which at least large banks hold accounts, and possibly with small banks
holding accounts with large banks. Individual and corporate customers are at the
bottom or base of the pyramid holding their accounts in banks (whether large or
small).464
Given the prominence of this system, there is an inclination to address rCBDC as an
‘amendment’ or ‘correction’ to it, by way of adding to it a feature, under which, in
addition (or even in lieu of) tangible banknotes, scriptural central bank money
becomes available to the public at large – and not only to the large banks. It is thus
not surprising that account‐based schemes are being discussed as a rCBDC option.
Nonetheless, in Subsection 2.2.2, we defined a digital coin as a distinct entity
consisting of data in the form of a unique string of bits expressing a specified
number of units of value. Like physical coins and banknotes, digital coins are not
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On moving away from this tiering structure see e.g. Evangelos Benos, Gerardo Ferrara
and Pedro Gurrola‐Perez, «The impact of de‐tiering in the United Kingdomʹs large‐
value payment system» (2017) Bank of England, Working Paper No 676.
See e.g. E Gerald Corrigan, «Luncheon Address: Perspectives on Payment System Risk
Reduction», in David B. Humphrey, ed, The U.S. Payment System: Efficiency, Risk and the
Role of the Federal Reserve (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990) at 129‐130. See
also Hans J Blommestein & Bruce J Summers, «Banking and the Payment System», in
Bruce J Summers, ed, The Payment System: Design, Management and Supervision
(Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1994) at 15 and 27; and Bruce J Summers,
«The Payment System in a Market Economy», in Summers, ibid, at 1–5.
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paid out of bank accounts. This distinguishes them from an account‐based product
even where information relating to value stored in it is available digitally.465
Consequently, we argue that as a matter of law, only token‐based schemes involve
digital coins and can be treated as genuine rCBDC products. However, we recognise
that this restriction is not universally held. This Section challenges both the efficacy
and, as far as the ESCB is concerned, also the validity of the so‐called account‐based
rCBDC schemes.
To begin with, such schemes fall into two broad categories:
1. ‘Plain sovereign money’466 schemes under which CeBM467 becomes available
to members of the public in accounts on the books of the central bank.
2. ‘Electronic money’ schemes under which digital devices ‘loaded’ with CeBM
will be distributed to the public through commercial banks.468
Both proposals will impose «a large administrative burden» on the central bank that
«could distract it from its other functions in [regulating] and managing monetary
policy.» Furthermore, thereunder, the central bank, «a state‐owned enterprise»,
would undertake pure market functions, in which it «would have no commercial
incentive to innovate [payment] services».469 Accordingly, under a variation of the
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See regarding account vs token‐based approaches: Bank of England (2020) p. 46‐47.
Beware of inconsistent use of terminology. Andrew Jackson, Sovereign Money ‐ paving the
way for a sustainable recovery (London: Positive Money, November 2013), online:
https://positivemoney.org/wp‐content/uploads/2013/11/Sovereign‐Money‐Final‐
Web.pdf, accessed 28 December 2017, uses the term to denote central bank money
distributed directly to business to fund infrastructure projects.
However, it does not make sense to us to have a hybrid system under which scriptural
money is available to the public in both CoBM and CeBM as we read Dyson & Hodgson
(n. ???) at 28‐30 to suggest.
CPSS and the Group of Computer Experts of the central banks of the Group of Ten
countries Security of electronic money (Basle: BIS, 1996) particularly at 5; online:
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d18.pdf . For e‐money redeemed in CoBM see Tobias
Adrian & Tomasso Mancini‐Groffoli, The Rise of Digital Money, (IMF Fintech Note/19/01
July 2019) at 4.
Ben Dyson & Graham Hodgson, Digital Cash: Why Central Banks Should Start Issuing
Electronic Money, London: Positive Money, 2016 (link) at 15, accessed 28 December 2017.
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first proposal, customersʹ accounts on the books of the central bank will be operated
through and managed by commercial banks.470
The ‘plain sovereign money’ proposal is also contrary to Article 17 of the Statute.
Thereunder, «[i]n order to conduct their operations, the ECB and the national central
banks may open accounts for credit institutions, public entities and other market
participants.» General members of the public are not included. Taking into account
the overall objectives and tasks of the ESCB, we read the list as exhaustive so as to
exclude those who are not listed. Accordingly, to bypass direct operations by a
central bank and comply with Article 17 of the Statue, both proposals could be
adjusted by having CoBM become accessible to their customers against a full reserve
of CeBM.
Small amendments to Article 17 of the Statue do not require a Treaty change.471
However, both ‘plain sovereign money’ and ‘electronic money’ proposals, including
their variations, involve scriptural money that, by definition, does not consist of
‘banknotes’ as envisaged in Article 128(1) TFEU. 472 But regardless of the
interpretation of TFEU and Statute provisions, access to central bank scriptural
money is not a matter of (properly defined) digital currency, as the latter, similarly
to cash, is to be distinguished from central bank scriptural money.473
As well, access to central bank scriptural money has monetary policy implications
and in a way, goes to a radically different model of monetary system as well as
banking. Such a model has been envisaged a long time ago, albeit as a full‐reserve
banking, under which commercial banks maintain 100% reserve of CeBM and do not
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For a precedent from Sri Lanka, albeit for investorsʹ securities accounts operated by
intermediaries on the books of the central bank, see Payment & Settlement Systems Act,
No. 28 of 2005, Chapter II Securities Accounts (Secs 6‐10), online:
<http://www.cbsl.gov.lk/pics_n_docs/09_lr/_docs/acts/Paymt_&_setmt_sys_act.pdf>,
accessed 28 December 2017.
Rather, under Article 129(3) TFEU, they «may be [made] by the European Parliament
and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure [which]
shall act either on a recommendation from the European Central Bank and after
consulting the Commission or on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting
the European Central Bank.»
For the view that compliance with TFEU art. 128 requires «to equate the CBDC to a
digital form of banknotes» see e.g. Banque de France, Central Bank Digital Currency,
(n. ???) at 31.
See supra Section 2.2.
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create CoBM beyond such reserve.474 An alternative model, under which the public
will have access to CoBM backed by fractional reserve as well as to either CeBM475 or
CoBM backed by full reserve will be, to say the least, quite confusing to the public.
In any event, an «account‐based [system] (…) uses a reconciliation‐intensive,
message‐based approach to adjust entries in a ledger»476 in which «the operator of
the system authenticates the sender to ensure authorization to update account
balances on a potentially centralised account ledger.» 477 Conversely, since «[i]n a
token‐based system, the token contains all information necessary for the recipient to
verify the legitimacy of the transaction (…) the recipient can verify [on his or her
own] the object transferred (i.e., the token)»,478 which brings efficiency gains.
Finally, without an identity tied to it, a figure recorded in a bankʹs server, in the form
of a bit string, could easily be changed by a hacker who penetrates into the bankʹs
computer. 479 «It is this very fact that allows a hacker to sneak into the [bank]
computer and later the figure from $1.00 to $100.00 or to withdraw whatever he
wishes.»480 Conversely, for its own part, inasmuch its unique bit string expresses its
identity, a digital coin is less exposed to alteration and is less hackable.481
For all these reasons, the discussion in this Part is confined to token‐based schemes
so as truly to be considered e‐banknotes.
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475
476
477
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Patrizio Lainà, Proposals for Full‐Reserve Banking: A Historical Survey from David Ricardo to
Martin Wolf, Economic Thought 4:2, 2015 (link) at 12, accessed 28 December 2017.
For such a dual system see Dyson & Hodgson, Digital Cash (n. ???) at 25 – 28.
The Digital Dollar Project (n ???) at 10.
Ibid. at 18.
Ibid. at 17.
See in general «Metadata: a hackerʹs best friend» (25 July 2017), online:
https://blog.sweepatic.com/metadata‐hackers‐best‐friend/
Samid (n.) at 25.
Even as this risk exists, albeit to a less extent, in relation to cryptocurrencies. See e.g.
«Once hailed as unhackable, blockchains are now getting hacked» (February 19, 2919),
online:
https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/02/19/239592/once‐hailed‐as‐
unhackable‐blockchains‐are‐now‐getting‐hacked/
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5.3 rCBDC‐proposals
5.3.1 Forerunners
A few specific central bank cryptocurrency schemes have been floating.482 In the US,
proposals have been made for Fedcoin, being a central bank‐issued centrally created
cryptocurrency, to be available to the public at large. 483 Digital coins are to be
centrally issued on a blockchain‐style decentralised ledger, but nevertheless with the
central bank being in full control of quantity, timing and fixed value in
denominations of the national fiat currency unit of account. Effectively, transactions
will be validated by an independent notary nominated by the central bank. A similar
proposal was made in the UK for RSCoin.484
Another proposal is for a NationCoin, being a Regulated and Sovereign Backed
Cryptocurrency (RSBC). The scheme envisages cryptocoins, which as in Bitcoin, will
be created by and transacted over a blockchain. Upon their creation, cryptocoins will
be stored, and released to the public by a Digital Asset Reserve, as RSBC, at the fixed
value of the national unit of account. Transactions are to be verified by ‘miners’ who
will be paid freshly minted cryptocoins.485
For its part, The Digital Dollar Project Whitepaper speaks of a «new transactional
infrastructure such as distributed ledger technology»,486 but does not elaborate.
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483

484
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See: Morten Bech and Rodney Garratt, «Central bank cryptocurrencies» (2017) BIS
Quarterly Review (link), at 55, accessed 12 March 2018. See also: Katrik Hegadekatti,
«Towards Regional Monetary Unions through Blockchain Networks» (2017) MPRA
paper No 82838 (link), accessed 12 March 2018; and Heike Mai, «Why would we use
crypto euros? Central bank‐issued digital cash – a user perspective» (2018) EU Monitor
Global financial markets (link), accessed 12 March 2018.
See e.g. Wendy McElroy, «Fedcoin: The U.S. Will Issue E‐Currency That You Will Use»,
Bitcoin.com, 12 January 2005 (link), accessed 28 December 2017.
See George Danezis and Sarah Meiklejohn, Centrally Banked Cryptocurrencies (London:
University College London, 2015), online: https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/502.pdf , accessed
28 December 2017. In part this article is too technical to the uninitiated in computer
science and related subjects (including myself). «RSCoin is the core of a system of
scalable and auditable transactions, not a full product» which thus could be used as a
basis for either a retail or wholesale product. Email message to the author from George
Danezis dated 4 December 2017.
Kartik Hegadekatti and Yatish S G, Generation, Security and Distribution of NationCoins by
a Sovereign Authority, 7 January 2017 (link), accessed 28 December 2017.
N. ??? at 11.
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5.3.2 Libra
Proponents of cryptocurrencies are attracted by the amenability of a rCBDC
regulated by blockchain to an algorithmic monetary policy. 487 A prominent
cryptocurrency rCBDC project is that of the most recent version of Libra, under
which a single‐currency stablecoin is backed by a reserve consisting of cash or cash
equivalent in the given currency and in the full amount of the issue.488 To facilitate
agreement among all validator nodes on the ledger transactions, the Libra
Blockchain adopted the Libra Byzantine Fault Tolerance (LibraBFT) consensus
protocol:
«The main guarantee provided in this approach is resilience against to
Byzantine failures – preventing individual faults from contaminating the
entire system. LibraBFT is designed to mask any deviation from correct
behavior in a third of the participants. These cover anything from a benign bit
flipping in a nodeʹs storage to fully compromising a server by stealing its
secret keys»489
Thus, even if up to one third of the network validated nodes are compromised or fail,
BFT consensus is designed to function correctly. This class of consensus protocols
enable high transactions throughput, low latency and a more energy‐efficient
approach to consensus than ‘proof of work’ used in some other blockchains. For its
part, the Libra Association pledges it will perform due diligence on prospective
validators.
Previous blockchain projects view the blockchain as a collection of blocks of
transactions. Conversely, the Libra Blockchain will be a single data structure that
records the history of transactions. At the same time, in order to securely store
transactions, data on the Libra Blockchain will be protection free by Merkle trees, a
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See e.g. Note «Digital Delegation Doctrine: Central Bank Digital Currencies and the
Future of the Separation of Powers» 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 874‐910 (2019).
For details see Libra White Paper v2.0, April 2020, online: https://libra.org/en‐US/white‐
paper/, on which the discussion below relies.
The LibraBFT Team, State Machine Replication in the Libra Blockchain (modified to
incorporate updates to the Libra payment system as found in the White Paper v2.0, ibid.)
at 2. https://developers.libra.org/docs/state‐machine‐replication‐paper.
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data structure used by other blockchains that enables the detection of any changes to
existing data.490
In the Libra payment process, transactions will be signed cryptographically so that
even if all validators are compromised, no falsified transactions from addresses with
secure signature keys can be accepted as committed.
5.3.3 WingCash
There are also a few specific proposals for non‐cryptographic rCBDC. One is
WingCash. The United States Federal Reserve established in 2015 a 331‐member
Faster Payments Task Force to support a broader effort to improve the speed, safety
and efficiency of payments. 491 On March 29, 2016 McKinsey & Company was
selected to support Faster Payments Task Force efforts to assess faster payments
solution proposals from various providers across the United States payments
industry.492 Among the 17 faster payments solutions, WingCash came tied in the first
place.493 Its proposal is described as:
«A software platform that would be owned and operated by the Federal
Reserve and the Governing Organization.494 The Federal Reserve would issue
digital currency (digital Fed notes) and is tied to the Internet domain
(Fednotes.com).»
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492
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494

For ‘Merkle tree’ being a transaction data linked together with hash references in a
turned upside down tree‐like fashion see e.g. Daniel Drescher, Blockchain Basics
(Frankfurt am Main: 2017, Apress) at 77‐78.
«Strategies for Improving U.S. Payment System» (26 January 2015) Federal Reserve
System, online: https://fedpaymentsimprovement.org/wp‐content/uploads/strategies‐
improving‐us‐payment‐system.pdf , accessed 28 December 2017.
«Federal Reserve engages in effort to access faster payments solutions» (29 March 2016)
Federal
Reserve,
online:
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20160329a.html , accessed 28
December 2017.
See «The U.S. Path to Faster Payments FINAL REPORT PART TWO: A CALL FOR
ACTION»
(July
2017)
Faster
Payments
Task
Force
at
13, online:
https://fasterpaymentstaskforce.org/wp‐content/uploads/faster‐payments‐task‐force‐
final‐report‐part‐two.pdf , accessed 28 December 2017.
Defined in the Glossary as «The executive officers, board of directors and board of
advisors responsible for governing the Raster Payments Network [‐ FPN]».
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This faster payment solution proposal «seek[s] to make it possible for any entity to
transfer value electronically using methods that seek to preserve and to emulate
physical currency.» Accordingly, its Faster Payments Network (FPN) will allow
«persons and businesses to hold and transfer digital Fed notes for payment, with the
direction of payment flow from the Payer directly to the Payee.» Thus,495
«(…) the FPN specifies a single Internet domain (…) where the Federal
Reserve publishes digital bills and coins (Fed notes). Each Fed note is a
unique web page with an immutably assigned URL that includes both a
currency code (e.g., USD) and a unique identifier similar to a serial number
(…). Combined these components form a unique immutable address for each
Fed note (…).»
The Fed notes would constitute ‘legal tender’ so as to be the equivalent of US
physical currency. «[E]ach Fed note is assigned a single, permanent, monetary unit
of value» as well as «a field that stores the URL of the issuer (…) and a field that
stores the URL of the current holder (…).» Each Fed note would be
cryptographically ‘signed’ by the ‘Fed’ using ‘asymmetric (public key) cryptography’
(PKC), with the Fed also acting as the Certificate Authority (CA). Fed notes are to be
transferred by means of an exchange of cryptographically ‘signed’ messages from
the payer to the Fed, (with a copy to the payee) followed by a message from the Fed
to the payee. With the completion of each payment, the FPN updates the
‘possession’ of attribute of the Fed note from the payer to the payee. In the process,
the Fed thus acts not only as the issuer but also as a controller of the Internet domain
associated with each Fed note and custodian of the transfer record.
The WingCash proposed solution envisages the use by the Fed of the WingCash
platform. It is a platform that allows a safe and secure transfer of value among
individuals and businesses. The Network has two distinct parts: one allowing
Treasury to design and issue digital Fed notes. The second is to be operated by the
Fed (either directly or through a Governing Organization), and consist of a global
directory service distributing the digital notes and records their transfer. Initial
distribution is to be made by the Fed to banks which will make the digital notes
available for withdrawals to their customers. Both successful competition and
interoperability with existing networks such as ACH and cards is anticipated.

495

WingCash (Proposer), Faster Payments QIAT (21 February 2017) at 11 and 14, online:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_CNPQWTRQwuZWhqbDUzNVJsNGc/view
,
accessed 28 December 2017. B. Geva, co‐author of this research paper, contributed to the
legal analysis.
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5.3.4 BitMint
BitMint money, developed by BitMint, was identified as «the only candidate
qualifying as a universal digital representation of worldwide currencies.» 496 Its
digital currency, unlike all known cryptocurrencies, does not rely on algorithms that
could be cracked by quantum computers. BitMint looked into a different strategy to
build the digital currency. They chose quantum‐grade randomness as the basis for
future currencies. Each coin has a unique identity; however, the identity of the bits
does not determine the value of the coin. The value of the coin is determined by
payload string. The identity string and the payload string are based on pure
randomness and are fused together, inseparably. A coin trader can extract a
substring, containing an identity string and payload string, and pass it to another, as
payment.
Users get a coin to their device like a text message. They can then split the coin to
make payment for any sum up of the sum of the coin. Payment is carried out by
directly transmitting the bits that comprise the coin split to the payeeʹs device under
any communication method without real time intervention of any remote server.
Thereby, BitMint facilitates continuous payment simultaneously made in real time
during the purchase – as for example a buyer fills in his or her car tank in a gas
station.
Having a unique identity, a coin can be made tethered money, so that it is possible to
tie to it terms of use, expiration date, intended purpose, time of payment or
designated redeemer. 497 As well, the BitMint digital money framework enables
uninterrupted payment online and offline, not dependent on network availability,
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Helmut Scherzer, «Chapter 36: On the Quest to the Ultimate Digital Money» in
Linnhoff‐Popien, Claudia, Ralf Schneider, and Michael Zaddach. Digital Marketplaces
Unleashed. (Springer: 2018) at 36.6. See also this quote in Helmut Scherzer, Senior
Principal Technology Manager for Giesecke & Devrient at the Chip‐to‐Cloud Security
Forum, held September 25‐17, 2013, Nice, French Riviera. It is online at slide no. 16 in
http://pennwell.sds06.websds.net/2015/amsterdam/slideshows/T1S7O3‐slides.pdf
,
accessed 28 December 2017.
Gideon Samid, Tethered Money: Managing Digital Currency Transactions (London:
Academic Press Elsevier, 2015) at 108. See also at 50 where the author discusses
tethering as a means to protect the holder of BitMint coins in case the digital device on
which they are held is stolen. We should however oserve that whether this will protect
the dispossessed owner from a bona fide purchaser for value is a question of law.
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that fits centralised or decentralised regimen, and peer‐to‐peer payments – all of
which makes it fit to become legal tender.
BitMint is centrally minted. Its rCBDC solution is a digital‐fiat currency claim‐check
to a defined quantity of a specific commodity, including a fiat currency.498 It can be
issued either directly by a central bank499 or by a private issuer such as a commercial
bank,500 ideally holding 100% reserve.
BitMint digital currency may be operated either as a unified global digital money
platform or decentrally, in a system in which each central bank operates its own
CBDC mint. Central banks can, however, choose any distribution and/or
authentication channel, whether of BitMintʹs delegated authentication solution or
delegated to ‘designated dealers’, such as commercial banks, delegated Mints and/or
distributed ledgers network (e.g., blockchain, Ethereum). When authenticating on a
distributed ledger, only the identity of the coin is exposed; no need to expose the
value, like when authenticating cryptocurrencies. When several central banks of
various countries launch their own respective rCBDC, or if one large country will
authorise several local Mints, there will be full interoperability through BitMintʹs
InterMint.501
BitMintʹs technology enables controlled privacy, from full anonymity to be fully
traceable and anything in between, in compliance with regulatory requirements in
each jurisdiction. The coin itself can carry its chain of custody (optional) that can be
bypassed only by court order. 502 Each coin is equipped with smart contracts
capabilities. Through its quantum randomness generation process and distribution
management model and technical architecture, BitMint retains the basic
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For detailed information on BitMint see e.g.: http://www.bitmint.com/, accessed 12
March 2017; http://finder.startupnationcentral.org/company_page/bitmint/, accessed 12
March
2017,
and
sites
and
videos
accessible
through
it;
and
https://medium.com/@bitmintnews , accessed 12 March 2017, and associated articles.
For details, see Gideon Samid, «Bitcoin.BitMint: Reconciling Bitcoin with Central Banks»,
BitMint, LLC, online: https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/244.pdf , accessed 28 December 2017.
DigFin, Banking & Payments: Q‐Pay could mark the next sea change in finance Bank of
Shanghai is testing BitMintʹs Q‐Pay, a.k.a. «pay like cash», which looks like a preamble
to
a
new
paradigm
of
digital
money,
January
8,
2019,
online:
https://www.digfingroup.com/bitmint‐q‐pay/ accessed 08 May 2020.
David Lee Kuo Chuen, editor, «Handbook of Digital Currency«, 2015, Elsevier
Academic Press, chapter 20.
See e.g. «BitMint: Non‐Speculative Digital Currency (The Future of Money)» (August 07,
2014) online : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f5UfpW1kS4Y.
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characteristics of having quantum security, resisting counterfeiting and discouraging
money laundering. This eliminates or at least substantially reduces the possibility of
misuse or participating in illegal acts, while protecting individualsʹ privacy rights.
BitMint is inoculated against quantum attack, because it is vaccinated with quantum
randomness, as the critical ingredient for construction of a comprehensive financial
platform. That platform is designed to move and store money fast, efficiently,
conveniently and securely. Not being a cryptocurrency, BitMint is not underlined by
complex cryptographic algorithms that may crash against quantum computers.
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6 Architecture and issuance models
6.1 Introduction
The ensuing discussion puts forward a few generic rCBDC architectural designs. To
make the discussion relevant to the ESCB, we tailor the analysis to fit the legal
framework for the issuance of euro e‐banknotes.
To begin with, under Article 128(1) TFEU, either the ECB or the NCBs under the
ECBʹs authority, but no one else, may issue e‐banknotes circulating within the Union
as legal tender. Anyone else, including a commercial bank, may issue only non‐legal
tender e‐banknotes, and only as authorised by the ECB. We read the power to issue
banknotes under Article 128(1) TFEU to include the power to redeem them. As well,
while the TFEU does not address the point, for an e‐banknotes system to operate, as
in the case of written banknotes, there must be a mechanism for the distribution of
the e‐banknotes to the public. Finally, and this is by definition also not addressed by
Article 128(1) TFEU, unlike written banknotes that pass from hand to hand by
delivery, an e‐banknote system requires a mechanism of transfer or payment. We
take this mechanism to operate online real‐time. The powers to distribute and run a
transfer system may be seen as incidental to the issuance power or part of the basic
task to «promote the smooth operation of payment systems» under Article 127(2)
TFEU as further implemented by Article 22 of the Statute 503 stating that:
«The ECB and [NCB]s may provide facilities, and the ECB may make
regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems
within the Union and with other countries.»
rCBDC models are often divided into direct, indirect and hybrid. Under this
classification, in the direct model, the central bank issues the currency and runs its
transfer system. Under the indirect model the central bank issues the currency to
intermediaries which issue to the public their own currency, fully backed by the
central bank issued currency. Those intermediaries also run the inter‐customer
transfer system. Finally, in a hybrid system, the central bank issues its currency
directly to the public, and yet the transfer system is run by intermediaries.504
While we avoid purely hypothetical options, we do not adopt this classification,
together with its terminology, as in our view, it is not adequately fine‐tuned to take

503
504

c/r.
These classifications are similar but not identical to Auer/Böhme (2020) pp. 88‐93.

Page 117

Architecture and issuance models

into account all reasonable scenarios. Particularly, this classification does not
address the distribution of the banknotes to the public as well the option of
commercial banks acting on behalf of the central bank. In pointing out our options,
we nevertheless suppose that, other than the ECB and NCBs, the only other
legitimate player in its own right in each scenario is a commercial bank. This
assumption may also be supported by reading a ‘banknote’ in Article 128(1) TFEU to
mean a note issued by a bank and no one else. We take ‘bank’ to cover a licensed
deposit‐taking commercial bank, which under EU law is a ‘credit institution’,505 but
argue that the term could include every regulated entity carrying out a substantial
aspect of the ‘banking business’. For sure, each of the three players (the ECB, the
NCBs and a commercial banks) may outsource functions and yet remain legally
bound by the acts or omissions of their third‐party contractor. While we do not
divide functions between the ECB and the NCBs, we note that the authorisation
power is exclusively in the ECBʹs hands. We assume that overall the ESCB operates
in concert so that there is no competition either among NCBs or between any NCB
and the ECB. At the same time, the greater is the role for commercial banks, the
more space becomes available for autonomy and hence competition as well as
innovation, albeit at the cost of a greater need for interoperability. For simplicity
sake, we also assume that under each option, redemption is exactly the reverse
operation of issuance. Finally, under all options, other than the backed one,
discussed below in Subsection 6.2.5, the legal issuer is a central bank, whether the
ECB or the NCBs, so that the e‐banknote has legal tender status.
At the same time, we reject outright an option under which non‐legal tender ‘digital
coins’ not characterised as an e‐banknote will be issued by the ECB (or the NCBs) as
a claim to a ‘legal tender’ paper banknote. We question the power to issue such
digital coins as well as whether they will not be e‐banknotes in any event. As well,
from the banknote history we can learn that a promise to pay legal tender by a
financial institution, and certainly by a central bank, is likely to be treated as ‘money’
and then become, at least used as, ‘legal tender’. We do not see any good reason to
take this roundabout route.
The following options are thus available:

505

Under Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and
investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 [2013] OJ L176/1:
«credit institution means an undertaking the business of which is to take deposits or
other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account».

Page 118

Architecture and issuance models

6.2 Issuance (and redemption) options
Under the first three scenarios outlined here, a member of the public holding an e‐
banknote has a direct claim against the central bank, which depending on the
scheme, is either the ECB or an NCB.
6.2.1 Full direct option
Both the distribution and transfer system are run by the ECB or the NCBs.
In this scenario, the central bank (either the ECB or the NCBs) will deal directly with
e‐banknote holders. Holders will purchase e‐banknotes directly from the central
bank typically paying out of bank accounts or, in theory, in tangible banknotes. A
comprehensive network linking all e‐banknote holders throughout the Union will be
run by the ESCB. To clarify, as any of the other systems set out below, this option
will not require the opening or use of accounts in a central bank by members of the
public.
6.2.2 Limited direct option
Distribution is run by commercial banks, while the transfer system is operated by the ECB or
the NCBs.
As far as distribution is concerned, this scenario mimics the current system for
tangible banknotes. Commercial banks will buy e‐banknotes from a central bank
(either the ECB or the NCBs), paying out of their reserve accounts. Commercial bank
customers will purchase e‐banknotes (issued by a central bank) from their own
commercial banks and will typically pay by having their respective accounts with
their commercial bank debited. As in Subsection 6.2.1, a holder of an e‐banknote will
have a direct relationship with the issuing central bank. Moreover, as in Subsection
6.2.1, a comprehensive network linking all e‐banknote holders throughout the Union
will be run by the ESCB.
6.2.3 Indirect option
Both the distribution and transfer system are operated by commercial banks.
This option replicates the scenario discussed above in Subsection 6.2.2 other than
that the inter‐customer transfer system is also run by commercial banks (and not the
ESCB). Otherwise, as in Subsection 6.2.2, commercial banks will buy e‐banknotes
from a central bank (either the ECB or the NCBs), paying out of their reserve
accounts. Commercial bank customers will purchase e‐banknotes (issued by a
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central bank) from their own commercial banks and will typically pay by having
their respective accounts with their commercial bank debited. As in Subsection 6.2.1,
the holder of an e‐banknote will have a direct relationship with the issuing central
bank.
6.2.4 Hybrid option
Both the distribution and transfer system are operated by commercial banks.
Also in this scenario, a member of the public who holds an e‐banknote has a direct
claim against the central bank (whether the ECB or an NCB). This scenario differs
from the option addressed in Subsection 6.2.3 in facilitating the issuance of e‐
banknotes by one or more commercial banks on behalf of the central bank. The task
delegated to a commercial bank is purely ministerial and does not involve policy
choices. Rather, the issuing commercial bank will act strictly as instructed by the
delegating central bank.
Unlike in the scenario set out above in Subsection 6.2.3, commercial banks issue the
e‐banknotes as agents for a central bank (either the ECB or an NCB). Upon the
issuance of an e‐banknote on which the central bank (and not the commercial bank)
is liable directly to the holder, the reserve account of the (‘issuing’) commercial bank
at its NCB is debited.
6.2.5 (Likely) Backed option
Both the distribution and transfer system are operated by commercial banks.
In theory, Article 128(1) TFEU allows for the ECB to authorise commercial banks to
issue non‐legal tender e‐banknotes without fastening any condition as to the
availability of a full reserve of CeBM. 506 Nevertheless, in the broad context of a
rCBDC, we shall limit our discussion to the option under which one or more
commercial banks are authorised to issue e‐banknotes only against a full central
bank money reserve. In this scenario, a holder of an e‐banknote will not have a direct
claim against either the ECB or an NCB. At the same time, as long as the system runs
properly, the holder will have the security of full backing by either the ECB or an
NCB as if the e‐banknote was issued by the latter. While an e‐banknote issued by a
commercial bank is not legal tender, it is redeemed (i.e., payable) in legal tender,

506

See on the option to grant access to reserve accounts to this end, thus creating a
synthetic CBDC Kiff et al (2020) p. 25 and Box 1 on p. 27.
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namely banknotes (whether in paper or electronic format) issued by a central bank
(whether the ECB or an NCB).

In this scenario, authorised commercial banks issue e‐banknotes in their own names
so that each will have under each e‐banknote a direct relationship with the
respective holder. The latter will not be in privity with a central bank (whether the
ECB or an NCB). Under Article 128(1) TFEU, such e‐banknotes do not have legal
tender status. However, if the e‐banknotes are fully backed by CeBM, the chance is
that they will circulate as monetary objects in discharge of payment obligations.
What is thus envisaged is not a system of the private issuance of fiduciary digital
currencies. 507 Hence, issues identified in the old system under which written
banknotes were issued by commercial banks – as a form of CoBM 508 – are not
anticipated to arise. Rather, under this scenario, the system will mimic the issuance
of written banknotes in the UK by a few designated banks in Scotland and Northern
Ireland.509 Such banknotes are not accorded legal tender status but are accepted in
payment as a matter of practice.510 By law, these banknotes are required to be fully
backed by earmarked sterling obligations of the Bank of England.511 Similarly, in the
scenario envisaged under this option, commercial banks in the Union may be
authorised to issue e‐banknotes, fully backed by CeBM.
6.3 Final observations:
1. In all scenarios, a central bank, whether the ECB or an NCB, will keep its
position as a facilitator or catalyst as well as an overseer (or even regulator) of
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With regard to which we recognise the need for government intervention as in Ben Fung,
Scott Hendry and Warren E. Webber, Swedish Riksbank Notes and Enskilda Bank Notes:
Lessons for Digital Currencies, Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper 2018‐27.
The experience with the old system is discussed by Ben Fung, Scott Hendry, Warren E.
Weber, Canadian Bank Notes and Dominion Notes: Lessons for Digital Currencies, Bank of
Canada: Staff Working Paper 2017‐5 (link).
See Banking Act Part 6, particularly s. 213, 2009 c. 1. For HM Treasury Consultation
Document, Banknote issue arrangements in Scotland and Northern Ireland, July 2005 (link),
accessed 1 June 2018.
See e.g. Briefing Note 122/08, The Status of Scottish and Northern Irish Banknotes (Research
and Library Service Northern Ireland Assembly, 24 July 2008) available online:
<http://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/io/research/2008/12208.pdf> accessed 1 June 2018
Scottish and Northern Ireland Banknote Regulations 2009, SI 2009/3056 issued by the
Treasury under ss, 215‐220 of the 2009 Banking Act.
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the check‐claim e‐banknote system.512 Only in the scenarios set out above in
Subsections 6.2.1 and 6.3.2, being involved to one degree or another in
distribution and transfer, it will also be an operator or direct provider.
2. Operationally, the scenarios set out above in Subsections 6.2.4 and 6.2.5 may
be the same. In each case, a commercial bank earmarks funds from its reserve
account with its NCB against which it issues the e‐banknotes. However, as
explained, in each such scenario, the legal implications of the ECB/NCBʹs
liability and legal tender status are quite different.
3. While in the scenarios discussed above in Subsections 6.2.4 and 6.2.5
commercial banks’ funds in their reserve account are earmarked, in scenarios
addressed above in Subsections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3, a commercial bank uses such
funds to pay its NCB for the e‐banknotes to be purchased by it. The difference
appears to be that in the scenarios dealt with in Subsections 6.2.4 and 6.2.5,
funds are debited from the reserve account only upon the redemption of each
e‐banknote, while in scenarios discussed in Subsections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3, funds
are debited to the commercial bank’s reserve account as soon as the e‐
banknotes are purchased by it.
4. Commercial banks’ reserve funds at the respective NCB are not involved in
the scenario addressed above in Subsection 6.2.1. In that scenario, a holder
‘purchases’ the e‐banknote directly from the issuing ECB/NCB.

512

For these central bank functions in the payment system see in general: Ben Fung, Miguel
Molico and Gerald Stuber, Electronic Money and Payments: Recent Developments and Issue,
Bank of Canada Discussion Paper/ 2014‐2 at 19.
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7 Conclusion
7.1 Summary
Part 2 sets the stage by showing that several reasons, but above all the overall
accelerating decline in the demand for cash, will likely induce central banks to issue
a digital equivalent of cash in the near future. With regard to the admissible forms of
such equivalent, we address the question of whether a digital coin can be a
‘banknote’ from a broad perspective covering history, statutory interpretation and
general principles of law. Being a negotiable instrument, the banknote historically
emerged as an unconditional promise in writing signed by a banker, engaging to
pay on demand a sum certain in money to the bearer. It is transferrable by delivery
free from claims and defences. For its part, an electronic or digital coin is a distinct
entity consisting of data in the form of a unique string of bits expressing a specified
number of units of value. Digital coins are transferrable by control and like physical
coins and banknotes, they are not paid out of bank accounts. A ‘cryptocurrency’
denotes a digital coin in which encryption techniques are used to regulate the
generation of units of currency and verify the execution of payment transactions on
a decentralised network. Conversely, bit‐minted money is not hinged on a
mathematical riddle that even as it cannot be solved at present, may be solved in the
future. A digital coin could also be a digital representation of the fiat currency
banknote. We evaluate each format and argue eventually that a digital coin in any
discussed format falls into the definition of a ‘banknote’ and fulfils the functions of a
banknote.
In Part 3 we deploy a goal based perspective. We argue that, first and foremost, the
issuance of banknotes stipulated in Article 128(1) TFEU justifies and requires the
issuance of a digital equivalent of cash. With the marginalisation of physical cash,
the public will ultimately miss out on benefits that public money provides. These
benefits include, amongst others, an issuer that acts in the general interest, an
adequate level of privacy and inclusive access to a credit‐risk free monetary value. In
essence, Article 128(1) TFEU not only provides for a right for the ECB to issue cash,
but is also accompanied by a duty to make use of that right, which cannot be fully
waved or delegated. Accordingly, it must be interpreted in such a way that it also
includes the issuance of a digital functional equivalent of the paper banknote since,
with the dwindling demand for cash, the fulfilment of the ECB’s task to issue a
credit‐risk free public money would otherwise become impossible.
In addition, we highlight that the fulfilment of the basic tasks set out in Article 127(2)
TFEU, in particular the conduct of monetary policy, requires as an essential
precondition the issuance of traditional banknotes or, in case of their (further)
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marginalisation, a digital functional equivalent. Issuance of e‐banknotes may
become necessary, in particular, to prevent or reduce the switch of the public to
funds not denominated in euro. The latter could impair the monetary transmission
mechanism, prompting the ECB to loosen monetary policy control. This effect
cannot be addressed appropriately by regulation alone. We reject, however, any
option, whereby an e‐banknote would be designed to be interest‐bearing and/or
have other variable features in order to be used as an instrument that itself generates
monetary policy impulses.
In Part 4 we explore the ECB’s powers to issue or authorise the issuance of an e‐euro
from a constitutional perspective. A historical, teleological and systematic
interpretation of Article 128(1) TFEU reveals that the ECB possesses the power to
issue an e‐euro to the extent that this e‐euro is designed as a functional equivalent to
cash. The ECB’s powers are exclusive in the sense that they prevail over any
remaining national competences, which are strictly limited to the issuance of
physical coins as subsidiary cash. As an accessory argument, we then explore the
ECB’s powers to issue an e‐euro in case that e‐euro were not to qualify as ‘banknote’
or ‘coin’ according to Article 128 TFEU, but were to represent a different monetary
object. These powers are implied in the ECB’s monetary mandate, as the issuance of
a public money constitutes a precondition of monetary policy. We also address the
issue of when an e‐euro would possess legal tender status and when such status
would be excluded. While it would be preferable for an e‐euro to be legal tender due
to network effects, there are other ways to clarify the legal status of an e‐euro.
Finally, we balance the ECB’s issuance of an e‐banknote against the interests of third
parties in light of their fundamental rights to conduct a business and to privacy.
With respect to the former we find, based on the available evidence in the literature,
that the risk of disintermediation associated with the issuance of an e‐banknote
might to some extent even reduce existing distortions of competition. Moreover,
such risk can be contained by mitigating measures and an adequate design of the e‐
banknote itself. With regard to privacy, we find that e‐banknote needs not be
designed in a completely anonymous way, but that it will suffice to replicate the
status quo of physical banknotes through its technical design. While anonymity
ought to be maintained for transactions below a certain threshold, transactions
above that threshold would be trackable for the benefit of overriding public interests,
including the financial market and tax system integrity.
Elaborating on rCBDC design options in Part 5, we reject an account‐based model
both on policy grounds and as a matter of statutory interpretation. We examine and
assess three token‐based rCBDC systems: Libra, WingCash and BitMint. Finally, we
present possible issuance models in Part 6, each complying with Article 128(1)

Page 124

Conclusion

TFEU. Reflecting various degrees of responsibility‐sharing between the ECB and
NCBs on the one hand and commercial banks on the other, these models address
issuance, distribution, operating a transfer system and redemption of e‐banknotes.
7.2 Recommendations
[to be provided]
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